Appeal No. EAT/0415 & 0416/03/SM

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 15 August 2003

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE ANSELL
MR M CLANCY
MR P A L PARKER CBE

MR A SAHOTA	APPELLANT

WOLVERHAMPTON CITY COUNCIL	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR TOM BROWN
(of Counsel)
Appearing under the
Employment Law Appeal
Advice Scheme	

HIS HONOUR JUDGE ANSELL

1	These two preliminary hearings are listed by leave of Judge Clark in relation to a decision and a refusal to review of an Employment Tribunal sitting in Birmingham, who sat in November 2002 and February of this year and, at the end of the hearing, unanimously decided that the Applicant’s claim for racial discrimination was dismissed on the grounds of jurisdiction and specifically on the grounds that he was 19 days outside the three month period in presenting his complaint.

2	There was a review sought to that decision and brief review decision is contained in a letter of 17 March, the original decision having been promulgated on 26 February refusing leave for review on the grounds that there were no reasonable prospects of success.

3	The Appellant, who is 19 years of age, of Asian ethnic origin, applied for a job as Network Support Officer, having seen it advertised on the Respondent’s website.  He completed an application form which was delivered on the closing date of 16 October 2001.  He was not selected for the short list;  he had effectively been told of that in the first week of November when he was told by e-mail that during that week successful interviewees would be told and he was not so notified.  The full notification came on 16 November and the Tribunal held that, in fact, it was that date that triggered the three month time limit.  On that date he sent back an e-mail as to why he had not been short listed but there was not an immediate response.  On 5 December he sent a request for information under section 65 of the Race Relations Act, that was an e-mail setting out fourteen questions about the candidates experience and a breakdown of employees within the department.  That was eventually replied to 18 December by letter setting out seven numbered paragraphs as to why he had not been short listed for interview together with certain other documents although they did not complete a formal response to the section 65 request.  The Originating Application was sent by fax from the UNISON branch on 6 March 2002.  It was noted in the Tribunal decision that the Appellant’s father is a UNISON representative who has experience in Tribunal matters and has personally made a number of such applications.

4	The Tribunal’s conclusion was that the 3 month period ran from 16 November and he was therefore 19 days out of time and they refused to extend the time limit on the just and equitable basis.  His reason for delay was that he had no certainty about his case because proper response had not been given to the questionnaire.  The Tribunal noted that some information had been given on 18 December.  The other element relied on was his lack of awareness of time limits and the Tribunal pointed, in particular, to the fact that he had the benefit of help from his Father who, as the Tribunal found, had particular experience in this type of case.

5	The Tribunal’s view was that the position was clear as from 16 November, that was the date of the act of discrimination, and it was open to him to pursue an application at any time thereafter, and even after 18 December when he got more information he still had just under two months to complete the form.  Nothing happened between 18 December and 6 March that caused any particular complication as far as Mr Sahota was concerned, and they point out that he must have had grounds for complaint about the situation simply because immediately after 16 November he started asking for information as to why he had not been short listed.

6	The Tribunal’s view was, therefore, that there were no particular circumstances that demanded an extension of the time limits and we can see no grounds to interfere with their discretion which appears to have been exercised with great care.  Further we see no reason to interfere with the refusal of review which, in our view, was inevitable in light of their original decision.  Accordingly, we have refused leave for these matters to proceed to a full hearing.