Appeal No. PA/0637/03/DM

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 19 August 2003

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE McMULLEN QC
(SITTING ALONE)

MR T GRIFFIN	APPELLANT

SWINDON BOROUGH COUNCIL	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

RULE 3(10) APPLICATION – EX PARTE

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR T GRIFFIN
THE APPELLANT
IN PERSON	

JUDGE J McMULLEN QC:

1.	This is an application under Rule 3(10) of the EAT Rules, made by Mr Griffin, the applicant in the proceedings conducted before an Employment Tribunal at Bristol, Chairman, Mr W H Owen, on 12 March 2003.  The Tribunal decided that the applicant would not be granted an adjournment and went on to hear his case of unfair dismissal and then to dismiss it.  A claim for costs made by the Council was deferred to another occasion and I do not know what has become of that.

2.	Against that decision, the applicant appeals.  The basis of his appeal, which is described in terms of a fair hearing and compliance with Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention, can be divided into two.
a.	He did not have a fair hearing
b.	The substance of the decision of the Tribunal about his dismissal was wrong.
A judge read the papers and decided to recommend the Registrar use her power to take no action. She in turn decided that there is no question of law pursuant to section 21 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 arising out of this case.  

3.	The order which Mr Griffin seeks is that the matter be sent back to the Employment Tribunal where he can obtain a hearing on a fair level playing field.  That is not a power I have, the only power is to allow this matter to go forward to a full hearing if I identify a question of law. 

4.	At the hearing before the Tribunal, the applicant asked for a postponement because he wanted to obtain legal advice.  The Tribunal decided that he had had five and a half months in order to obtain advice.  He is an educated man well able to prepare his own statement and had taken no steps whatever, pursuant to directions given in the case, to prepare his statement himself.  He said he was not prepared to go on with the case because his insurer had indicated that it would not represent him at that time but that, if an adjournment were obtained, it would provide the possibility of an interview with a solicitor with a view to representation.  Previous applications made by the applicant for a postponement had been adjourned in February 2003.  

5.	The Tribunal indicated that it would be wrong to postpone the hearing on those grounds.  It was accustomed to dealing with persons acting for themselves and he would be given guidance about what to do.  The applicant was in a perfectly fit state to conduct his own application but he elected to leave.  Thus the Tribunal went on to hear the originating application.

6.	Today, the applicant challenges that decision on the basis, not that he was seeking legal advice, but that he was unable to defend himself since he could not appear at the Tribunal in the presence of his neighbours since the he was under a restraining order having pleaded guilty to the offence of harassment on 20 July 2002 at Swindon Magistrates’ Court. He tells me he was given advice that he could not even attend in their presence.  When he attended on the day, he heard them in another room and felt that he would be in breach of the order.  

7.	I deal with these kind of orders when I sit in Southwark Crown Court, and find it incomprehensible that a person seeking justice before an Employment Tribunal should be advised not to present their case simply because the person, the object of a restraining order, was being called as a witness by the respondent employer. Nevertheless, the Tribunal does not find that as a ground and I can find no trace of that argument being put to the Tribunal.  In my judgment, no legal question arises out of that part of its decision.

8.	I then turn to the second part of the complaint, which is that the Tribunal erred in substance in the decision which it made.  Having considered all the papers it found that the applicant was fairly dismissed.  He had been the subject of warnings given by his employer since he was a Building Control Officer, that he should not harass his neighbours, Doctor and Mrs Harpin.  He was given a warning following a complaint made in 1999 and 2001 and the Council regarded this conduct as affecting his work since he was an officer of the Council and the Council is responsible for issuing noise abatement orders under section 70 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.  That means that the Council was involved in investigating complaints made by neighbours of the applicant’s behaviour.

9.	As the Tribunal put it, following the conviction alone, it would be wholly inappropriate for him to continue to be employed by a local authority for he had, in breach of his previous warning, continued to harass the neighbours and pleaded guilty.

10.	Thus, the Tribunal came to the conclusion, as a matter of substance, the action of the respondent fell within the band of a reasonable employer in these circumstances and had conducted the procedure in accordance with ordinary standards of fairness and its own code.

11.	I am unable to identify any question of law which arises from that part of its decision and so both parts of the attack on the Tribunal’s decision fail.  I will uphold the Registrar’s decision that no further action be taken, dismiss the application and the appeal is dismissed.