Appeal No. UKEAT/0601/06/CEA

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 23 April 2007

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE ELIAS (PRESIDENT)
MR P R A JACQUES CBE
MR M WORTHINGTON

MISS L K INGRAM	APPELLANT 

BRISTOL STREET PARTS	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR JOE SYKES 
(Consultant)
Employment Lawyers
26 Farringdon Street
London
EC4A 4AB	
For the Respondent	MS ANYA PALMER
(of Counsel)
Instructed by:
Messrs Hammonds Solicitors 
Rutland House
148 Edmund Street
Birmingham
B3 2JR	

SUMMARY

Practice and Procedure – 2002 Act and Pre-action Requirements

Unfair Dismissal – Contributory fault

Employee dismissed for gross misconduct.  It was not contended that the dismissal was unfair under general unfair dismissal law, but that it was automatically unfair for failure to comply with the statutory dismissal procedures. The Tribunal held that it was unfair but reduced both the compensatory and basic awards to nil on the grounds that there was 100% contributory fault.  The employee appealed claiming that the Tribunal could not lawfully reduce the compensation in this way.  The employer cross appealed against the finding that there was an automatically unfair dismissal.

The EAT upheld the cross appeal.  The finding on compensation was then strictly irrelevant.  However, the EAT went on to find that the Employment Tribunal had erred in its approach to the calculation of the basic award, but not its approach to the compensatory award. 
In the event, the appeal was dismissed.

  

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE ELIAS (PRESIDENT)

1.	This is an appeal against the decision of the Employment Tribunal sitting in Birmingham in which it found that the employee, Miss Ingram, had been automatically unfairly dismissed because of the failure by the employers to comply with the statutory dismissal procedures, but that there should be a 100% reduction in both the basic and compensatory awards on the grounds that it was just and equitable to make such a deduction because of the extent to which her gross misconduct had contributed to her dismissal.

2.	Two issues arise in the case. Taking them logically, the first is the finding that there had been an automatically unfair dismissal. That is the subject of a cross-appeal by the employers. The second is the employee’s appeal that the Tribunal erred in law in making a 100% reduction in relation to both the basic and the compensatory awards. Strictly, that issue does not arise for consideration if the cross-appeal succeeds, and therefore in our analysis we will deal with that issue first.

The background
3.	The material facts can be set within a relatively small compass. Miss Ingram was employed as an accounts’ clerk by her employers for a period of over seventeen years. The company delivered car parts to various car garages and dealerships. The deliveries were made by van drivers who would collect payment in cash from customers and place the cash, along with an invoice and control sheet, into a bag which would be given to Miss Ingram. This was known as “van cash”. 

4.	On 12 October 2005 Miss Ingram informed management that approximately £900 had gone missing from her drawer. There was an investigatory meeting at which Miss Ingram acknowledged that she had been aware that cash had gone missing over a period of time. It was, therefore, plain to her that there had been a number of thefts. She said that the sums were between £300 and £400 each time and that the first occasion had been in July 2005. Her explanation for not informing the company earlier was that she had attempted to catch the thief and therefore after the first occasion had deliberately left money in her drawer and abandoned her desk on a further two or three occasions in the hope of discovering the culprit. Unfortunately, this further money, placed as a bait, had also gone missing without the thief being caught.

5.	It transpired at the investigation meeting that Miss Ingram had been covering up the fact of the thefts by adopting an improper accountancy practice known as “teeming and lading”.  The details of that do not matter since she accepted that she had adopted that improper practice. The effect of doing so was to conceal thefts from management.

6.	The company concluded that there was evidence of gross misconduct and they handed a letter to the employee on 13 October inviting her to a disciplinary meeting the following day. The material part of the letter is as follows:
“At [that disciplinary meeting] the question of disciplinary action against you, in accordance with the Company’s Disciplinary Procedures, will be considered with regard to:-
1.	That you failed to notify the company on several occasions when monies in your safekeeping had been taken from your desk drawer resulting in further considerable losses.
2.	That you hid those losses by fraudulently offsetting cash and cheques received by you against earlier invoices whose payments in turn were used to pay even earlier invoices – “Teeming and Lading”.
 We consider these actions to be gross misconduct which may lead to your dismissal.”

7.	Miss Ingram attended the meeting on 14 October together with her representative. She was given invoices dating back to July 2005 which the company were alleging demonstrated that the false accounting had gone back at least to that period. She and her representative were invited to go into a separate room to consider those invoices at their leisure. 

8.	Miss Ingram, however, became very upset at this stage and it was agreed that the meeting would be adjourned until Monday, 17 October.

9.	At the hearing on 17 October the company made it plain they were not alleging that Miss Ingram herself was guilty of the thefts. The Tribunal observed that the employer could reasonably have drawn that inference, but the respondents have never made that allegation.

10.	The stance adopted by the employers at that meeting was that Miss Ingram had failed to disclose the fact of the thefts and covered them up by teeming and lading. Moreover, the manager, Mr Westley, one of the company representatives at the disciplinary meeting, produced various additional invoices in which he sought to demonstrate that the false accounting had extended for a period well before July. This was disputed by Miss Ingram. 

11.	Mr Westley however, with what was described by the Tribunal as “an accountant-like desire for precision”, insisted that he wished to pursue this date further.  In order to enable him to do this, the meeting was adjourned and reconvened for 21 October. Further bank cash sheets were produced by the employers at that reconvened meeting which, according to Mr Westley, showed that the teeming and lading had started in November 2004. Miss Ingram continued to deny that. The meeting was adjourned for a short time while the employers considered the position and when it was reconvened, Mr Westley informed Miss Ingram that it was considered that she had been guilty of gross misconduct in respect of the accounting deceit alone and accordingly she was dismissed.

12.	In view of these facts it is hardly surprising that Mr Sykes, who appeared for Miss Ingram below and before us, did not seek to pursue before the Employment Tribunal a general complaint of unfair dismissal. No doubt he recognised that even if there were some failings in the procedures adopted by the employer, the evidence was that the employers would in any event have dismissed even had impeccable procedures been adopted, and that dismissal would have been fair.  So the dismissal would have been fair notwithstanding any procedural errors as a result of the application of s98A(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.   Mr Sykes directed his fire at a narrower target alleging that the statutory disciplinary procedure had been breached by the employer and therefore there was an automatically unfair dismissal under s98A(1) of the 1996 Act. 

Was there an automatic unfair dismissal?
13.	In order to understand the nature of this aspect of the case it is necessary to set out certain relevant statutory provisions. It is common ground that the relevant procedure applicable here was the standard disciplinary procedure, as set out in Part 1 Chapter 1 of Schedule 2 to the Employment Act 2002. Steps 1 and 2 are as follows: 
 “Step 1: 	statement of grounds for action and invitation to meetings
1 -	(1) 	The employer must set out in writing the employee’s alleged conduct or characteristics, or other circumstances, which lead him to contemplate dismissing or taking disciplinary action against the employee.
(2)	The employer must send the statement or a copy of it to the employee and invite the employee to attend a meeting to discuss the matter.
Step 2:	  meeting
2 – (1)	The meeting must take place before action is taken, except in the case where the disciplinary action consists of suspension.
	(2)	The meeting must not take place unless –
(a)	the employer has informed the employee what the basis `	was for including in the statement under paragraph 1(1) the ground or grounds given in it, and
(b)	the employee has had a reasonable opportunity to consider his response to that information.”

Step 3 concerns the right of appeal and we need say no more about that.

14.	Mr Sykes contended that the employers had failed to comply with either Step 1 or Step 2.  The Tribunal had no difficulty in rejecting the contention that no Step 1 letter was sent prior to the disciplinary meeting. They noted that the first effective disciplinary meeting was on 17 October and that there had been a clear statement of the nature of the complaint by the letter given to Miss Ingram on 13 October. It was perfectly plain what conduct of the employee was being relied upon, particularly given the admissions which Miss Ingram had herself made at the investigatory meeting earlier that day.

15.	The Tribunal, however, concluded that there had been a breach of the second stage of the procedure. They summarised their reasoning as follows:
“Step 2(2)(a), referring to the disciplinary meeting, requires that the employer must inform the employee of the basis upon which it is alleging that the employee’s conduct is worthy of disciplinary consideration. Put another way, the tribunal take this to be a requirement, placed upon the employer to give the employee an opportunity to consider the evidence that the respondent is going to rely on in the charges against her, prior to the meeting and with adequate opportunity for her to consider that before she enters into the meeting. (That second point is dealt with by step 2(2)(b)). Our findings of fact above reveal that at each of the three dates of the meeting the claimant was given information either immediately prior to or during the meeting. On each of those occasions the claimant was given wedges of paperwork and on 17 and 21 October invited to comment immediately upon what the respondent said that paperwork revealed.”

16.	The Tribunal observed that strictly no documentary evidence was needed in order to disclose the fact of the theft or indeed, given the admissions, the teeming and lading charge. But once the company had decided to go down the track of establishing the precise date when the accountancy failings began, then they were stuck with the obligation to comply with the procedure, and had failed to do so.

17.	The employers contend that the Tribunal erred in law in reaching this conclusion. Ms Palmer, counsel for the employers, submitted that the basis of the case against Miss Ingram was plain; it was her own acceptance of wrongdoing which was in fact supported by invoices she herself provided as well as by further documents given to her well before the 17 October meeting and which she had ample time to deal with.  She had been adequately informed of the case she had to meet.  Ms Palmer submitted that the fact that additional material was provided both at the meeting on 17 and 21 October did not constitute any failure to comply with Step 2. That might be relevant in determining whether or not the dismissal was unfair within the general meaning of s98(4) but it was not material when determining whether there was an automatically unfair dismissal. This was particularly so given that the later documentation provided to her did not in any event go to the reason for the dismissal itself but rather only to the length of time during which the concealment had been operating.  She referred in this context in particular to two authorities.

18.	In Alexander v Bridgen Enterprises Ltd [2006] IRLR 422 the EAT (Elias P presiding) set out the obligations in Step 1 and Step 2 of this procedure as follows (paras 38-39):
“Taking these considerations into account, in our view, the proper analysis of the employer’s obligation is as follows. At the first step the employer merely has to set out in writing the grounds which lead him to contemplate dismissing the employee, together with an invitation to attend a meeting. At that stage, in our view, the statement need do no more than state the issue in broad terms. We agree with Mr Barnett that at step one the employee simply needs to be told that he is at risk of dismissal and why. In a conduct case, this will be identifying the nature of the misconduct in issue, such as fighting, insubordination or dishonesty. In other cases it may require no more than specifying, for example, that it is lack of capability or redundancy. That is consistent, we think, with the approach which this tribunal has adopted in relation to grievance procedures in the Canary Wharf and other cases. Of course, most employers will say more than this brief statement of grounds, but compliance with the statutory minimum procedure is in our view met by a limited written statement of that nature.

It is at the second step that the employer must inform the employee of the basis for the ground or grounds given in the statement. This information need not be reduced into writing; it can be given orally. The basis for the grounds are simply the matters which have led the employer to contemplate dismissing for the stated ground or grounds. In the classic case of alleged misconduct this will mean putting the case against the employee; the detailed evidence not be provided for compliance with this procedure, but the employee must be given sufficient detail of the cae against him to enable him properly to put his side of the story. The fundamental elements of fairness must be met.”

In essence, the obligation is to provide a basic outline sufficient to enable the employee to understand the fundamental nature of the case and to give a response.

19.	In the later case of YMCA Training v Stewart [2007] IRLR 185 (Underhill J presiding) the EAT noted that it will commonly be the case that the requirements of both Step 1 and Step 2 are addressed in the same letter to the employee. The EAT there followed Alexander in holding that the basis of an allegation (para 11):
 “does not mean all the detailed evidence that may be relied on but rather a sufficiently detailed statement of the case against him to enable him properly to put his side of the story” 

20.	Mr Sykes submits that the decision of the Tribunal was plainly justified.  Miss Ingram was given extensive and complex documentation which she had little or no time to assimilate or in which to respond.  This was not a perverse decision and cannot be overturned on appeal.
  
21.	We accept the argument of Ms Palmer.  In our judgment the Tribunal reached the wrong conclusion not because the decision was a perverse conclusion in the application of the appropriate principles, but because they failed properly to interpret these statutory provisions.   In our view they set the requirement under Step 2 far too high. It was not necessary for the employee to see in advance all the detailed invoices in order to deal with the fundamental complaint against her, namely failing to disclose the fact of the thefts and then concealing them by false accounting,   The Tribunal was wrong to assume that the statutory requirements obliged the employers to provide in advance all the evidence on which they intended to rely. It merely requires sufficient material to enable the employee to put her side of the story.  In our judgment there can be no doubt that this principle was honoured here.

22.	As we have said, whether a failure to give a proper opportunity to deal with those additional  invoices provided at the meetings might render a dismissal unfair under the general unfair dismissal law is not to the point; the statutory procedures provide merely a basic minimum standard. Compliance does not necessarily mean the employer escapes liability for unfair dismissal. It merely precludes a finding of automatic unfair dismissal: see the observations to that effect both in Alexander  (para 35) and YMCA  (para 15).

23.	In this case we are satisfied that the Tribunal did, therefore, adopt the wrong approach in concluding that the failure to provide the invoices in advance of each of the meetings constituted a breach of these basic procedural obligations. Miss Ingram fully understood the nature of the case against her and the basis in general terms on which the employers were contending that she had been committing gross misconduct.  

The calculation of compensation
24.	Strictly, in view of our conclusion on the cross-appeal, there was no unfair dismissal and therefore no compensation was payable.  However, we have heard detailed argument on the point and in the circumstances we will briefly indicate our conclusions.

25.	The Tribunal concluded that the failure to notify the employers that the money had been missing, the bungled attempts to identify the thief which simply led to further thefts, and the deliberate concealing from the respondent of the fact that the thefts had taken place, together constituted the grossest negligence, particularly given that Miss Ingram was the employee charged with the responsibility for the company cash. They observed that “if ever a case merited a contribution of 100%, this is it.”  It is plain that they did not consider that in the circumstances she deserved any compensation. 

26.	 However, Mr Sykes submits that the law prevented the Tribunal from lawfully reaching that conclusion. Neither the basic nor the compensatory awards could properly be reduced by that proportion. Section 31(3) of the Employment Act 2002 expressly requires that any award of compensation should, absent exceptional circumstances, be increased by between 10 and 50%, and it would wholly negate the purpose of that provision to allow a full reduction.  The detailed arguments in relation to each of the basic and compensatory awards are different because of differences in the statutory provisions, and therefore they require separate consideration.  However, there were two arguments advanced which were common to both aspects.  

27.	The first was that Parliament could not have intended that an employee who has been found to have been unfairly dismissed for breach of the very basic standards imposed by the statutory procedures should end with no compensation.  It would make a mockery of the finding of automatically unfair dismissal itself, particularly given that Parliament has provided that compensation should generally be increased because of a failure to comply with these provisions. 

28.	  We reject that argument.  There is no reason in principle why Parliament should not take the view that no compensation at all should be awarded, even where the employer’s procedural failings are significant, if the justice of the case does not merit it. Similarly there is nothing intrinsically objectionable to Parliament stating that in the usual case compensation should be increased for a failure to comply with the statutory procedures but that there may be circumstances where no compensation at all should be awarded.  The intention of Parliament has to be gleaned from the language used in the statute and not from some a priori assertion of what Parliament must be taken to have thought desirable.

29.	Second, it is alleged that the finding of 100% contributory fault was in any event perverse given the procedural defects.  Mr Sykes submitted that there could not be a finding of 100% contribution where the employer was at fault.  We do not accept that.  Whenever there is a finding of unfair dismissal, it must follow that the employer has not acted appropriately.  If Mr Sykes were right, there could never be a finding of 100% contributory fault, yet there is House of Lords authority establishing otherwise: see Devis v Atkins [1997] AC 931.  We accept the submission of Ms Palmer that the authorities establish that the employee’s blameworthy conduct must be considered to determine the extent to which it has caused or contributed to the dismissal, not to the unfairness of the dismissal: see e.g. Gibson v British Transport Docks Board [1982] IRLR 228, paras 28-29.  Mr Sykes referred to certain obiter comments of mine in the case of Kelly-Madden v Manor Surgery [2007] ICR 203; [2006] IRLR 17 at para. 61 which he submits supports the conclusion that where there are significant procedural errors by the employer, a finding of 100% contributory fault is never appropriate.  I was not intending to lay down such a principle; indeed, I was purporting to follow the Gibson case and nothing I said in Kelly-Madden should be treated as inconsistent with it.  Sometimes procedural failings by the employer will be causally relevant to the dismissal itself, and where that is so a finding of 100% contributory fault is unjustified.  But that is not this case.  It is plain beyond doubt that the blameworthy conduct of the employee was the sole factor resulting in this dismissal.  The failing in procedure at best went to the peripheral issue of how long the admitted wrongdoing had taken place.

30.	We now turn to the specific arguments directed to the basic and compensatory awards.  

The basic award
31.	It is necessary to consider the relevant legislation. Section 118(1)(a) provides that an award of compensation for unfair dismissal will include “a basic award (calculated in accordance with ss119-122 and 126)”. Section 119 sets out the method of calculating the basic award and it is common ground that if the usual award were made in this case then it would be 17 weeks, reflecting Miss Ingrams’ 17 years’ employment. Section 120 then provides for certain cases where a minimum basic award must be provided. Section 120(1A) provides in the case of an automatically unfair dismissal contrary to s98A(1) that:
“(c) [if] the amount of the award under section 118(1)(a), before any reduction under section 122(3A) or (4), is less than the amount of four weeks’ pay the employment tribunal shall, subject to subsection (1B), increase the award under section 118(1)(a) to the amount of four weeks’ pay.”   
We consider subsection (1B) below.

32.	Section 122 then provides for certain reductions. Subsection (2) is as follows:
“Where the tribunal considers that any conduct of the complainant before the dismissal (or, where the dismissal was with notice, before the notice was given) was such that it would be just and equitable to reduce or further reduce the amount of the basic award to any extent, the tribunal shall reduce or further reduce that amount accordingly.”

33.	Subsection (3A) and (4), the two provisions specifically identified in s120(1A), concern cases where certain awards or payments have been made to the employee by the employer and they are not material to this case. Ms Palmer submits that it is plain that the reduction for contributory fault under s122(2) applies to the four weeks calculated by reference to s120(1A) so that a further reduction is permitted by virtue of that provision.  She says that it must be implied that this is the case otherwise an employee would be entitled to four weeks pay even where he or she had committed the grossest offence.   The Tribunal appears to have accepted this argument, or something like it, since it said in terms that s120(1A) was expressly subject to any reduction under s122.

34.	We do not accept this submission. The calculation under s120(1A) requires that the ultimate award payable under s118(1)(a) must be increased to four weeks’ pay save to the extent that there may be reduction by reason of ss122(3A) or (4). Had the intention been to provide that a reduction under s122(2) could be also be made after any uplift to four weeks, then in our view that  would have been stated in terms.   This is precisely what Parliament has said with respect to s120(1) which provides for a higher minimum in certain circumstances.  That is subject to any reduction under s122; but the permissible reduction under s120(1A) is more tightly drawn.

35.	As to Ms Palmer’s contention that this could lead to absurd results, that is incorrect.  It does not necessarily follow that the Tribunal would have had to award four weeks’ pay in any event.  It is expressly provided in s120(1B) that:
“An employment tribunal shall not be required by subsection (1A) to increase the amount of an award if it considers that the increase would result in injustice to the employer.”

36.	The Tribunal did not refer to that provision. It appears that it was not drawn to their attention.  We recognise that given the finding of 100% contributory fault, the Tribunal may well have taken the view that some reduction was justified under this provision.  Indeed, Ms Palmer submitted that the position is so clear that we should uphold the conclusion that there should be no basic award whilst correcting the legal basis for that ruling and justifying it under s120(1B).   We would not have been prepared to do that.  In our judgment, it is not inevitably unjust to an employer to make an award for an automatically unfair dismissal of this nature even where there has been 100% contributory fault.  The one provision focuses on justice to the employer; the other on the contributory fault of the employee. Had the point remained alive, we would have been minded to remit the matter back to the Employment Tribunal to consider that question (absent any agreement being reached), but since we have found that there was no unfair dismissal, it is not of course necessary for us to do that.

37.	Accordingly, we do think that the Tribunal erred in its analysis of the basic award. It expressed the view that s120(1A) was subject to any reduction under s122. That is not correct and it led to an unsustainable conclusion.

The compensatory award
38.	The basic principle is that the compensatory award, calculated as indicated by s.118(1)(b), is to compensate the employee for the loss flowing from the dismissal in such amount as is just and equitable: see s123(1). Subsection (6) provides as follows:
“Where the tribunal finds that the dismissal was to any extent caused or contributed to by any action of the complainant, it shall reduce the amount of the compensatory award by such proportion as it considers just and equitable having regard to that finding.”

39.	Section 124 identifies certain limits on the compensatory award, and s124A provides for the order which should be followed where there is an adjustment in compensation pursuant to s. 31(3) of the Employment Act 2002 for failure to comply with the statutory procedures.   The section states that:
“an adjustment shall be made in the amount awarded under section 118(1)(b) and shall be applied immediately before any reduction under section 123(6) or (7).”

40.	As we have said, the amount of the reduction is between 10 and 50% as the Tribunal considers just and equitable. There is, however, an exception under s31(4) of the Act which provides that no uplift should be made if the tribunal considers that there are exceptional circumstances meriting no increase.

41.	The Tribunal concluded that there should be 100% reduction, although it is right to say that they appear to have made that deduction to compensation before applying the increase which s. 31(3) would require.  

42.	Mr Sykes made a number of submissions about the approach of the Tribunal to this issue. First, he submitted that it was always necessary for the Tribunal actually to identify a figure for compensatory loss. That cannot, with respect, be right. It would be a wholly futile exercise where, as here, the Tribunal concludes that a reduction should be 100%. 

43.	Second, Mr Sykes contends that the exception in s31(4) is inconsistent with a 100% reduction.  The premise of the argument appears to be that it provides the only route by which the uplift can be denied to the employee. We see no reason why it should be so construed.  It may be that in some cases there are alternative routes.  In any event, we suspect that s31(4)  may be dealing with a narrower class of case.  Possibly – but we have heard no argument about this – s31(4) would only apply where there are exceptional circumstances explaining why the employer had not complied with the statutory procedure and would not apply where the exceptional circumstance relied upon was the fault of the employee. If that is so then the behaviour of the employee would not be capable of amounting to an exceptional circumstance and s. 31(4) would be irrelevant.

44.	In our judgment the key provision is s124A which deals expressly with adjustments required to be made under the 2002 Act. That section in terms says that the adjustment shall be applied “before any reduction under s123(6)”. In view of that, it is quite unsustainable to argue otherwise. We accept that the tribunal does appear to have made the adjustments in the wrong order.  However, as Miss Palmer points out, in a case such as this where there is a percentage increase (under s31(3) of the 2002 Act) and a percentage reduction (under s123(6) of the 1996 Act), it makes no difference to the outcome in which order they take place.  Mathematically the result is the same either way.  Here the Tribunal first made a 100% contribution to the compensatory award, leaving nothing, and then applied the adjustment which still left nothing on the basis that any percentage increase of nothing is nothing.  Had they approached the matter the right way, they would have calculated the compensatory award, made the adjustment upwards, but then applied the 100% contribution to that figure, again reducing the compensation to nothing.  Mr Sykes maintained that if this were right it would make s124A meaningless, but this is not so since it applies in other circumstances where the order in which the steps are taken will be material.

45.	In short, we are satisfied that the Tribunal reached a permissible and lawful conclusion in determining that there would be no compensatory loss by reason of the 100% contribution. Such a reduction is exceptional but it is plainly permitted as Devis v Atkins makes clear.  We do not accept that this is no longer good law in the context of automatically unfair dismissal, as Mr Sykes suggested.  

Disposal
46.	The cross-appeal succeeds, and therefore the employee is entitled to no compensation. Had the cross-appeal failed, then there would have been an issue as to whether or not any compensation might be due by way of the basic award. That would turn on whether the four weeks’ minimum laid down in s120(1A) should be reduced pursuant to s120(1B) on the grounds that it would be unjust for the employer to pay all or part of that sum. That would have been a matter for remission had the issue remained alive, but for reasons we have given, it is no longer material.