Appeal No. UKEATPA/1600/06/DM
UKEATPA/0096/07/DM
UKEATPA/0388/07/DM
 UKEATPA/0410/07/DM

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
On 24 January, 30 May 2007
                                                              Judgment handed down on 26 June 2007

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE McMULLEN QC
(SITTING ALONE)

MR E A E EDEM	APPELLANT

1) AJILON (UK) LTD	RESPONDENTS
(2) FUTJITSU SERVICES LTD

Appeal No. UKEATPA/0304/07/DM

MR E A E EDEM	APPELLANT

(1) EGG PLC								                   RESPONDENTS
(2) MS J CROFT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	No appearance or representation by or on behalf of the Appellant	
For the Respondents	No appearance or representation by or on behalf of the Respondents	

SUMMARY

Practice and Procedure - Striking-out/dismissal and Case management

Appeals against interim Judgments of Employment Tribunals were dismissed when the Employment Tribunal subsequently struck out the Claimant’s case and the EAT refused to allow an appeal against it.  In a separate appeal, it was an abuse of the process of the EAT to consider an appeal relating to a stay, when the condition relating to the stay had been discharged.

HIS HONOUR JUDGE McMULLEN QC 
1.	This hearing concerns five Notices of Appeal lodged by the Claimant Mr Edem.  The nature of the hearing is to consider matters originally raised at an oral hearing under Rule 3(10) of the EAT Rules and to give directions on the sift and for further conduct of the appeals. 

2.	The case against Egg Plc and Ms J Croft (0304/07) relates to the period first in time when he was employed by Egg.  Nine Employment Tribunal decisions are cited and it is acknowledged that only three of them are in time.  They are in respect of measures taken between 14 July 2005 and 2 August 2006.  I will formally dismiss the Notice of Appeal insofar as it relates to those which are out of time since no application has been made for extension. 

3.	The remaining four Notices of Appeal relate to a claim against Ajilon (UK) Ltd and Fujitsu Services Ltd. and complain about arrangements made by Ajilon to send the Claimant as a security specialist to Fujitsu for three months in September 2005.  Although the vehicle for presenting complaints against Fujitsu and Ajilon are the four Notices of Appeal against them, examination of the contents of those notices shows an appeal from about 34 different steps taken or not taken by Employment Tribunals.  Some may be double counted as they recur but the point is that the Claimant seeks to appeal against a very large number of measures taken, or not taken, by Employment Tribunals in relation to his complaint.  

The Fujitsu and Ajilon case
4.	The Notices of Appeal can be divided as follows
a.	The Claimant’s first Notice of Appeal 1600/06, was subject to an opinion given by Burton J, under Rule 3(7) that it was “hopeless”. Pursuant to Rule 3(8), this became a fresh Notice of Appeal, upon which His Honour Judge Peter Clark formed the opinion that it had no reasonable prospect of success.  I heard argument on this and adjourned it for reasons I give below. 
b.	The second Notice of Appeal dated 17 January 2007 0096/07 came in days before my hearing on 24 January 2007 of the first Notice of Appeal, and I decided to consider the sift of that appeal under Rule 3(7).  
c.	On that date, 17 January 2007, the Employment Tribunal which had given directions the subject of the foregoing appeals met and struck out the Claimant’s claims against Ajilon and Futjitsu. That was a judgment of Miss J Hill, Chairman, sitting alone, registered with reasons on 31 January 2007.  In turn, it attracted the third Notice of Appeal 0388/07.
d.	Thereafter, the Claimant appears to have presented a further claim against Futjitsu and Ajilon. It appears that this may have been presented out of time and this is the subject of consideration by an Employment Tribunal presently but the decision to so consider it attracted the fourth Notice of Appeal 0410/07.  

5.	On 24 January 2007 I indicated to the Claimant that I would take a holistic approach to his cases.  He welcomed it.  This would mean consideration of the first, second, third and, what became the fourth, Notices of Appeal.  My concern was that, if the claim had been struck out, there would be no point in considering the interim appeals unless it could be said that errors had occurred which were replicated in the strike-out judgment.  That approach did not subsequently commend itself to the Claimant for he sought permission directly from the Court of Appeal to appeal against it.  Permission was refused.  A renewed application was made before Rix LJ on 30 March 2007 [2007] EWCA Civ 394.  He refused permission, commending my approach as sensible case management in a complex situation.  Indeed that was accepted by the Claimant before Rix LJ (see paragraph 11 of the judgment).  Rix LJ also directed that the Claimant should recognise that he needs to show an error of law and that he would have a full opportunity to make his case on the merits at the adjourned oral hearing.  The judgment of Rix LJ is essential reading for an understanding of a number of today’s proceedings.

The Egg case
6.	As for the proceedings against Egg Plc and Ms Jo Croft, the background is more sophisticated.  The Claimant made three claims against both Egg Plc his former employer and one of its managers. Case management directions were given at a pre-hearing review of three consolidated claims. Certain parts of the claims relating solely to money owing were struck out variously as misconceived, out of time, having no prospect of success, leaving claims of race and sex discrimination and unfair dismissal to be tried.  The Claimant appealed against that judgment.  The appeal was heard by His Honour Judge Reid QC on 16 January 2006. It was dismissed as misconceived and hopeless, substantially endorsing the opinion given by Elias J when he dealt with the case on the sift, and the ruling by the Chairman below.  Judge Reid obviously had a heavy heart, for he recognised that the Chairman was clearly “trying to marshal what is going to be a very long and acrimonious dispute into as user-friendly form as possible”.  But one ground of appeal was allowed, which was described by Judge Reid as ‘minuscule’ and ‘piffling’, relating to the payment of expenses for the Claimant to attend an interview.   

7.	The Claimant was dissatisfied with Judge Reid’s judgment and applied for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.  This was refused.  He renewed the application before Arden LJ on 31 March 2006.  Judge Reid’s judgment was upheld.  So was the discretion exercised by Elias J at the earlier stage of the appeal.  Arden LJ added that the Claimant was very familiar with the proceedings and that there was no denial of his right to a fair trial by the absence of legal representation, and no interference with his human rights.  

8.	The Claimant was dissatisfied with Arden LJ’s judgment and presented a petition for leave to appeal to the House of Lords.  On 8 June 2006, the House of Lords referred the application for leave to an Appeal Committee.  It noted that an Appeal Committee had waived the requirement for the Claimant to pay a fee.  On 13 March 2007, the Appeal Committee, constituted as Lords Bingham, Rodger and Carswell, refused leave to appeal because “the application is inadmissible:  Practice Direction 1.14(a) and Section 54 of the Access to Justice Act 1999”.  This prevents permission being given to appeal against the refusal of permission, which in this case was by Arden LJ to appeal against the judgment of Judge Reid QC.

9.	During the time that matter was being considered by the House of Lords, the Employment Tribunal at Nottingham had taken no action to list what remained of the Claimant’s case and which required further case management.  Over time, the Claimant became dissatisfied with that, and on 23 February 2007 presented a Notice of Appeal 0304/07.  What he seeks is that the stay imposed by the Nottingham Tribunal should be lifted and that there be a pre-hearing review.

The approach to these proceedings
10.	Half a day was set aside for this hearing.  Notwithstanding that, the Claimant considers that this hearing is “redundant” and he has declined to attend.  I have read all the papers he has sent and I declare that this is a hearing, albeit the Claimant has not attended.  The Claimant’s final word was delivered by email on 25 May 2007 in which he said “I need not and will not attend in-person or be represented because, in my opinion, there are not in fact any such issues involved”.  That is not a helpful way in which to approach the issues in these cases and it demonstrates a failure to carry out the duty of a party under the overriding objective.  I will now give my own view of how these issues should be approached.  

11.	First, I regard these directions and other aspects of the case as entirely appropriate in the light of 
a.	the Claimant’s case to me at the Rule 3 hearing and his initial agreement thereto;
b.	the directions of Rix LJ when he refused the Claimant’s renewed application for permission to appeal against my Orders setting up this hearing; 
c.	the overriding objective to determine all issues expeditiously; and 
d.	the bombardment of the Employment Tribunal at Reading and now the Employment Appeal Tribunal, by the Claimant with constant fax and email.  I have identified 43 separate potential appeals against measures taken or not taken by the Employment Tribunals. Having reviewed the files of the EAT and the findings by the Employment Tribunal, bombardment is the correct description.  One of the Respondents in this case had a firewall system which filtered out the Claimant’s constant email as SPAM.  

12.	Secondly, the Claimant is in person but it is relevant to note, as did Arden LJ, that he is highly experienced in employment litigation and associated administrative processes.  He has petitioned the House of Lords and will now seek to reopen this sequence of litigation against Egg by applying to the Court of Appeal (copies of which he has sent to me) to challenge Arden LJ’s judgment.  He will also apply to the European Court of Human Rights, although he describes this as “an appeal”.  He does not turn up to relevant proceedings including the strike-out at Reading and this EAT hearing.  This is an echo of the seat of his complaint against Fujitsu and Ajilon, where he did not turn up to work, either.  He also operates through a limited company known as Eden Information Systems Ltd and causes it to be cited as Claimant in these proceedings.  No one has yet taken this point but it seems to me relevant to know that a litigant in person is actually the front for a limited company.

13.	Thirdly, I bear in mind that the Claimant’s approach to litigation combines the following.  He generally seeks a reversal of the decision, by review or otherwise.  He always appeals to the level above, that is to the EAT, to the Court of Appeal, to the House of Lords, and now to the European Court of Human Rights.  He seeks to appeal acknowledging that matters are out of time; and to reopen final matters long after they have been determined, see for example his most recent application to the Court of Appeal in the Egg case.  He complains to the Ombudsman about the administration of justice in handling his case by officers of the ET, and of the EAT.  He makes frequent applications under the Freedom of Information Act and the Data Protection Act. He complains about the conduct of the judiciary and thereafter the disposal of such complaints by presiding judicial officers.  

14.	I make clear that I am not concerned, in dealing with this case, about any of the matters except the last.  As to this, I am guided by the judgments of the EAT, Burton J, President, and of the Court of Appeal (both judgments are relevant) in Ansar v Lloyds UKEAT 0152/06, UKEAT0609/05, [2006] EWCA Civ 462   I am aware of three complaints made by the Claimant about my hearing on 24 January 2007, as to which there has been a final determination by Rix LJ in the Court of Appeal, and my subsequent Orders.  Complaints have been handled in accordance with the prescribed procedure by the President of the EAT, who has dismissed them all summarily without reference to me.  Applying the judgments of the Court of Appeal and of the EAT in Ansar, I have no difficulty in dealing with the Claimant’s case and I am not, in any event, asked to recuse myself.

15.	Fourthly, each of the Claimant’s communications is prefaced by a strap line that it is subject to his applications variously to appeal or to apply for relief in respect of any matter to the Registrar, from the Registrar, to the President from the Registrar, and so on.  It must be noted that no such right is granted to any party in the EAT and each application and Notice of Appeal is treated on its merits.  The Claimant is wholly indiscriminate in the authority which he cites in support of each application.  For example, he does not set out why his treatment on 15 accessions (Egg) and 38 occasions (Ajilon) by the four judicial levels has violated Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the European Convention, prohibiting torture, unlawful restraints on his liberty and private life, or the unincorporated Article 13.  He has not indicated why the CPR or procedural rules in the House of Lords affect judgments in the Employment Tribunal or the EAT.  Nevertheless, in the bombardment of the Employment Tribunal and the EAT, these matters are constantly recycled.  

16.	I take the view that it is not my duty to deal with every single one of the 43 measures or failures to take measures identified by the Claimant in the Tribunals below.  Affirmed by the approach of Rix LJ, I will first decide the appeal against the striking out of his claim by the Reading Tribunal on 17 January 2007.  Lest I am wrong about that, and so that the Claimant may preserve his rights under Rule 3, I will deal analytically with the earlier and later matters.
The legal provisions
17.	Section 21 of the Employment Tribunals Act allows an appeal to the EAT against a judgment order decision or any proceedings of an Employment Tribunal.  It is apt to include failures to act.  Unless an error of law is identified, the EAT is deprived of jurisdiction.  The practice in the EAT is for an appeal to be sifted by a judge and if it discloses no reasonable prospect of success or is an abuse of the process of the EAT or is likely to disrupt the proceedings, an opinion is issued under Rule 3(7) of the EAT Rules. The Claimant is offered the opportunity to amend his Notice of Appeal by submitting a fresh one under Rule 3(8) or to apply to a judge under Rule 3(10) where an oral hearing will occur.  

18.	Wide powers are given to an Employment Tribunal, usually acting through a Chairman, to strike out misconceived cases or cases with no reasonable prospect of success.  At the EAT, wide powers of case management are provided by the overriding objective in the EAT Rules and Practice Direction paragraphs 1.4 and 9.1.

The Egg appeals
19.	The substantive issue before the EAT in the Egg Notice of Appeal is whether or not the stay should be lifted.  A stay was imposed on the Claimant’s cases on 14 July 2005 pending appeal to the EAT.  Despite at least eight further applications by the Claimant to the Employment Tribunal, this decision has remained in place.  It has been refreshed by reference to the Claimant’s continued appeals, or, more accurately, applications for permission to appeal, up to and including the House of Lords. Nevertheless, the original decision remains.  It was felt inappropriate for the Employment Tribunal to consider the Claimant’s discrimination and dismissal claims while aspects of his complaint were the subject of treatment, on the Claimant’s application, by respectively the EAT, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.  

20.	The Claimant acknowledges that the nine measures against which he appeals include six which are out of time, and which I have dismissed.  The remaining three appear to be simply a reiteration of the same judgment.  I decided by an Order on 27 March 2007 that these appeals appeared to be academic, once the House of Lords decided on 13 March 2007 that his petition was inadmissible.  For myself, I do not understand why it took so long for this to be decided since by statute the Claimant had no right. But the House of Lords was seised of this matter up to that date.  Thereafter the Claimant exhausted all his domestic remedies.  This is apparent from the fact that he has told the EAT that he is “appealing” to the European Court of Human Rights.  His ability to seek to re-open this matter before the Court of Appeal is the subject of discretion and, it seems to me, does not affect the Employment Tribunal’s judgment that his case should be stayed until exhaustion of his appeals, which has occurred on the dismissal of his petition as inadmissible by the House of Lords on 13 March 2007.  

21.	In any event he is facing in two directions.  By seeking under the CPR to reopen a final decision against his case at the Court of Appeal, I do not know whether he wishes the stay to be lifted or to be restored consistent with his earlier applications.  By directing that there should be a case management discussion (listed for 26 June 2007 but vacated to await this Judgment) the Employment Tribunal in Nottingham has shown that there is no longer a stay. I decided on 27 March 2007, both by letter and by Order, that the Claimant should indicate any live issue which he seeks to pursue, and if not then his case would be struck out in accordance with Rule 26 for failing to comply with EAT orders.  It is open to the EAT to strike out under Rule 26, for failure to comply with EAT directions, an appeal by a Claimant who does not attend at the EAT: see Sedley LJ in Bertolin v Thornbury Estates Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 25.   Permission to appeal against my exercise of rule 26 in that case was not interfered with. This case will therefore be struck-out under Rule 26 for failure to comply with my directions.  The Claimant was given every opportunity to attend but dismissively decided he would not.  He has failed to comply by showing why there is any live issue in relation to his appeal.  I see no reason why I should not carry out that Order and this Notice of Appeal is struck out.

22.	In doing so I have borne in mind my assessment of the strength of this appeal. Although not necessary for my Judgment, I will express my opinion under Rule 3(7).  The Claimant has not responded saying why there is any live issue now. I am advised that the Employment Tribunal has listed a case management discussion of his case on 26 June 2007.  It follows therefore that the Tribunal no longer regards the case as stayed by reason of any pending appeal.  In any event, as a matter of construction, I would hold that the stay ceased to have effect automatically when the prescribed event took place on 13 March 2007.  This application therefore is academic and an abuse of the process.  Further, I consider that the appeal should not be entertained for it is simply an appeal against the repetition in writing of six earlier decisions, which appeals, the Claimant accepts, are out of time. That decision was not to take further steps in his case while there was an appeal on foot before, at his instance, the EAT, the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords.  In essence it is the same decision.  There is no jurisdiction to hear this appeal out of time since the Claimant has withdrawn his appeals against the original decision and there is no merit in any contention that these are essentially new decisions. 

23.	I further hold that there is no reasonable prospect of success in overturning the case management decision of the Employment Tribunal to stay the hearing of his remaining tribunal claims pending appeals to the higher courts.  This is an exercise in discretion and I see no error in principle.  Indeed it was the correct decision.

24.	Further, I would hold under Rule 3 that his simple response to not rely upon the first six measures against which he appealed but simply to rely on the last three does not constitute any reason under Rule 3(7) for the appeal to be continued further.  Given the opinion I expressed on 27 March 2007, he has had an opportunity, effectively under Rule 3(10), at this hearing to put any matter before me which he wished.  I have considered the matters which he has put, none of which contains any merit.  This is indeed an academic appeal wholly without merit. In addition I consider that it would obstruct the disposal of proceedings in the Employment Tribunal for an appeal to be heard by the EAT at this stage.  There is no reason for his money claims, misconceived and correctly held to be struck out by the Employment Tribunal, EAT, Court of Appeal and House of Lords, to hold up the hearing of his other claims. If I had not struck it out under Rule 26, I would have dismissed it under Rule 3(10) on each of the three separate grounds therein.

The Claims against Fujitsu and Ajilon
The first Notice of Appeal 1600/06
25.	I do not consider it necessary for me now to deal with the earlier interim appeals since the claim has been struck out and I see no error in the Employment Tribunal Chairman's judgment for reasons which I give (paras 31-38 below).  There being no live claim and no live appeal there is no jurisdiction to hear an interim appeal.  The appeal is dismissed. But lest I am wrong about that I will give my opinion. It is independent of my decision on the third Notice of Appeal (below).  The first appeal was the subject of an opinion by Burton J that it was ‘hopeless’.  The fresh appeal under the same number 1600/06, met with the same fate before His Honour Judge Peter Clark.  That came before me under Rule 3(10) on 24 January 2007.  In my opinion, this is a case which has no prospect of success and is an abuse of the process of the EAT.  

26.	It emerges out of a case management discussion on 28 July 2006 (‘the Watford order’) where certain claims were dealt with.  It fed into a further case management discussion at Reading (‘the Reading order’).  This was necessary in order to define the issues in this complex case.  Those issues were correctly set out for the orderly management of the case in accordance with the overriding objective.  There is no error of law.  In addition, now that the case has been struck out, as I will in due course show to have been correctly decided, it is an abuse of the process to continue with this matter.  Rix LJ was of the same provisional view, and this case therefore fails all of the tests under Rule 3(7).  No further action will be taken and the Notice of Appeal is effectively dismissed at this adjourned Rule 3(10) hearing of it.

The second Notice of Appeal 0096/07
27.	This is an appeal against a series of interim measures taken by the Employment Tribunal at Reading.  As a matter of analysis, and in order to deal expeditiously with these cases, I hold it to be principally an appeal against the judgment of the Employment Tribunal on 28 November 2006 to hold a pre-hearing review and setting out an agenda for it.  In my judgment, this, and all of the associated measures taken in response to the correspondence with the Tribunal, constitute the vehicle for this appeal.  It has not yet been sifted.  It was my direction expressed at the hearing on 24 January 2007, to consider this matter with him at the adjourned hearing.  He did not turn up. 

28.	As with the first Notice of Appeal, I do not consider it necessary for me now to deal with this second interim appeal since the claim has been correctly struck out, and the (third) Notice of Appeal from it has been determined under Rule3(7) below. There being no live claim and no live appeal there is no jurisdiction to hear an interim appeal. The appeal is dismissed. 

29.	Lest I am wrong I will deal with it in two ways but with the same result, each independent of my decision on the third Notice of Appeal (below). The Claimant was required to produce grounds on which the appeal was made and to indicate any live issue which he wished to pursue in this appeal following my Order and letter of 27 March 2007.  He has failed to do so and failed to attend the hearing.  Bertolin v Thornbury Estates Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 25 applies. I would strike it out under Rule 26. 

30.	Yet further, if I am wrong about both of those decisions, I would form an opinion under Rule 3(7), which is as follows. This case contains no basis for an appeal to the EAT with a reasonable prospect of success.  Standing back from this, all that was being done, in response to the Claimant’s constant electronic bombardment, was to set up a pre-hearing review.  The matters were not set in stone.  This was within the powers of case management of an Employment Tribunal.  It was consistent with the overriding objective.  In addition, Rix LJ considers that the approach of considering these matters holistically in the EAT is sensible. I would hold that since I have formed the opinion that the strike-out of the Claimant’s case by the Employment Tribunal was correct, this interim appeal is an abuse of the process of the EAT.  If the appeal had not been struck out, then, pursuant to Rule 3(7), I would rule that no further action be taken and the appeal effectively be dismissed. The claimant's rights under rules 3(8) and 3(10) therefore do not come into play.

The third Notice of Appeal 0338/07
31.	The appeal in this case is against the judgment to strike out the Claimant’s claims made on 17 January 2007 at a hearing where the Respondents were represented, each by Counsel, and the Claimant failed to attend.  I have power under Bertolin v Thornbury Estates Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 25 to strike this out as he failed to attend the Employment Tribunal and the EAT as well. But in fairness to him, I will instead deal with this on the merits under Rule 3(7), in accordance with the green light given by Rix LJ.   The history of the matter is set out by the Employment Tribunal as follows:-

“4.	In essence the circumstances relating to this claim are that Ajilon arranged for Mr Edem to be interviewed for a security specialist role with Fujitsu at their Reading base.  It was for a three month contract.  Security clearance was required for it.  Two forms were sent to Mr Edem, one of which he completed on the 13th September 2005. In respect of that Fujitsu granted him clearance. He was offered therefore a start date of the 17th October 2005. He failed to attend that day but wrote to Ajilon saying “I trust the contract is in the post as it should be signed by both parties prior to the start date”.
5.	A further start date was offered to the Claimant of the 24th October which he did not attend. On the 7th November 2005 the Claimant filed a complaint with Ajilon saying he had been denied a three month contract with Fujitsu as a consequence of illegal treatment and poor service that he had received by Fujitsu. This appears to be in response to Fujitsu withdrawing the contract and his notification of that by Ajilon.
6.	The Claimant pursued claims of breach of contract against both Respondents, race discrimination and sex discrimination. He claims that the reliance by Fujitsu on the requirement for a security clearance before the start of the engagement is unlawful. There was a reliance on bogus references and a refusal by the Respondents to allow him to start the engagement on lawful, fair and standard terms and conditions. This is the basis of both the race and sex discrimination claims.
7.	In his additional information the Claimant also asserts acts of harassment, aiding and abetting discrimination and unlawful acts after the relationship had concluded. He provided no details of the basis of those claims.”

32.	The Tribunal noted the approach of the Claimant to these proceedings in the following way:
“8.	The history of this litigation has been somewhat difficult given the Claimant’s propensity to send very lengthy e-mails, often several on the same day, dealing with a minutiae of procedural issues but failing to address the factual and legal issues to be considered at any trial relating to his claims. Ultimately, the Second Respondents made application that the Tribunal consider striking out Mr Edem’s claims on the grounds they had no reasonable prospects of success. Around the same time Mr Edem sought an unless Order against both Respondents regarding discovery. On the 17th November the First Respondent also made application that the claims be struck out on the grounds they had no reasonable prospects of success. Both applications from the Respondents contained a request that an Order for costs be made.

33.	The Chairman considered the arguments raised by the Respondents in support of their respective claims to strike out.  In my judgment the Chairman was correct to hold that there was no reasonable prospect of success in either of the claims, for a number of reasons but principally because the Claimant had not been refused work and had been offered work which he had declined to turn up to do.  

34.	The Chairman considered that there was no prospect of success. She then decided separately whether to strike them out and held that she should, for the following reasons, including that there could be no fair trial, for she said this:
“29.	Should the claims therefore be struck out? Before striking out a claim the Tribunal must be aware that to strike out a claim is a draconian action. However, the Tribunal must also consider whether it would be possible to have a fair trial of any issues. The Tribunal has to conclude that is impossible. This is a clear and obvious case where there is no prospect of success; it is equally clear and obvious that no fair trial could ever take place for the following reasons:
(1) Mr Edem writes lengthy and obscure e-mails about issues relating to process but never addresses the issues of the substantive claim.
(II) He bombards both the parties and the Tribunal with those e-mails.  Frequently those e-mails are two, three or four in a day
(Ill) Such behaviour in failing to address the substantive merits of the claim but only address process is very similar to how he responded when offered a job.”

35.	She reached the same conclusion by the entirely separate route of dealing with the unreasonable behaviour of the Claimant.  She said this:
30.	If I were in any doubt, which I am not, that these claims had any prospect of success I would strike out the claims for unreasonable conduct by the Claimant. This Tribunal has not previously encountered a claim where a Claimant has sent so many e-mails such that one of the Respondents computers treated them as SPAM.  In the period 3lst August 2006 to 17th January 2007 the Claimant had sent 56 e-mails to the Tribunal as compared to the Respondents combined 22. Frequently, the emails would come in batches throughout the same day. The Claimant has been warned both by the Chairman Mrs Hill at the Case Management Discussion on the 12th September 2006 and by the Regional Chairman shortly thereafter to desist from sending the e-mails. He has not.  He has failed to address the triable issues. I do not consider he will in the future. It is therefore appropriate to strike out the claims.”

36.	  The Chairman correctly addressed the relevant issues before making the decision to strike out the claim.  She has given full reasons for each strand of her decision and I see no error in them.  Indeed in my judgment it was a correct decision to make.

37.	As to the application by the two Respondents for costs, the Chairman’s judgment was, with respect, entirely within her power.  In the light of the bombardment of the ET and of the conduct by the Claimant including his failure to turn up to defend the strike-out applications, it cannot be said that the Chairman went outside her jurisdiction or exercised her discretion to award costs for a reason which was wrong in principle.  

38.	I would therefore form the opinion under Rule 3(7) that there is no reasonable prospect of success. I also consider that it is an abuse of the process of the EAT for this case to continue. Further, in my opinion continuation of this case will obstruct the proceedings of the EAT.  That abuse and obstruction consists of the constant electronic bombardment, this time of the EAT, by the Claimant, causing a massive deployment by EAT staff in order to attend to his innumerable email.  He has sent over 60, excluding many applications by fax relating to complaints about administration and judiciary.  He was ordered to desist by the Employment Tribunal and he did not.  I now order him to desist.  It is contrary to the overriding objective of the EAT to ensure that justice is done to suffer him constantly to issue peremptory, dismissive, abusive and reiterative email to the EAT.  He takes up precious time and resources in a jurisdiction where there is a long line of parties seeking to have their cases tried and appeals heard quickly. This is a relevant consideration: Andreou v Lord Chancellor’s Department [2002] IRLR 728 at para 46 per Peter Gibson LJ. He will, of course, have an opportunity under Rule 3(8) and Rule 3(10) to consider again his Notice of Appeal.  

The fourth Notice of Appeal 0410/07
39.	This Notice of Appeal was lodged at the EAT on 15 March 2007.  It appears to contest decisions by the Reading Employment Tribunal and the London Central Employment Tribunal on 15 and 16 February 2007 respectively.  These have already been the subject of proceedings and should not be reiterated.  It is an abuse of the process for these matters to be redone.  The sole basis of the remaining grounds of appeal relate to what appeared to be new claims presented by the Claimant against Fujitsu and Ajilon. So far, all the Employment Tribunal has done is to identify that they may be out of time.  In my opinion, under Rule 3(7), it is an abuse of the process of the EAT for any step to be taken on appeal in relation to these matters unless, and until, a finite judgment is given by the Employment Tribunal.  There is no reasonable prospect of success in challenging a decision by an Employment Tribunal that it wishes to hear why a matter is said to be out of time.  In my judgment this appeal should not be taken further.  The Claimant has his rights under Rules 3(8) and 3(10).  

General
40.	I have dealt analytically with the five Notices of Appeal issued by the Claimant, four against Fujitsu and Ajilon, and one against Egg.  With no help from the Claimant, I have identified 43 separate measures or failures, said by the Claimant to have taken place by the respective Tribunals.  It is not consistent with the overriding objective, or with the holistic approach which I have taken, and has been upheld by Rix LJ, for me to descend into each of the 43 separate events.  It is time now to deal robustly with this litigation and to close down as wholly unmeritorious those appeals which I have dealt with above, and those appeals which are subject to his rights under Rule 3(8) and Rule 3(10).  His substantive claims of dismissal and discrimination, and his “piffling” expenses claim, in the Egg case are now live. It is in the interest of all concerned in that case that the Claimant focus on it now. Similarly and for the same reasons I refuse the Claimant’s application already made for a review of my order on 30 May 2007 simply to reserve Judgment. Any typographical slips will be cured in the Order today. Apart from those specific steps required to be taken in accordance with the Practice Direction for the lodging of bundles, skeleton arguments and authorities, no correspondence will be undertaken by the EAT with the Claimant and none with the Employment Tribunals while the EAT is seised of these matters. All correspondence will be sent in hard copy form and case managers will not respond to e-mail.