Appeal No. UKEATPA/1639/07/CEA

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 30 April 2008

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE REID QC
(SITTING ALONE)

MS J SLATER	APPELLANT

PROVIDENT PERSONAL FINANCE LIMITED	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

RULE 3(10) APPLICATION - APPELLANT ONLY

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MS J SLATER
(The Appellant in Person)	

SUMMARY

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Successful Claimant cannot appeal against failure of the Employment Tribunal to make immaterial findings of fact she would have liked or to correct immaterial errors of fact which do not affect the decision.

HIS HONOUR JUDGE REID QC

1.	This is a prospective appeal from a decision of an Employment Tribunal held at Thornaby‑on‑Tees from 17-21 September 2007.  After a day’s deliberation on 8 October, the Decision was promulgated on 21 November 2007.  By its decision, the Tribunal held that the Claimant had been unfairly dismissed.  Her claim under the Sex Discrimination Act was dismissed.  She had withdrawn it.  She says that she was unaware that her solicitors had put that claim in and that was not really what she was on about.  The matter of compensation and the Respondent’s claim for costs in respect of the sex discrimination claim were adjourned.  The compensation remedies hearing is due to be heard, I am told, in August.

2.	This prospective appeal is by the successful Claimant and it relates to her successful claim for unfair dismissal.  The basis of the claim is that the employer is a large company which has, in a large variety of respects, behaved extremely badly and that none of those matters are dealt with by the Employment Tribunal’s judgment.  Her Notice of Appeal appears to seek no substantive relief because she had, after all, succeeded in the claim that the Tribunal had to decide.  She merely seeks to have the judgment of the Employment Tribunal amended in respect of detailed findings of fact, which she says are incorrect.

3.	She has, in fact, identified one material error of fact which can, and will, be corrected under the Slip Rule, Rule 37(1) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure.  The name of the respondent company is misstated in the judgment.  The name should be Provident Personal Credit Limited and not Provident Personal Finance Limited.  The claim form and the response both make it clear which company it is that is involved and I am told by the respective Appellant that she believes there is in fact a separate company with the other name.  That correction can, and will, be made by the Employment Tribunal.

4.	So far as the remainder of the appeal is concerned, it appears to be based on a misapprehension.  An appeal lies against a decision; it does not lie against the reasoning by which the unchallenged conclusion was reached, nor does it rely against specific findings of fact which do not affect the Decision.  It is not the job of the Employment Tribunal to castigate an employer in respect of matters which are unnecessary for its decision on the issue which it has to decide.

5.	When the matter came before HHJ Birtles under Rule 3 of the Rules, the learned judge noted that the Appellant had won her case and the Notice of Appeal disclosed no point of law.  He therefore took the view the appeal should go no further.  Following that decision, she has sought, pursuant to Rule 3(8) and Rule 3(10), to present her arguments at an oral hearing, which she was entitled to do.  What she is seeking to do is to correct what appeared to her to be errors of fact and major omissions of fact in the Employment Tribunal’s judgment.  Those had no bearing on the result.

6.	In those circumstances, I share HHJ Birtles’ view.  The Notice of Appeal discloses no arguable point of law, she is not seeking to attack the Tribunal’s conclusion, and therefore this appeal should go no further.  I will direct there be a transcript of this judgment which should be sent to the Employment Tribunal so that it can correct the error in the name of the Respondent company.