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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Cleeve Link Ltd v Bryla (Unlawful Deduction from Wages : no sub-topic) [2013] UKEAT 0440_12_0810 (8 October 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2013/0440_12_0810.html Cite as: [2013] UKEAT 440_12_810, [2014] ICR 264, [2014] IRLR 86, [2013] UKEAT 0440_12_0810 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE HAND QC
(SITTING ALONE)
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
For the Appellant | MR IAN SCOTT (of Counsel) Instructed by: Charles Russell LLP Compass House Lypiatt Road Cheltenham Gloucestershire GL50 2QJ |
For the Respondent | MS E BRYLA (The Respondent in Person) |
SUMMARY
UNLAWFUL DEDUCTION FROM WAGES
The principles enunciated in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 1979 and re-stated in Lordsvale Finance PLC v Bank of Zambia [1996] QB 752, Alfred McAlpine Capital Projects v Tilebox Ltd [2005] EWHC 281 TCC, [2005] BLR 271 and Murray v Leisureplay PLC [2005] EWCA Civ 963, [2005] IRLR 946 are relevant to the issue of unlawful deductions from wages, because if the sum is a penalty then its deduction cannot be lawful; guidance offered to Employment Tribunals on their application. Here the Employment Judge had struck down a recoupment of expenses provision as a penalty but on the wrong basis. He did not address the position at the time the contract was entered into but at the time of breach. Moreover, he never considered whether there was an extravagant or unconscionable gulf that existed between the maximum amount that could be recovered in a common-law action for damages for breach of contract as opposed to the sum stipulated in the agreement.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE HAND QC
"Before I consider the grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal I should just say this about the Judge's reasoning. With respect to him, I am not sure that the analysis in terms of 'genuine pre-estimate of loss' is correct. That evokes a line of authorities about clauses which purport to liquidate future losses caused by a breach of contract. The £500 stipulated in the present case – as, NB, a maximum not a fixed sum – is to cover expenses incurred during the period of the employment and which will therefore have been incurred at the time that the clause operates."
"If the employee's employment is terminated as a result of the employee's misconduct or at the employee's own request within six months of their date of commencement, the employer reserves the right to recoup these costs in full from the employee. This will normally be by deduction from the employees' [sic] final pay or any other monies due to the employee."
"An employee shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless—
(a) the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or relevant provision of the worker's contract, or
(b) the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction."
"[…] whether the agreement is enforceable and in particular: whether the sums specified as due amounted to a genuine pre-estimate of the loss the respondent would likely suffer if the claimant resigned or was dismissed for misconduct at a point in time which triggered repayment, or whether instead it amounted to an unenforceable penalty clause."
"I find that the figures in the repayment agreement represented a genuine pre-estimate of the cost to the respondent of recruiting the claimant."
"Whilst I entirely am satisfied the various sums set out at page 25 were a genuine pre-estimate of the cost to the respondent of recruiting the claimant, I am not satisfied it follows from that that they were a genuine pre-estimate of loss. If the claimant had resigned the day after her training completed, then the figures would represent the loss to the respondent, since it would have expended these sums and obtain nothing in return. The Claimant did not, however, resign at that point, rather the respondent had the benefit of her service for 3 months before she was dismissed. Furthermore, the agreement provides for repayment in full where an employee has worked for up to 6 months. Only after 6 months does the amount repayable begin to reduce. This arrangement appears to overcompensate the respondent since it does not reflect the benefit of employing a live-in care worker for up to 6 months in the service of its clients. I find that the agreement does not amount to a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is unenforceable as a penalty clause. Accordingly I find the deduction made from the claimant's December pay was unlawful and she is entitled to £781.35 (the sum due for the month to dismissal of £1,203.35, less the payment of £422.50 for untaken holiday which I deal with separately below)."
"The speeches in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd [1915] AC 79 show that whether a provision is to be treated as a penalty is a matter of construction to be resolved by asking whether at the time the contract was entered into the predominant contractual function of the provision was to deter a party from breaking the contract or to compensate the innocent party for breach. That the contractual function is deterrent rather than compensatory can be deduced by comparing the amount that would be payable on breach with the loss that might be sustained if breach occurred. Thus the presumption of penalty arises where "a single lump sum is made payable by way of compensation, on the occurrence of one or more or all of several events, some of which may occasion serious and others but trifling damage ... " which is a citation of the speech of Lord Watson in Lord Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron and Coal Co. Ltd (1886) 11 App Cas 332. 342.."
"It is perfectly true that for upwards of a century the courts have been at pains to define penalties by means of distinguishing them for liquidated damages clauses. The question that has always had to be addressed is therefore whether the alleged penalty clause can pass muster as a genuine pre-estimate of loss. That is because the payment of liquidated damages is the most prevalent purpose for which an additional payment on breach might be required under a contract. However, the jurisdiction in relation to penalty clauses is concerned not primarily with the enforcement of inoffensive liquidated damages clauses but rather with protection against the effect of penalty clauses. There would therefore seem to be no reason in principle why a contractual provision the effect of which was to increase the consideration payable under an executory contract upon the happening of a default should be struck down as a penalty if the increase could in the circumstances be explained as commercially justifiable, provided always that its dominant purpose was not to deter the other party from breach."
"The usual way of expressing the conclusion that a contractual provision does not impose a penalty is by stating that the provision for the payment of money in the event of breach was a genuine pre-estimate by the parties to the agreement of the damage the innocent party would suffer in the event of breach. As Lord Dunedin said in the Dunlop case, the 'essence' of a liquidated damages clause is 'a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage' (at page 86). As the Dunlop case and the citation from the Philips case (in the Cine case) show, a contractual provision does not become a penalty simply because the clause in question results in overpayment in particular circumstances. The parties are allowed a generous margin."
"However in the normal situation, the test will be whether or not the parties genuinely pre-estimated the loss that would occur on breach. This is a relatively low level of review: see paragraphs 44 and 45 above. I agree with Mr Bannister that the parties do not have to make an accurate assessment of the damages that would have been awarded at common law. Indeed it may be very difficult for them to do so. That will frequently be the case in an employment contract. In ascertaining whether the parties have made a genuine pre-estimate of the damage, the court will consider the reasons which the parties had for agreeing to the clause in question at the time when the agreement was made."
47. In addition to the authorities which I have mentioned, counsel have also drawn my attention to the relevant passages in Chitty on Contracts (29th edition) and Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts (11th edition). At paragraph 10-021 of Hudson, the editor states:
'It may be a consequence of producer influence, but there would appear in fact to be virtually no reported cases in the United Kingdom where periodical liquidated damages for delay in building contracts have been held excessive so as to constitute a penalty. Liquidated damages clauses in general are not looked on with the same disfavour at the present day, and modern disallowances seem to arise almost entirely in the field of hire-purchase where Lord Dunedin's principle 4(c) above has frequently been violated.'
48. Let me now stand back from the authorities and make four general observations, which are pertinent to the issues in the present case.
1. There seem to be two strands in the authorities. In some cases judges consider whether there is an unconscionable or extravagant disproportion between the damages stipulated in the contract and the true amount of damages likely to be suffered. In other cases the courts consider whether the level of damages stipulated was reasonable. Mr Darling submits, and I accept, that these two strands can be reconciled. In my view, a pre-estimate of damages does not have to be right in order to be reasonable. There must be a substantial discrepancy between the level of damages stipulated in the contract and the level of damages which is likely to be suffered before it can be said that the agreed pre-estimate is unreasonable.
2. Although many authorities use or echo the phrase 'genuine pre-estimate', the test does not turn upon the genuineness or honesty of the party or parties who made the pre-estimate. The test is primarily an objective one, even though the court has some regard to the thought processes of the parties at the time of contracting.
3. Because the rule about penalties is an anomaly within the law of contract, the courts are predisposed, where possible, to uphold contractual terms which fix the level of damages for breach. This predisposition is even stronger in the case of commercial contracts freely entered into between parties of comparable bargaining power.
4. Looking at the bundle of authorities provided in this case, I note only four cases where the relevant clause has been struck down as a penalty. These are Commissioner of Public Works v Hills [1906] AC 368, Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Limited [1962] AC 600, Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Limited v Dojap Investments Limited [1993] AC 573, and Ariston SRL v Charly Records (Court of Appeal 13th March 1990). In each of these four cases there was, in fact, a very wide gulf between (a) the level of damages likely to be suffered, and (b) the level of damages stipulated in the contract."
"With the benefit of the citation of authority given above, in my judgment, the following (with the explanation given below) constitutes a practical step by step guide as to the questions which the court should ask in a case like this:-
i) To what breaches of contract does the contractual damages provision apply?
ii) What amount is payable on breach under that clause in the parties' agreement?
iii) What amount would be payable if a claim for damages for breach of contract was brought under common law?
iv) What were the parties' reasons for agreeing for the relevant clause?
v) Has the party who seeks to establish that the clause is a penalty shown that the amount payable under the clause was imposed in terrorem, or that it does not constitute a genuine pre-estimate of loss for the purposes of the Dunlop case, and, if he has shown the latter, is there some other reason which justifies the discrepancy between i) and ii) above?"
"110. That insight requires a recasting in more modern terms of the classic test set out by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop [1915] AC at p86:
'The essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the offending party; the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage'
That recasting is to be found in the judgment of Colman J in [Lordsvale] at 762G, a passage cited with approval by Mance LJ in paragraph 13 of his judgment in the Cine case […]:
'whether a provision is to be treated as a penalty is a matter of construction to be resolved by asking whether at the time the contract was entered into the predominant contractual function of the provision was to deter a party from breaking the contract or to compensate the innocent party for the breach. That the contractual function is deterrent rather than compensatory can be deduced by comparing the amount that would be payable on breach with the loss that might be sustained if the breach occurred.'
111. It is important to note that the two alternatives, a deterrent penalty; or a genuine pre-estimate of loss; are indeed alternatives, with no middle ground between them. Accordingly, if the court cannot say with some confidence that the clause is indeed intended as a deterrent, it appears to be forced back upon finding it to be a genuine pre-estimate of loss. That choice illuminates the meaning of the latter phrase. 'Genuine' in this context does not mean 'honest'; and much less, as the argument before us at one stage suggested, that the sum stipulated must be in fact an accurate statement of the loss. Rather, the expression merely underlines the requirement that the clause should be compensatory rather than deterrent. […]
113. […] That also, in my view, is as far as this court went in the Cine case itself. That was a summary judgment case, involving no more than the identification of a triable issue: I would draw attention in that connexion to the observations of Thomas LJ in his paragraph [50] and of Peter Gibson LJ in his paragraph [54]. The approach that should be applied at trial would be in more general terms than that suggested by my Lady in her paragraph 42, that always requires a comparison between the liquidated and the common law damages to see if the comparison discloses a discrepancy; and then requires that discrepancy to be justified as a genuine pre-estimate of damages, or by some other form of justification.
114. I venture to disagree with that approach because it introduces a rigid and inflexible element into what should be a broad and general question. […]"
"If the claimant had resigned the day after her training completed, then the figures would represent the loss to the respondent […]."