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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> First Greater Western Ltd v Moussa (Whistleblowing detriment; s.47B Employment Rights Act 1996 - Victimisation; s.27 Equality Act 2010 - Causation; Treatment of the Claimant) [2024] EAT 82 (24 May 2024) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2024/82.html Cite as: [2024] IRLR 697, [2024] EAT 82 |
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London EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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FIRST GREATER WESTERN LIMITED |
Appellant (First Respondent below) |
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- and - |
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AHMED MOSES MOUSSA |
Respondent (Claimant below) |
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Mr Martin Wynne Jones (instructed by Cameron Clarke Lawyers) appeared for the Respondent
Hearing date: 23 April 2024
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Crown Copyright ©
SUMMARY
Whistleblowing detriment; section 47B Employment Rights Act 1996
Victimisation; section 27 Equality Act 2010
Causation; treatment of the claimant.
The tribunal had not erred in finding that the first respondent employer (FGW) had inflicted detriments on the claimant in 2018 on the ground that he had made protected disclosures in 2012 and because he had done protected acts in 2013. The tribunal's decision was adequately reasoned and none of its findings of fact was perverse.
There was no procedural unfairness arising from the tribunal's findings that a particular employee, whom FGW chose not to call as a witness, had played a major part in influencing the third respondent decision maker, who was found not liable because he did not know about the protected disclosures and acts dating from 2012 and 2013.
The tribunal was entitled to find that FGW had, through that employee and one or more other unidentified employees within its management, perpetuated a culture of prejudice and ill will towards the claimant which encouraged the third respondent decision maker to treat the claimant unfairly in a disciplinary investigation in 2018, leading ultimately to a written warning in 2019.
The Honourable Mr Justice Kerr:
Introduction
The Facts
"fed back to [Ms] Czechowicz, in a way that was seriously prejudicial to the claimant. this shows a received wisdom and collective memory relating to the claimant as being an agitator and a malign influence which we find dates back to the events of 2012 and 2013."
The Tribunal Proceedings
"If we are wrong about this, our decision would be the same if the complaint related only to the protected acts (victimisation) as we consider that the background of the claimant's historic grievances and claims as a whole, including protected disclosures and protected acts, influenced the later events."
"The third respondent [Mr White] was overzealous in pursuing allegations against the respondent, which was facilitated by Klaudia Czechowicz, but we accept that he had no direct knowledge of the claimant's history. We therefore do not uphold the complaint against the third respondent."
"72. In relation to the first respondent, we find that there is a 'collective memory' within the first respondent, which is prejudicial to the claimant and which has permeated the approach of HR (in particular Klaudia Czechowicz) and, in turn, those advised by HR, including the third respondent. This is illustrated by Klaudia Czechowicz's email of 12 September 2018. Taken as a whole we find this email demonises the claimant and is wholly sympathetic towards Patrick Larkin. The email shows us that there is a general negative view of the claimant within the management 'lore', which we find is connected with the history of the claimant's employment with the respondent, including the involvement of the claimant's legal representative. By sending that email to the Head of HR Business Partnering, she perpetuated the prejudicial view of the claimant within the organisation.
73. We find that this negative view had its origins in the events of 2012 and 2013. We reach this finding because there is evidence of a series of contentious events at that time, resulting in the dismissal and subsequent reinstatement of the claimant in a different station. We have not been shown any evidence of more recent problems with the claimant which would explain the negative assumptions about him and we therefore conclude that this view of the claimant dates back to the earlier period, when he was clearly a thorn in the side of the first and second respondents.
74. The detrimental treatment of the claimant is manifested in the following ways.
74.1. The stark difference between the treatment of the claimant and Patrick Larkin, particularly in relation to the way the suspension was dealt with. From our findings, it was Patrick Larkin who had done more than the claimant to trigger the original investigation, yet he was taken off suspension quickly. His Assault Report Form was not held against him on the grounds that he was dyslexic and had problems filling it in, even though it was clearly in his handwriting and it is not apparent to us what impact the dyslexia had. In contrast, the first respondent continued to rely on the claimant's Assault Report Form to support a disciplinary case against him, even though it was not completed by him, he said from the first time he was told what was in it that it was not accurate, and English is not his first language. No allowance at all appears to have been made for any communication issues arising from the language barrier or any possible misunderstanding on the part of Dorothy Colmer, who may have had in her mind what Patrick Larkin had said to her.
74.2. A distinction was drawn between Patrick Larkin and the claimant on the basis that Patrick Larkin withdrew his statement and showed remorse for having made it. Patrick Larkin made a formal statement to the police, which the claimant did not, so he had a statement which he was able to withdraw. On the claimant's understanding, he had not made a statement and was unable to withdraw something that did not exist. To the extent that the respondents rely on his Assault Report Form, he said that it was not accurate and did not reflect what was said.
74.3. The Whatsapp exchanges with Natalie show us that the claimant's situation was being discussed among management, also evidenced by Klaudia Czechowicz's comment in her email about receiving information from the 'management team' about the claimant influencing Patrick Larkin. The implication from Natalie's words of warning is that the conversation did not appear to be favourable for the claimant. (This exchange also shows us that the claimant was straight-dealing and was confident in his narrative regarding the incident.)
74.4. The suspension of the claimant, including the continuation of the suspension when there was no allegation of gross misconduct against him, which appears to be contrary to the provisions of the first respondent's disciplinary policy.
74.5. The investigation was handed to the third respondent to deal with. He was inexperienced and relied heavily on Klaudia Czechowicz, whose judgment and approach was clearly influenced by the negative view she had of the claimant.
74.6. The inept handling of the allegations against the claimant also, in our view, stem from the prejudiced view of the claimant among managers and HR. For example, the original allegation which led to the suspension was subsequently dropped but there was no suggesting of ending the suspension. Two additional allegations were added on 27 April 2018 at the conclusion of the formal investigation process. It is not clear whether these were potentially grounds for suspension and, in any event, they should have been dealt with as separate matters. The first respondent ended up citing three allegations for the disciplinary hearing, none of them being the original allegation for which the claimant was suspended.
74.7. The lack of justification for the claimant's ongoing suspension was confirmed by Steven Hawker's response to the disciplinary allegations, two of which he did not pursue and the third of which resulted in a First Written Warning. We find that Steven Hawker came to the matter afresh with no knowledge of any background history with the claimant and saw clearly that the disciplinary allegations should not have been pursued in the way that they had been.
74.8. The first respondent did not deal with the letters sent on behalf of the claimant by his legal representative on 6 September 2018 and 11 November 2018. It is worth recording that the claimant's legal representative at this time (and at the hearing) was the same representative who represented him in 2012 and 2013. The first respondent, led by Klaudia Czechowicz, did not engage with the claimant or his representative in any meaningful way. The respondents relied on the provision in the Grievance Procedure which states
'If you have a complaint about your dismissal or the taking of other relevant disciplinary action (other than warnings) by the Company under the Disciplinary Procedure, you should raise your complaint by way of appeal under the Disciplinary Procedure, rather than the Grievance Procedure.'
The first respondent failed to realise that the claimant's complaint was not about dismissal or other relevant disciplinary action under the Disciplinary Procedure and therefore this clause did not apply. It was only when Steven Hawker met with the claimant that he was able to air his grievances.
75. The first respondent failed in part to follow the recommendations given in the Occupational Health reports of Dr Krishnan of 13 July and 18 October 2018. To the extent that the first respondent failed to engage with the claimant's legal representative, this is a failure to follow the Occupational Health physician's recommendation. For example, on 27 September 2018, Klaudia Czechowicz wrote to the claimant's legal representative, telling him that they were engaging with the claimant direct and would be in touch with him to arrange the disciplinary meeting. However, we do not agree with the claimant that there was a recommendation for the grievance to be resolved before the disciplinary hearing. The recommendation was for the workplace issues to be addressed before the claimant returned to work.
76. For the same reasons as we set out in relation to the failure to follow Occupational Health advice, we find that the first respondent partly failed to liaise with the Claimant's legal representative regarding the Claimant's complaints about the disciplinary process. There was acknowledgement of correspondence but no proper engagement with the issues being raised.
77. In conclusion, we find that the first respondent did subject the claimant to detriments on the grounds of the protected disclosures and protected acts. We do not suggest that there was a conspiracy among the protagonists but we find that the myriad examples of unfairness and less favourable treatment cannot simply be explained by a string of unfortunate errors. In our view, they show the existence of an underlying negative attitude towards the claimant shared and understood by management, including in particular Klaudia Czechowicz."
The Appeal Proceedings
"4. Most of the first respondent's actions were taken by Klauia Czechovvicz of their HR department. The first respondent chose not to call Klaudia Czechowicz or submit a witness statement on her behalf.
5. We found that the claimant had been subjected to detriments mostly by Klaudia Czechowicz, either directly or indirectly. As she did not appear before us, we had to make findings on the basis of the documentary evidence before us. There were three matters in particular which we relied on in reaching our conclusion that she had adopted a received wisdom among managers (what we termed 'management lore') that there was a general prejudicial view of the claimant. I accept that 'management lore' was not a term advanced by the claimant but it was the explanation we found was the most likely to explain the first respondent's treatment of the claimant."
"The List of Issues asks whether the detriments were as a result of the protected acts or protected disclosures. We found that they were. Respectfully, it is a matter for the appeal tribunal to determine whether we were entitled to reach that conclusion on the basis of the claims as pleaded."
The Parties' Submissions
' there may be cases where there is an organisational culture or chain of command such that the final actor may not have personal knowledge of the protected disclosure but where it nevertheless still materially influenced her treatment of the complainant ."
"The only way we could make sense of this, bearing in mind we did not hear from Klaudia Czechowicz, was that the respondent's management had a negative view of the claimant for reasons going back to the protected acts and protected disclosures."
Reasoning and Conclusions
The perversity challenges: grounds 5 and 6
"I didn't get evidence from Aiesha and Koroma. I tried but they didn't turn up for meetings. She offered a statement but never gave it. Eventually she offered to meet me but it was too late. I don't know why there was a delay. Maybe I was on annual leave or nights but I can't remember. I agree their evidence was relevant but I didn't manage to get their evidence. I invited them to meet but they didn't show . I was on nights, hence the delay. I have given them an opportunity to come to a meeting. I didn't get bodycam footage. By the time I was aware of it, the footage is overridden after 10 days I don't believe their evidence would have changed anything."
The procedural unfairness challenge: ground 8
The "reasons" challenge: ground 3
" one ought not to take too technical a view of the way an employment tribunal expresses itself, a generous interpretation ought to be given to its reasoning and it ought not to be subjected to an unduly technical analysis".
(a) The claimant was involved in a dispute at Ealing in 2012, involving a local union representative about whom he made three complaints in 2012. He was dismissed and brought two tribunal claims in 2013, settled by re-employment and, later, transfer to Paddington.
(b) He was blamed for an incident in February 2018 involving a train passenger. He was disciplined over that incident. He was poorly treated in numerous ways during the disciplinary process.
(c) The 2012 and 2013 matters had left the claimant with a bad reputation among management. There was evidence during the disciplinary process that he had that reputation and that it was influencing the disciplinary process.
(d) Two of the complaints against the union representative in 2012 were protected disclosures. At least one of the two claims brought in 2013 was a protected act. The treatment he received in 2018 following the incident in February 2018 consisted of a series of detriments.
(e) Mr White conducted the investigation under Ms Czechowicz's influence; the investigation was biased, defective and unfair, but Mr White's treatment of the claimant was not directly linked to the protected disclosures and acts, of which he did not have direct knowledge.
(f) Mr Haynes knew all about the protected acts and disclosures but, contrary to the claimant's perception, was not vindictive towards the claimant, was aware of the treatment of the claimant but did not take part in it.
(g) FGW's management had a collective memory prejudicial to the claimant, transmitted or translated through Ms Czechowicz into the disciplinary process, which permeated the approach of HR and Mr White who was guided by Mz Czechowicz.
(h) By this means the claimant was demonised, by contrast with Mr Larkin who was favoured. Ms Czechowicz was chiefly responsible for perpetuating the prejudicial view of and treatment of the claimant which had its origins in the protected acts and disclosures.
(i) The detriments alleged by the claimant occurred, they were detriments within the statutory meaning and were inflicted by FGW "on the ground that" he made the protected disclosures and "because" he did the protected acts.
(j) The evidence supporting those findings was the evidence of bias against the claimant and subjection of the claimant to the detriments, coupled with the absence of any other explanation for doing so other than the protected disclosures and protected acts.
The causation challenge: grounds 1 and 2
"yes, if a person in the hierarchy of responsibility above the employee determines that she (or he) should be dismissed for a reason but hides it behind an invented reason which the decision-maker adopts, the reason for the dismissal is the hidden reason rather than the invented reason."
" hypothetically there may be cases where there is an organisational culture or chain of command such that the final actor might not have personal knowledge of the protected disclosure but where it nevertheless still materially influenced her treatment of the complainant. In such cases, however, it would still be necessary for the ET to explain how it had arrived at the conclusion that this is what had happened."
" it was agreed before us that the difference in the statutory provisions as between the discrimination legislation and the unfair dismissal legislation meant that it was unsafe to read across from one type of case to the other."
" manipulation can take many forms and is not confined to those apparent from direct communication between Mr Huckerby and Mr Wilson. If a manager is as heavily involved in directing the investigation as Mr Huckerby clearly was and plays the kind of role that he did in steering the investigation towards a disciplinary hearing and dismissal, there is a much stronger case for attribution ."
"not only of the positive acts taken by the employer, namely the redeployment of Mrs Fecitt and Mrs Woodcock and the removal of shifts from Mrs Hughes, but also of the failure by the employer to take proper steps to prevent victimisation by colleagues. They also alleged that, quite separately from the question whether the employer was personally liable for its actions, the employer was in any event vicariously liable for the acts of victimisation perpetrated by fellow workers in the course of their employment."
Conclusion