[2010] UKFTT 165 (TC)

TC00470                         

 Appeal number TC/2009/13805

PROCEDURE –Self Assessment Return – Notice of Enquiry given in 2001- Closure Notice applied for more than eight years after enquiry opened - Whether reasonable grounds for not issuing closure notice shown by HMRC?- No – Direction to issue Closure Notice granted

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX 

	HAROLD HUGH COLLINSON	Applicant

	- and -

	THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
	REVENUE AND CUSTOMS (Capital Gains Tax)	Respondents

TRIBUNAL:		Adrian Shipwright (Judge)
			Sheila Wong Chong FRICS (Member)

Sitting in public in London on 8 January 2010

Richard Bramwell QC and Anne Redston for the Appellant

James Rivett, Counsel, instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs for the Respondents

© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2010
DECISION

Introduction

1.	 This decision concerns the application made by Harold Hugh Collinson (“the Applicant”) for a direction that a closure notice be issued in respect of the enquiry opened on 5 January 2001 by the Respondents (“HMRC”) into the Applicant’s tax return for the year of assessment 1998 – 1999.  The enquiry has therefore been continuing for more than nine years into a return in respect of a period that ended more than a decade ago.

2.	The enquiry concerns a loss for 1998-1999 claimed by the Applicant in respect of transactions involving what the Applicant says is a relevant discounted security which he says in the circumstances gave rise to a loss for tax purposes. We express no view on this as that is not the issue before us. 

3.	We announced our decision at the end of the hearing that HMRC had not shown reasonable grounds why a closure notice should not be issued and that accordingly we direct that the appropriate officer of HMRC issue a closure notice within 30 days of the date of this hearing of the application (i.e. 8 January 2010). The closure notice should therefore be issued on or before 4.00 pm on 7 February 2010. This will allow the matter to proceed at a more appropriate pace and if necessary allow a greater possibility of a fair hearing of the issue.

4.	This decision sets out the direction and our reasons and findings of fact

The Issue 

5.	 The essential issue for decision in this case is whether “there are reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice within a specified period?” The direction for the closure notice is to be issued unless HMRC shows objectively reasonable grounds for not doing so. The onus is on HMRC (see section 28A TMA set out below).

6.	This decision is not concerned with directions as to the production of documents or case management issues and similar matters. It is solely concerned with the application for a closure notice which is all that is before the Tribunal for determination. 

The Law 
The Legislation

3.	The Law, in so far as is relevant to this application, is found in section 28A TMA. This is headed “Completion of enquiry into personal or trustee return” and provides:
“(1) An enquiry under section 9A (1) of this Act is completed when an officer of the Board by notice (a “closure notice”) informs the taxpayer that he has completed his enquiries and states his conclusions.
In this section “the taxpayer” means the person to whom notice of enquiry was given.

(2) A closure notice must either—
(a)	 state that in the officer’s opinion no amendment of the return is required, or
(b) make the amendments of the return required to give effect to his conclusions.

(3) A closure notice takes effect when it is issued.

(4) The taxpayer may apply to the Commissioners for a direction requiring an officer of the Board to issue a closure notice within a specified period.

(5) Any such application is to be subject to the relevant provisions of Part 5 of this Act (see, in particular, section 48(2) (b)).

(6) The tribunal shall give the direction applied for unless … satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice within a specified period”.

The Authorities

4.	We were provided with copies of the following authorities which we have read and considered:

Section 28A TMA
Eclipse Film Partners No 35 LLP v Revenue and Customs Commissioners SpC 736 [2009] STC (SCD) 293
Astall & anor v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2008] STC 2920. 

5.	We have also considered (inter alia)

Jade Palace Ltd v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2006] STC (SCD) 419
 Tower MCashback LLP 1 and another v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2008] EWHC 2387 (Ch)
D’Arcy v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2006] STC (SCD) 543

6.	We were also provided at the hearing with extracts from HMRC’s Manuals. No objection was taken to any of these and they were all admitted.

The Evidence

7.	We were provided with a volume of documentation.  This was an agreed bundle of documents. The documents were all admitted in evidence no objection having been taken to any of the documents.

8.	We heard oral evidence from Brian Manning of HMRC’s Anti Avoidance Group. A witness statement was provided for him. He was cross-examined. There were no other witnesses.

Findings of Fact 

9.	From the evidence we make the following findings of facts solely for the purpose of deciding this application:

(1)	The Applicant made his tax return for the year of assessment 1998 – 1999 on time.  The return included a claim for loss relief in respect of a relevant discounted security. The relief claimed was some £436,082.

(2)	 The Applicant provided additional information with his self assessment return explaining how the loss arose.  This set out that:

(a)	 The Applicant had subscribed the relevant discounted securities in a 
		  company which he owned;
(b)	 The relevant discounted securities were given to the trustees of an 
	      interest in possession settlement of which he was the life tenant;
(c)	 The difference between the amount subscribed and the market value    
	      the time of gift was the amount of the loss claimed.

(3)	 HMRC opened an enquiry into this return and informed the Applicant of this by letter dated 5 January 2001.

(4)	 HMRC by letter also dated 5 January 2001 requested information about the relevant discounted security transactions from the Applicant’s accountants.

(5)	 The documents requested were set out in the Appendix to the letter.

(6)	The accountants acting for the Applicant (“the Accountants”) supplied the formal documentation but refused to give documents containing the tax advice given in relation to the transactions (“the Tax Advice Material”). This was essentially Counsel’s Opinion(s) and legal advice that the Applicant claims is privileged and not relevant.  Mr Rivett very properly accepted that this was all that had not been supplied.

(7)	In a letter dated 30 March 2001 HMRC asked on what grounds the Tax Advice Material had been withheld.

(8)	The Accountants replied questioning the relevance of the Tax Advice Material. They confirmed that the Applicant entered into the transactions for the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage. Mr Bramwell QC candidly and very properly accepted that there was what might be described as a “tax avoidance” motive here.

(9)	 The Accountants were dealing with a number of similar cases. It was agreed in November 2001 that the Applicant’s case should be included in the group of cases under discussion between the Accountants and HMRC.

(10)	No further correspondence on the particular case took place until 2007. 

(11)	The case of Campbell v IRC was decided in 2004 by the Special Commissioners.

(12)	The Accountants wrote to HMRC on 16 April 2007 referring to the Campbell decision and requesting that a closure notice be issued.

(13)	HMRC responded that they were looking at all relevant discounted security schemes collectively apparently to ensure consistency of approach. HMRC also said that they “… do not think this will delay matters unduly”.  We note that this was written in 2007 and no closure notice had been issued by January 2010.

(14)	There were subsequently seemingly some attempts at reaching a settlement.  However, no settlement was reached.

(15)	On 19 November 2008 the Accountants wrote to HMRC referring to the closure request of April 2007. They pointed out “the length of time this enquiry has been opened and the fact that the original request was made over a year ago”.  They repeated the request for a closure notice to be issued.

(16)	HMRC wrote to the Accountants on 15 December 2008 saying they proposed to review the discounted security claims on a case-by-case basis.  No reference was made to the closure request.
(17)	 On 11 January 2009 HMRC wrote to the Accountants stating that they were seeking legal advice asking that they bear with them whilst the advice was obtained.

(18)	The Accountants wrote on 27 March 2009 to HMRC referring to the uncertainty of when a decision on the Applicant’s case would be made and repeating the request for a closure notice to be issued.

(19)	By letter dated 7 April 2009 HMRC replied saying that the case cannot be closed because the Tax Advice Material has not been provided (sic).  HMRC argued that if the enquiry were closed the information powers in section 19A TMA would cease to apply.  We note at this point that these powers were repealed as from 6 April 2009.  HMRC said that the Tax Advice Material is needed in relation to the point on which they are seeking advice namely whether the sums nominally paid for the relevant discounted securities can be attributed to something else.  The letter does not vouchsafe what this something else could be.

(20)	On 8 May 2009 HMRC wrote to the Accountants saying that they had been advised that in principle the sums nominally subscribed for the relevant discounted security may not be wholly “in respect of [the subscriber’s ] acquisition of the security”.  As a statement of general principle this is unexceptionable but does not deal with the specifics of Mr Collinson’s case.

(21)	In a letter dated 26 May 2009 reference was made to another case being dealt with by the Accountants where there was a similar point which HMRC did not see should be litigated twice but repeating that HMRC did not have adequate documentation in respect of these cases.

(22)	The Accountants replied on 3 June 2009 that as Mr Collinson had been making closure notice requests since April 2007 unless the enquiry was closed by 30 June 2009 an application would be made to the tribunal under section 28A TMA for a direction to issue a closure notice.

(23)	HMRC replied on 18 June 2009 requesting several items of information and saying that there would be closure within 30 days of receipt of that information.  The information requested is essentially the Tax Advice Material.  This material had been withheld on the grounds that it was not “reasonably required” within the meaning of Schedule 36 FA 2008.

(24)	HMRC wrote further on 14 August 2009 contending that the advice is potentially relevant.

(25)	On 4 September 2009 application was made by the Applicant for a direction that a closure notice be issued in respect of the enquiry opened on 5 January 2001, over eight years earlier.

(26)	HMRC has never sought to use its powers to obtain the Tax Advice Material.  No clear reason was provided as to why these powers had not been exercised if the material was so vital. No reference was made to the Tribunal powers to order the production of documents or how this might prejudice HMRC.

(27)	The hearing of this application was more than nine years after the enquiry was opened and more than ten and a half years after the year of assessment 1998-1999 ended. The position has still not been resolved. There is no closure notice so the Applicant cannot appeal and have the tax position determined.

The Submissions of the Parties

The Applicant’s Submissions in outline

9.	In essence, the Applicant submitted that:

(a)	It is over nine years since the enquiry opened. HMRC have had ample time to consider matters and to test their powers to obtain information they think they do not have.

(b)	There is no prejudice to HMRC if the direction for the issue of a closure notice is granted as Rule 16 of the Tribunal Rules allows an application for an order for  “… any person to answer any questions or produce any documents in that person’s possession or control which relate to any issue in the proceedings…”

(c)	This application is not concerned with the production of documents but the closure notice.

(d)	HMRC has not shown there are “reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice within a specified period” more than nine years on from the start of the enquiry. The documentation requested had been provided other than the “Tax Advice Material” which the Applicant says HMRC are not entitled to.

(e)	Accordingly, the direction for the closure notice is to be given in accordance with section 28A TMA as HMRC had not shown “…reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice within a specified period”. 

(f)	HMRC’s suggested grounds were essentially that there was outstanding information. This consisted of the Tax Advice Material which they were not entitled to on the grounds of lack of relevance within Schedule 36 FA 2008.They have failed to respond appropriately to the closure requests in 2007 and 2008. They have had ample time (nine years) to exercise such powers as they wished to and to reach a conclusion. Hence the application for a direction that HMRC issue a closure notice which should be granted as no reasonable grounds for not issuing it had been shown.

HMRC’s Submissions in outline

10.	In essence, HMRC submitted that HMRC had not been provided with all the information which it had requested and so HMRC could not reasonably complete their inquiry. Accordingly, there were “reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice within a specified period”. This was because, according to HMRC, the “information reasonably requested and which remains outstanding may be necessary to bring the inquiry to an analytical conclusion”. The Applicant had not been as cooperative as in Eclipse.

11.	It was accepted that HMRC had not sought to exercise their powers to obtain the documents that HMRC said they were entitled to and were “outstanding” (sic). However, it was said that it should be borne in mind that the “schemes” involving the type of securities involved here were being looked at generically and discussions had taken place which might have led to settlements in respect of those generic schemes.

12.	It was also argued that HMRC had to be careful in the phrasing of a closure notice in the light of the Tower MCashback case (see above). This case had been heard by the Court of Appeal last November and so judgement might be given soon which might affect the position particularly as to how a closure notice should be phrased as there had been argument about this. However, there was no information as to when the judgement might be delivered or what it might cover. It was accepted that accordingly the Tribunal was bound by the High Court decision.

13.	The importance of evidence of motive is shown by the Astall case.

14.	Accordingly, the direction for the closure notice should not be given in accordance with section 28A TMA as HMRC had shown “…reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice within a specified period”. 

15.	Mr Rivett very helpfully clarified that there was no suggestion of impropriety or misconduct by the Applicant. The Applicant had not provided documents asked for by HMRC which the Applicant said HMRC were not entitled to but HMRC believed they were and may be necessary for HMRC to conclude their inquiry. We are most grateful to Mr Rivett for this assistance.
Discussion

Introduction

16.	We bear in mind in considering this application Rule 2 of the Tribunal Rules headed “Overriding objective and parties’ obligation to co-operate with the Tribunal”. We are concerned here with the overriding objective. There is no suggestion that the parties have not cooperated with the Tribunal. They have been extremely helpful.

17.	Rule 2 provides:

“(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.

(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes—

(a)	dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties;
(b)	avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;
(c)	ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;
(d)	using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and
(e)	avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.

(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it—

(a)	exercises any power under these Rules; or
(b)	interprets any rule or practice direction.

(4) Parties must—

(a)	help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and
(b)	co-operate with the Tribunal generally”.

18.	We also remind ourselves of the often quoted saying "Justice delayed, is justice denied”.  This is reflected in Rule 2(1) (e).

19.	 Nine years is a considerable time to wait to know whether a Government Department will or will not allow your claim. If the claim is denied it is not until a closure notice has been issued that an appeal can be lodged. It could be some time then before the case is heard and a decision reached. The longer the period from the time the actual transactions took place the harder it is to find documents and reliable evidence. Witnesses cease to be available and memories fade. This makes it harder for there to be a fair trial in a reasonable time.

20.	We also bear in mind that HMRC must have a reasonable time in which to carry out its inquiries including time to obtain legal advice and reflect on such advice in the context of the information available. Here they have had more than nine years.

21.	As was said in Eclipse:

“[19].  The provisions of s 28B TMA 1970 are (as with the corresponding provisions relating to companies discussed in the case of Revenue and Customs Comrs v Vodafone 2 [2005] EWHC 3040 (Ch) at [44], [2006] STC 483 at [44]) ‘constructed so as to produce a reasonable balance’, given these different interests of the commissioners and the taxpayer.  It is implicit in the powers given to the general or special commissioners to give a direction requiring the issue of a closure notice, and is part of that ‘reasonable balance’, that a closure notice can be required notwithstanding that the officer has not pursued to the end every line of enquiry or investigation—what is required is that he should have conducted his enquiry to a point where it is reasonable for him to make an informed judgment as to the matter in question, so that, exercising such judgment, he can state his conclusions and make any related amendments to the taxpayer’s return.  The exercise of that judgment may require the officer to express his conclusions in broad terms, or even express alternative conclusions (see the observations made in the case of D’arcy v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2006] STC (SCD) 543, para 12)—which should at the practical level allow an officer of the commissioners to avoid the pitfalls identified in the Tower MCashback case of a closure notice too restrictively drafted in its conclusions.

22.	We have sought to achieve this “reasonable balance”. We consider that nine years
is ample time for HMRC to reach a view on the availability of losses. We find this as a primary fact in the circumstances of this case.

Suggested reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice

i.	Introductory 

23.	The grounds HMRC suggested for not issuing the closure notice included the following.

(1)	 HMRC had not been provided with all the information which it had requested “information reasonably requested and which remains outstanding and may be necessary to bring the inquiry to an analytical conclusion”
(2)	The Applicant had not been as cooperative as in Eclipse.

(3)	The “schemes” involving the type of securities involved here were being looked at generically

(4)	HMRC had to be careful in the phrasing of a closure notice in the light of the Tower MCashback case (see above). This case had been heard by the Court of Appeal

(5)	The importance of evidence of motive is shown by the Astall case

24.	We will consider each of these in turn.

ii.	Information not provided

25.	HMRC said it had not been provided with all the information which it had requested. It was also said to be “information reasonably requested and which remains outstanding and may be necessary to bring the inquiry to an analytical conclusion”. 

26.	HMRC have ample powers to require the production of relevant documents. They have not exercised them. Further, after the closure notice has been issued application can be made to the Tribunal under Rule 16 as discussed above. It was not suggested that the Tribunal would not direct that relevant documents are produced. It was not shown that HMRC would be prejudiced by this although it might not be as convenient. We have borne this in mind in reaching the balance described in Eclipse (see extract above).

iii.	Cooperation

27.	The Applicant had not been as cooperative as in Eclipse according to HMRC.

28.	It is to be noted that section 20 TMA notices were issued in Eclipse.

29.	We find as a primary fact that the Applicant has been cooperative here and that in the circumstances before us this is not a “reasonable [ground] for not issuing a closure notice”. The applicant has produced the documentation requested subject to withholding material it contends HMRC are not entitled to. They have withheld the Tax Advice Material which the Applicant says that HMC are not entitled to. HMRC could have tested this by application to the Tribunal if they wished to.

30.	A taxpayer is permitted to stand on, what it considers to be, its rights. There is a procedure for adjudicating this which HMRC could have invoked if it had chosen to do so. They have not chosen to do so.

iv.	The “Schemes” were being looked at generically

31.	The “schemes” involving the type of securities involved here were being looked at generically and so this case should be delayed along with the others on HMRC’s argument.

32.	This is interesting but it is not a reason for not issuing a closure notice in a particular case if the taxpayer applies for a direction to issue a closure notice. It may be administratively inconvenient for HMRC but the taxpayer has a right to have its rights determined in its own case on its own facts and not on a generic basis if it chooses to. Parliament has laid this down in statute.

v.	Tower MCashback

33.	It was also argued HMRC had to be careful in the phrasing of a closure notice in the light of the Tower MCashback case (see above). The further appeal in this case had been heard by the Court of Appeal. As yet the Court of Appeal has not given judgement and so we are bound as Mr Rivett graciously accepted by the High Court decision. We, of course, accept that Court of Appeal decisions are binding on us.

34.	It may well be in the Tower MCashback case that points had been argued before the Court of Appeal which could be relevant here. However, we do not as yet have the benefit of their decision and would not seek to second guess it. The High Court decision is binding on us and we gratefully adopt it.  

35.	Henderson J said in Tower MCashback case:

[22.] My conclusions on these points are as follows:

—Whilst there may be no required statutory form for the giving of closure notices, it was clear in this case that the letter that referred only to denying the allowances under s 45 and denying the income losses was regarded as the letter that gave the conclusions and adjustments, and the statute required neither detail nor reasons to be given for this notice to be a valid notice.  Accordingly the import of the notice was that it denied the allowances under the section under which they were claimed and it also denied the income losses.
—I was certainly not prepared to hold that HMRC could not adduce other grounds for challenging the capital allowances when the covering letter alone referred to s 45(5) and it also indicated that but for his being pressed to issue the notice by the appellants’ representatives, he would have preferred to have had more time in order to indicate other grounds for the conclusions and adjustments.

—Whilst it is not strictly necessary for me to consider what the position would have been had the formal letter itself referred just to s 45(5), I confirm that I would have reached the same conclusion as John Avery Jones reached in the recent case of D’Arcy v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2006] STC (SCD) 543, and would not have been able to distinguish this case from the decision in the D’Arcy case in the way that the appellants suggested that I should do.  The Inspector in that case had issued a closure notice based solely on a Ramsay attack on a scheme, and he subsequently dropped that line of attack and claimed that taxable income arose under another step in the transactions.  John Avery Jones’ decision was that the Inspector could advance other arguments in an appeal than those indicated in the closure notice, provided that they related to the same factual matter, on account of the tribunal’s over-riding power and duty to reach a correct finding in relation to the matter in dispute, rather than just to accept or reject particular contentions.  In the D’Arcy case, the further arguments all related to the same gilt repo scheme, and could thus be advanced.  In the present case it was suggested to me that the factual confines of the matter, for the purpose of applying the test just stated, extended only to points geared to the alleged licence to third parties.  I disagree with that.  The factual compass of the matter, the subject of the closure notice in this case, was the purchase of the software and all related transactions.  The denial of trading losses can hardly have been based on anything to do with licence rights to third parties.  Thus, consistently with the decision in the D’Arcy case, I accept that in an appeal HMRC can raise any arguments in support of their conclusions and adjustments related to those transactions.

—It is perhaps worth observing two practical points.  Unless an appellant succeeds in a contention in relation to closure notices that a notice is invalid if it merely gives conclusions and adjustments, without giving reasons for the conclusions, it seems likely that Inspectors will adopt the practice of giving bare conclusions without adding reasons.  This would diminish the risk of their being prevented from raising additional grounds in support of their adjustments, albeit that if a wide construction is given to the notion of ‘the factual subject matter covered in a closure notice’, this cautious approach might not be so tempting.  Secondly it would seem desirable for further attention to be given to this aspect of the statutory framework for closure notices.  For it might be desirable first that the Inspector should be encouraged to give reasons for his conclusions (in that the reasons given will often remain the only reasons in contention and the taxpayer will thereby be given clearer information) and desirable secondly that attention should be given to the further grounds that HMRC can raise in appeals because in litigation it is common for additional arguments to be raised at later stages.  It would seem strange if HMRC were to be precluded from raising any grounds in an appeal for supporting the bare conclusions given as regards a particular subject matter in a closure notice, and strange also if they were to be precluded from supporting conclusions and adjustments by adducing additional reasons beyond one or more actually mentioned in a closure notice as regards a particular subject matter addressed in a closure notice, construed broadly”.

36.	Whilst it may not be easy to draft the closure notice as Henderson J notes “… it seems likely that Inspectors will adopt the practice of giving bare conclusions without adding reasons”. It may be that this could be done here.

vi.	Astall

37.	HMRC also contended that the importance of evidence of motive is shown by the Astall case. We accept that. However, that does not seem to be a reason for not issuing a closure notice in the case before us and we so find.

vii.	Other 

38.	We have also consider the matter generally to see if there are any other reasons brought to our attention or which have occurred to us which would justify not issuing the direction for a closure notice. There are no significant matters which have weighed sufficiently to go against section 28A (6) TMA.
39.	We have also borne in mind the ‘reasonable balance’ referred to in Eclipse and the requirement that there be a fair trial if litigation is needed. All of this points to the necessity of resolving this matter as soon as possible.
40.	We also considered carefully whether HMRC would be prejudiced by a direction to issue a closure notice in the circumstances before us and concluded that it had not been shown that it would be prejudiced.
Specified Period 
41.	We considered what period would be appropriate here. After all this time HMRC must know why they have not allowed the Applicant’s claim for a loss and so do not need a long period to write this down.
42.	We considered that 30 days from the announcement of our decision at the hearing was a reasonable time to this and we so direct. 

Costs

43.	Both parties asked for their costs if they were successful. It was agreed that the Applicant should make written submissions as to costs (if it wished to) within seven days from the issue of this decision and HMRC should make written submissions in reply (if it wished to) within seven days from receipt of the Applicant’s written submissions as to costs. The Tribunal noted that Rule 10 was new and that the Tribunal was not aware of any case law on this aspect so that any help as to the scope of the Rule would be of considerable assistance. 

Conclusion

44.	We have found that there were no “reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice within a specified period”. We consider that thirty days from the date of the announcement of our decision at the hearing of the application is a suitable period. That would be by 7 February 2010. 

Direction

45.	 We direct that:

An officer of HMRC issue a closure notice on or before 4.00 pm on 7 February 2010 in respect of the enquiry opened on 5 January 2001 by HMRC into the Applicant’s tax return for the year of assessment 1998 – 1999 informing the Applicant that the officer of HMRC has completed his or her enquiries into the tax return of the Applicant for the tax year ended 5 April 2007 and stating his or her conclusions.

The Parties are reminded that there is a right to apply for permission to appeal against this decision pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules.   The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

ADRIAN SHIPWRIGHT
    TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 13 April 2010