[2011] UKFTT 217 (TC)
TC01082
Appeal number: MAN/08/0055
VAT –
MTIC – contra-trading – clean chain broker – knew or should have known? – yes -
appeal dismissed.
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX
TOTEL
DISTRIBUTION LTD Appellant
-
and -
THE COMMISSIONERS
FOR HER MAJESTY’S
REVENUE
AND CUSTOMS Respondents
TRIBUNAL:
Judge Richard Barlow
Rayna
Dean FCA
Peter
Whitehead
Sitting in public in Manchester on 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 22 July 2010 and 15 September 2010 (plus
subsequent written submissions).
Ms Vivienne Tanchel for the
Appellant instructed by Aegis Tax LLP
Mr Jeremy Benson QC and Mr
Jonathan Cannan instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue
and Customs, for the Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2011
DECISION
1. In
this appeal Totel Distribution Ltd appeals against the respondents’ refusal to
allow input tax claims made by it in respect of the prescribed accounting
periods consisting of the one calendar month-long periods April, May and June
2006 which we will refer to as 04/06, 05/06 and 07/06. The sums in dispute are
£1,130,503 for 04/06, £793,992.51 for 05/06 and £947,165.63 for 06/06 making a
total of £2,871,661.14.
2. The
reason for the refusal to allow that input tax is that the respondents contend
that it arose from transactions which were connected with the fraudulent
evasion of VAT and that the appellant either knew or should have known of that
connection with the consequence that, following authority to which we will
refer, the input tax claim that might otherwise have been payable was properly
refused. The case is therefore what is termed a Missing Trader Intra-Community
case (“MTIC case”).
3. This
particular appeal relates to what is called contra-trading which means that the
respondents allege that, although the appellant’s transactions were not
themselves directly part of a chain of transactions in which there was a
fraudulent tax loss, those transactions were connected with other chains of
transactions in which there was a fraudulent tax loss and that the appellant’s
transactions had lent assistance to the fraud in those other chains.
4. In
brief, the allegation is that the suppliers of the goods to the appellant had
input tax claims which arose in the course of those suppliers’ involvement in
fraudulent chains of transactions. In those fraudulent chains other traders
had failed to account for output tax so that when the appellant’s suppliers
claimed their input tax, having made zero-rated onward supplies of goods, that
input tax gave rise to a payment by HMRC which was not countered by a payment
of output tax elsewhere in the chain; thus making a fraudulent profit for those
involved in the fraudulent chain of transactions. The alleged purpose of the appellant’s
suppliers in making the supplies of goods to the appellant was that the
transactions in which the appellant bought goods from those suppliers created
output tax liabilities which offset and therefore disguised the existence of
the fraudulently claimed input tax, making it less likely the respondents would
make inquiries; because the suppliers’ tax returns would not appear to consist
of a large repayment claim or at least the size of the claim would be reduced.
5. Assuming
the respondents’ allegations are proved, the appellant’s suppliers are what are
known as contra-traders. That is a term coined by the respondents and we will
use it for convenience but it should not be overlooked that what is in issue is
whether the appellant’s transactions were connected with fraud in the relevant
sense and that labelling its counterparties in one way or another will in no
way assist in proving that connection. Similarly it has become common, for
convenience, to refer to a chain of transactions in which there is no actual
fraudulent loss (eg the chains of which the appellant’s transactions form part)
as a “clean chain” which is something of a misnomer, if the respondents’
allegations that it was entered into for fraudulent reasons are correct;
whether or not that was know to the appellant. Similarly a chain of
transactions in which a fraud has occurred is called a “dirty chain” which also
risks obscuring that fact that the existence of the fraud requires to be proved
if disputed.
6. It
would be better if the terminology were to be “the apparently clean chain” on
the one hand and the “allegedly dirty chain” on the other, at least until the
Tribunal has made the necessary findings, but the terminology has become so
ubiquitous that we will adopt it but with the caveat that we should not be
taken to have pre-judged any of the issues in the case by doing so.
7. We
would like to thank all three counsel and their solicitors for the presentation
of this case. The papers were extremely well prepared and the case was
conducted very efficiently. We would particularly like to express our
appreciation for the clarity and intellectual rigour with which Ms Tanchel
presented the appellant’s case.
8. The
legal principles applicable to this appeal are well established by authority
and we need not set them out in detail. The principles applicable to such
cases are contained mainly in the cases of Kittel –v- Belgium [2008] STC 1537, and Mobilx –v- HMRC [2010] EWCA Civ 517. In
view of the concessions made by the appellant (see below [21]) the only issue
is one of fact.
9. If
the Commissioners prove that a taxpayer’s transaction was connected with fraud
and that the taxpayer either knew or ought to have known that it was connected
with fraud that taxpayer will lose the right to recover input tax which would
otherwise be recoverable.
10. We were invited
to take account of the Tribunal’s findings about the grey market which were made
in a different appeal. We agree with the respondents that that would not be
appropriate as a matter of law because one Tribunal cannot bind another on
questions of fact unless two cases are heard together. We would however add
that the fact that the appellant’s transactions are in a grey market did not
advance the commissioners’ case against the appellant in any way. The evidence
did not prove to our satisfaction exactly what the size of the grey market in
the goods in question was at the relevant time. Although the evidence about
the grey market might have been relevant to issues about whether the
transactions in the dirty chains were fraudulent, on the basis that the
transactions constituted a suspiciously large part of that market or even
exceeded its size, the fact that those transactions were conceded to be
fraudulent, as we will mention later, made it unnecessary for us to decide
those issues. The evidence did not prove that the appellant knew what the size
of the grey market was so the evidence about it was irrelevant to the remaining
issues in the case.
11. The basic facts
about the appellant’s transactions are not in dispute.
12. We refer later
in this decision to a concession Ms Tanchel made on behalf of the appellant
which has considerably narrowed the issues still in dispute and obviates the
need for us to refer to a good deal of the respondents’ evidence much of which
related to the issues no longer in dispute.
13. It is sufficient
to summarise the commissioners’ case by saying that their evidence about the
chains of transactions was sufficient to show that the dirty chains leading to
the broker in those chains were fraudulent and that the clean chain
transactions were connected with that fraud; all of which is now conceded by
the appellant. The rest of the respondents’ evidence was provided to introduce
the evidence, mainly in the form of documents, about the appellant’s
transactions which we deal with below and which we have dealt with from the
point of view of the appellant’s explanations and evidence.
14. The
commissioners’ case was that the appellant knew or at least ought to have known
that its transactions were connected with fraud because of the nature of the
transactions. That knowledge or the fact that it ought to have been known to
the appellant is a matter for inference based on all the circumstances of the
transactions and the commissioners’ case was that the inference should be drawn
from all the evidence about the nature of the transactions and how they were
carried out.
15. The appeal
relates to thirteen transactions in period 04/06 in which the appellant bought
and sold iPods (six transactions) and mobile phones (seven transactions). The
invoice dates for the purchases of all thirteen transactions by the appellant
were 26, 27 or 28 April 2006 and the invoice dates for its onward sales were 28
April in nine cases, 23 April in one case (though that must have been in error
as the invoice for its purchase was 26 April), 26 April in one case and 3 May
in two cases. The 3 May sales should have been included in the May return if
that date is correct but nothing turns on that.
16. The appellant’s
suppliers were Morganrise Limited (‘Morganrise’) (six deals), Prime Telecom
(UK) Ltd (‘Prime’) (two deals) and Demravale Telecommunications Ltd
(‘Demravale’) (five deals). They were all UK registered companies. All the
goods sourced from Morganrise were sold to African Network BV (‘African’) (a Netherlands company). One parcel sourced from Prime was sold to FAF International Srl
(‘FAF’) (an Italian company) and the other was sold to Kiara Trading
International Sarl (‘Kiara’) (a French company). Three parcels of goods
sourced from Demravale were sold to Pro Choice Commercial (‘Pro Choice’) (a
Portuguese company) and two to Racheltel Slu (‘Racheltel’) (a Belgian
company).
17. The appeal
relates to 7 transactions in period 05/06. Four parcels were obtained from
K&M and were sold to African. The other three were obtained from Prime two
of which were sold to Kiara and the seventh was sold to Phone Connected Sarl
(‘Phone Connected’) (a French company).
18. The June deals
numbered six of which Demravale supplied four, all of which were sold by the
appellant to Euro Safety Net BV (‘Euro Safety’) (a Dutch company), and Prime
supplied two which the appellant sold to FAF.
19. The price of all
the appellant’s purchases included VAT as they were sales of goods from UK companies to a UK company. It is not in dispute that the UK suppliers accounted for output tax.
The appellant’s sales were all dispatches to other EU countries and were
therefore zero-rated giving rise, in principle, to a recovery of input tax by
the appellant on the purchases without there being any output tax payable on
its sales.
20. The appellant’s
gross profit on those sales in the three month period was £1,142,084.50 and it
made a book profit on every one of the deals involved in the appeal. The realisation
of the cash profit on every deal would however depend upon the recovery of
input tax because the sale prices achieved on the zero rated sales were always
less than the tax inclusive price paid to the UK suppliers. The profits were
generally in the range 4.5% to 6.0% but the Morganrise April deals 1-6 which
were iPods achieved 10.65% and the K&M May deals 1-4 which were car kits
achieved 13%.
21. Ms Tanchel
conceded the following points in her written closing submissions:
That the Commissioners can
prove:
(a)
that there were tax losses in the broker chains of the alleged contra-traders,
(b)
that the losses resulted from fraudulent evasion,
(c)
that the appellant’s transactions, the subject of this appeal were
(following the reasoning of the Chancellor between paragraphs 40 and 46 in Blue
Sphere) “connected” with that evasion.
She added that the sole issue
for the Tribunal is therefore whether at the time of entering into those
transactions the appellant knew or ought to have known that the transactions
were connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT.
22. Those
concessions were rightly made but we would like to add that Ms Tanchel was
perfectly entitled to put the Commissioners to proof of some aspects of their
case dealing with those issues (some were conceded at the outset) and the
concession she later made, though inevitable after the evidence had been
tested, in no way suggests that she could be criticised for taking the points
she did initially take issue with.
23. We therefore
turn to the evidence about the issue which remains in dispute which is whether
the appellant knew or ought to have known that its transactions were connected
with fraud.
24. The appellant’s
evidence consisted of that of its director Mr Keith Rowbotham and Mr Barry
Neilson. We will deal with the evidence of Mr Neilson first.
25. The truthfulness
of Mr Neilson’s evidence was not challenged. He gave evidence about work he
had done on behalf of the appellant in carrying out due diligence enquiries on
its behalf. He made enquiries about all four of the suppliers relevant to this
appeal, namely Morganrise, Prime, Demravale and K&M. He also enquired
about three of the seven relevant customers namely African Networks, Pro Choice
and Euro Safety and three Freight Forwarder/Storage companies namely United
Express, P&D and Tecsmart.
26. Mr Neilson had
been a salesman for various companies in his early years and later developed a
very successful company which provided a record storage system originally for
solicitors and later for businesses generally. After that business was bought
from him for a considerable sum he traded in mobile phones until he decided
that was too risky a business for him to engage in and latterly he had provided
the service of enquiring about due diligence on behalf of the appellant and
Totel Ltd. Totel Ltd is a separate company from the appellant and although
there are some factual connections between Totel Ltd and the appellant they are
not connected in any technical legal sense.
27. Mr Neilson
claimed to be able to use his business expertise to weigh up people whom he met
in the course of making due diligence enquiries and it appears he relied on
that expertise sometimes in the absence of objective proof of the correctness
of his opinions. He made it clear that the focus of his attention when he made
the enquiries was whether he thought it likely that the subject of the enquiry
would become a missing trader and he made the point that at the time of the
enquiries he had no knowledge of the concept of contra-trading; which we find
was the case as it was also given in evidence that at that time HMRC had not
really understood how contra- trading operated and certainly had not publicised
the phenomenon.
28. Dealing with the
specific enquiries he made we make the following findings which are the
uncontested facts as Mr Neilson stated them to be in his witness statement and
his oral evidence.
29. We will deal
first with his evidence concerning the appellant’s suppliers.
30. So far as
Morganrise was concerned Mr Neilson formed the view that the company had a
prestigious and busy office. He saw trade references and the director of that
company was able to prove to him that he had been resident at his home address
for ten years. No-one objected to Mr Neilson taking photographs and a possible
discrepancy about which suite of offices Morganrise occupied did not come to
his attention. We note that some documents refer to suite 202 and some to
suite 203 but we regard that as of no relevance as the company may have
occupied both suites and even if there was a mistake on some of the papers it
would be most unlikely to have led to any real consequences because of the
proximity of the addresses within the same building. We also note that the
photographic evidence showed that the company operated from serviced offices, a
fact that Mr Neilson failed to appreciate.
31. That due
diligence enquiry would have been of some considerable benefit to anyone
thinking of dealing with Morganrise but in the context of this case we find
that that enquiry was not really helpful to the appellant because Mr Neilson
agreed with Mr Benson QC that documents showed that his visit had been after 10
May 2006. That was after all the six deals between the appellant and
Morganrise in which the appellant bought goods worth £1,595,966.30 (tax
inclusive) on 28 April 2006 and committed itself to paying that sum to Morganrise.
32. Mr Neilson had
not kept any documents relating to his enquiries about Prime and so was unable
to give any evidence about the due diligence enquiry concerning that company
except that he remembered he had visited it.
33. Mr Neilson
visited Demravale and obtained details of the company, he observed that it
appeared to be a genuine business with 12 or so employees and obtained
photographs of the director and confirmation of his identity. The documents
show that this was carried out before any of the deals in this appeal and Mr
Neilson concluded that there was no reason to think that Demravale would become
a missing trader. We find that to be a reasonable conclusion and that he
reported that conclusion and passed that information on to the appellant before
the deals in question took place. We note however, that Mr Neilson’s
conclusion was that he thought Demravale would not go missing. He did not have
any basis for recommending whether that company was financially sound or
otherwise suitable for the appellant to engage in business with it. He did not
think the company operated from serviced offices but he accepted that it was
based on a business park.
34. Mr Neilson’s
enquiries of K&M led him to the conclusion that the company was in a
reasonably large way of business. It had cooperated by producing evidence of
identity for its director. We note that although it had only started trading
in February 2006 it claimed in its introductory letter to have had “many years
of experience in the industry”. The licence agreement for the occupation of
K&M’s business premises lasted for less than two months after the date of
Mr Neilson’s business but he did not appreciate the relevance of that. Mr
Neilson accepted in his witness statement that his visit to K&M post-dated
the appellant’s four deals with that company in which the appellant purchased
goods valued at £2,683,934.90 (tax inclusive) and committed itself to pay that
sum.
35. Next we deal
with Mr Neilson’s evidence about customers.
36. Mr Neilson
visited African Networks in the Netherlands. He obtained documents in Dutch
which were later translated as giving the date of incorporation and
commencement of business as 1997. He met a man whom he described as “a
character” in a café and took some photographs of the impressive looking
outside of a building said to be the company’s office but he was refused entry
on the pretext of its office being redecorated. He never received the promised
proof of identity of “the character”. Mr Neilson reported back to the
appellant that he thought African Networks was a “dodgy” (his word) company and
that he recommended the appellant should not deal with it until the proof of
identity was obtained. The appellant had already dealt with African Networks
by agreeing to sell to it some of the goods referred to in [16] above before Mr
Neilson’s visit and some of those referred to in [17] above after his visit but
before he reported his findings.
37. Thus the
appellant had bought and sold goods worth £4,279,901.20 without receiving Mr
Neilson’s due diligence reports for either of its counterparties in those deals;
being Morganrise and K&M as suppliers and African Networks as purchaser.
38. Mr Neilson met a
Mr Foy who was a director of ProChoice. He met Mr Foy in the UK though the company was incorporated in Portugal and was based in Madeira. Mr Neilson did not
discover that Madeira was not on the Portuguese mainland; though that would
have been a relevant point as it could materially affect the transport
arrangements the appellant would need to make in the event that a transaction
occurred between them. Mr Foy lived in Spain but Mr Neilson did not make
enquiries about how that affected the operation of ProChoice. Mr Foy produced
limited information in Portuguese and a passport photograph of himself. He
produced photographs of what he said was the outside of the company’s offices
and an interior shot of an office with an empty desk both of which Mr Neilson
agreed when cross- examined could have been anywhere. Mr Neilson did not say
when he met Mr Foy but the documents referred to were received from Mr Foy on 5
May 2006, after the appellant’s deals with ProChoice in which goods worth
£2,146,650 (zero rated) had been sold to that company.
39. Mr Neilson
visited Euro Safety on the same visit to the Netherlands as the one on which he
visited African Networks. That was before the appellant’s deals with Euro
Safety. The due diligence documents produced were extensive though they were
mostly in Dutch. The company’s director cooperated with Mr Neilson’s enquiry
and afforded him access to the company’s premises and provided proof of
identity. Mr Neilson formed the view that the company was properly run and in
a reasonably substantial way of business and we agree that there was a basis
for that conclusion. We do not agree with the respondents that it mattered
very much that the director lived in Belgium rather than the Netherlands as we were not told how far from the border the Euro Safety premises were or
how far from it the director lived.
40. Mr Neilson
verified the existence of the premises of three Freight Forwarder or storage
companies namely P&D, Tecsmart and United Express. His enquiries were
mostly limited to considering the premises themselves and, for example in
respect of United Express, he obtained limited information because the director
was on holiday. Mr Neilson was shown photographs of the United Express
premises which were in a converted castle or at least had a castellated wall and
he stated they were in a remote location at the end of a half mile single track
road on the top of a hill in North Wales.
41. The only other
witness for the appellant was Mr Rowbotham and, naturally, he was the main
witness.
42. Much of Mr
Rowbotham’s evidence consisted of describing his way of operating the
appellant’s business and referring to documents relating to the transactions
under appeal. Our decision is largely based on our analysis of the
transactions and the way they were conducted and the inferences to be drawn from
that evidence. There was a major disagreement between the parties about what
inferences should be drawn from the way the business was operated and in
particular the divergence between what the documents appeared to show was the
nature of the transactions and what Mr Rowbotham said was the form they
actually took.
43. Mr Rowbotham
described his experience in business. He had worked for the Mirror Group of
newspapers and had risen to the senior post of deputy general manager of its
Northern Office managing the printing and distribution of its papers and
magazines in the North of England and administering the organisation including
the management of considerable budgets. He accepted redundancy on favourable
terms in 1995 and spent some time organising corporate hospitality and then started
a company (MTS Ltd) whose business was dealing in mobile phones which that
company bought from authorised distributors and held as stock and sold in
relatively small numbers to retailers. That company operated from the same
premises as Totel Ltd but it failed following two thefts of uninsured stock
from its premises. Mr Rowbotham then spent some time dealing with sales of
mobile phones for Totel Ltd on a commission basis.
44. Mr Rowbotham
presented himself to us as a successful man who had achieved much in three
different spheres of life (the management of a large company, arranging
corporate hospitality and dealing in telephones). Having observed him giving
evidence over more than three days, much of that being under cross-examination
by a Queen’s Counsel, we find him to be an intelligent man and he struck us as
being by no means naïve in business life.
45. The appellant
company was founded in 2001 with a view to dealing in the wholesale market in
mobile phones and Mr Rowbotham chose the name Totel Distribution Ltd with a
view to benefitting from a supposed association with the Totel companies,
though Mr Rowbotham insisted that there was no actual association. The
respondents contended that there was an association with Totel Ltd and that the
appellant may not actually have been genuinely trading on its own account at
all.
46. Two particular
issues emerged in that respect. First was the somewhat unusual fact that,
although the two companies were clearly operating in the same competitive
field, Totel Ltd allowed one of its staff to work for the appellant as well as
for itself so that that member of staff knew about both companies’ trade
secrets. Mr Rowbotham accepted that that fact had caused confusion on
occasions and that some of the paperwork for Totel Distribution Ltd’s
transactions was wrongly addressed to Totel Ltd but he insisted that the transactions
in question were indeed the appellant’s transactions. In particular he relied
upon the fact that Totel Ltd was in a bigger way of business (or we would say
an even bigger way of business) than the appellant.
47. There was also
evidence that a large payment (£450,000) from Totel Distribution Ltd to Totel
Ltd had been described as a loan on some of the bank documents whereas Mr
Rowbotham said it was payment for a failed transaction that the two companies
had intended to undertake. In any event, it was paid back to Totel
Distribution Ltd a good time after the original payment and Totel Ltd appears
to have used the money for its own business in the meantime without paying any
interest. Mr Rowbotham did not explain how a business as reliant on cash as
the appellant could afford to be without such a large sum for such a long
period or why no effective steps were taken to recover the money immediately
after the deal in question fell through.
48. However, we find
that the evidence, although it does show that there was an unusual relationship
between the two companies, falls short of proving that the transactions with
which this appeal are concerned were in fact carried out by Totel Ltd.
49. Mr Rowbotham
said in his second witness statement that in some cases the appellant’s due
diligence enquiries “would have begun before the deals were done but not
completed until after the deals were concluded”. He appears therefore to admit
that there were deals where no due diligence was done before the deals were
done and it is certainly the case that on his own admission he paid little if
any attention to the credit ratings or other indications of the financial
strength of the appellant’s counterparties relying almost entirely on the
benefits of dealing on ship on hold terms, which we will deal with below.
50. Like Mr Neilson,
Mr Rowbotham said that he thought the important thing was to make sure the
counterparties were real organisations. He said: “I thought, well at least if
I do proper due diligence on people and visits and so on and meet them, at
least I’ll be able to put a face to a name and I’ll know where they operate
from, I’ll know which house they live at, I’ll know their passports. So, my
thinking was, if I can find people like that then at least I’ve got a good
chance that those people are not these mystery people that nobody ever seems to
have met and just disappear with the money”. Later he said: “I found that that
[Dunn and Bradstreet] credit check was really a waste of money because
obviously that doesn’t reflect on the people they purchased from but I was
hoping to put myself in a position whereby I didn’t need to risk my money on a
deal if I could get them imported, I would ship on hold”.
51. The reference to
“if I could get them imported” in the last passage quoted reflects Mr
Rowbotham’s stated belief that as long as he bought goods from importers he
could be sure they would not be defaulting traders and it is true that the
transactions in this appeal are purchases from importers and in one case, after
he found out that a company (which does not feature in this case) was not an
importer; he entered into no further deals with it.
52. However, the evidence
given by Mr Rowbotham about any additional due diligence he might have carried
out before the transactions in the cases where Mr Neilson did not visit the counterparties
until after the transactions had occurred or at least begun, was generally very
limited and amounted to little more than assertions that he had met the people
concerned, rather than that he had made any actual enquiries about them.
53. We bear in mind what
Moses LJ said in Mobilx about the limited relevance of due diligence and
we consider the actual features of the transactions and the way they were
carried out is much the more relevant evidence in this appeal. Nonetheless, we
cannot but find it significant that Mr Rowbotham traded with several of his
company’s counterparties before receiving the due diligence reports on them.
We find that indicates that the due diligence was obtained mainly for the sake
of appearance and not as a safety measure for the appellant. That is a strong
indication that Mr Rowbotham knew that he could safely deal with those parties despite
apparently knowing very little about them which is in itself an indication that
the deals were contrived and that the contrivance was something of which he
must have been aware.
54. Mr Rowbotham
described his business model in the following way in his second witness
statement and in his oral evidence. He proposed the appellant would deal in
larger volumes and values than he had been involved with before in MTS Ltd and
to deal only with goods sold to it by importers. The appellant would then sell the
goods to buyers in other countries. The deals were to be “back to back” by
which he meant that the appellant would only pay its supplier when it had been
paid by its customer. He envisaged that the sale prices would be lower than
the tax inclusive purchase prices so that only the tax would have to be
financed by the appellant which means that the appellant would have to be able
to bear the difference in price until the recovery of input tax. In fact the
difference in price would largely consist of the input tax though we assume Mr
Rowbotham realised that it would be the input tax less the appellant’s profit
on the deal that would have to be financed.
55. The actual
mechanics of the deals that this appeal is concerned with were said, by Mr
Rowbotham, to be as follows. The goods were at a freight forwarder’s premises
or storage warehouse in the UK after they had been imported. Mr Rowbotham
negotiated with the seller and the buyer to arrive at prices and when the deal
had been agreed in principle he instructed the Freight Forwarder or
Warehousekeeper to inspect the goods. Once that had been done and he was
satisfied the goods met the description given by the seller and that ordered by
the buyer the goods were shipped “on hold” at the appellant’s expense to
another Freight Forwarder’s premises or warehouse abroad nominated by the
buyer. The goods were on hold until the appellant was paid for the goods. The
buyer would pay the agreed price only after it had satisfied itself that the
goods were as described at which time the appellant would pay the supplier.
Ownership of the goods would then pass from the seller to the appellant and on
to the buyer.
56. Mr Rowbotham had
only a poor understanding of the concepts of possession and title to goods and
of the difference between those concepts.
57. The method of
trading adopted by the appellant involves risks. Mr Rowbotham said that the
agreement with the seller was also on “ship on hold” terms so that if the deal
fell through for some reason the appellant was only at risk so far as the
transport costs and the cost of inspection before shipping were concerned. If
the deal fell through the goods would simply be recovered and returned to the
seller who would remain the owner of the goods.
58. However, on the
evidence we heard, the risks appeared to be very much greater than that. The
appellant’s due diligence on its purchasers was very limited, as we have
already found to be the case and in particular it generally did not concentrate
on the financial standing of the purchasers at all. The appellant made no due
diligence enquiries about the purchasers’ Freight Forwarders or
Warehouse-keepers. There were therefore multiple risks inherent in sending abroad
goods worth very substantial sums. The appellant had not paid its suppliers and
it would have a potential liability to them if the goods went astray. The
goods were sent to customers who were entities about which the appellant knew
little. The goods were delivered into the custody of entities about which the
appellant really knew nothing but on whom it would have to rely to keep the
goods safe until the customers paid for the goods and to release them to the
customers only after the appellant had given proper authorisation.
59. The fact that
the agreements were on ship on hold terms, even if that is the case, by no
means removes the risk that either the buyer or its Freight Forwarder could
turn out to be dishonest or insolvent and would simply abscond with the goods
or fail to pay for them.
60. The method of
trading as described by Mr Rowbotham was also at odds with the paperwork in
many of the transactions. By paperwork we mean such documents as stock offers,
stock allocations, freight movement documentation and invoices. Despite the size
of the sums in question and despite the absence of any history of dealing with
its counterparties the appellant relied, and so indeed did the counterparties,
on the scantiest paperwork where it might have been expected that properly
drafted legally enforceable agreements would have been needed. Where
contractual terms were specified in such documents as were drawn up they were
often allegedly overridden by oral agreements which were themselves not
recorded. No record was kept of telephone conversations which Mr Rowbotham
claimed gave rise to such agreements.
61. Many of the
documents, as well as not accurately reflecting what the appellant had agreed
with its counterparties, were not provided until after the relevant party had
parted with possession of the goods. Freight movement documentation showed
impossibly short journey times.
62. By way of
example of the above points we will refer to some specific documents.
63. Morganrise
issued invoices which stated where the goods were located in the form “goods to
be released and to be located at” followed by the address of United Express in North Wales and stated the payment terms to be “full payment after the inspection of the
goods”. That document does not explain in what circumstances the goods were to
be released or what the inspection was to consist of and “after inspection” is
at best ambiguous as it could mean payment fell due as soon as inspection had
occurred or it could mean simply at some unspecified time later than the
inspection.
64. Offers of stock
and an allocation of stock form were faxed to the appellant at the same time
for each of the individual Morganrise deals and those forms for all six of the
deals were faxed within minutes of each other. The offer of stock stated that
if the appellant was interested in buying the stock it should inform Morganrise
as soon as possible but the accompanying allocation of stock form said “the …
goods have now been released and ready for collection”. The goods had
therefore been offered and released without Morganrise waiting for confirmation
that the appellant wanted the goods and were released without the appellant
having agreed that it had inspected them; at least so far as the documents
recording the transaction showed.
65. Morganrise gave
no proof that they actually owned the goods and Mr Rowbotham’s evidence was
that so far as he was concerned, as they were in Morganrise’s possession, he
was satisfied on that point. We have already found it to be the case that the
appellant dealt with Morganrise before receiving Mr Neilson’s due diligence so
in effect he was dealing with a company of which he knew little.
66. Morganrise
released the goods to the appellant without having received payment and
apparently contrary to its own terms. Those terms were inadequate at best, given
the value of the goods and, as we have found, were only the few ambiguous words
on the invoice.
67. While referring
to the Morganrise deals we also find that the goods cannot have been physically
dealt with in the way the documents suggest. The faxes releasing the goods
were timed between 15.39 and 15.45. The goods were at storage premises near
Abergele, North Wales and the appellant did not dispute that that was at least
316 miles from the Channel Tunnel yet most of them were checked in at the
Tunnel by 18.19 which we find to be an impossibly short time by a wide margin.
68. Mr Rowbotham
accepted in evidence that the goods must have left the storage premises before
he had sent the written instructions as to where they should go but he added “I
would have given them verbal instructions. Everything is verbal to start with
and then it’s followed up at a later – not always time critical – at a later
time”.
69. Even if the
appellant and Morganrise had had a history of dealing with each other on
specific terms it might have seemed odd that the paperwork was so scanty and it
would have been inexplicable that the goods left the storage premises before
the parties had agreed to sell and buy. But for deals of this value to be done
in this way between parties who barely knew anything about each other is so extraordinary
that it leads to the conclusion that the deals could not be what they appear to
be. That is our conclusion and we find that the deals were not straightforward
purchases and sales between parties dealing on normal commercial terms. Rather
we find that the deals must have been based on some understandings between the
parties which have not been expressed in the documents. Nor have we been told
how those understandings arose. We will return to this point later in the decision.
70. Prime’s invoices
to the appellant said payment was “due on receipt” but Mr Rowbotham stated in
evidence: “I assumed they were happy with the terms I had agreed with them”.
Prime released the goods to the appellant before payment but the appellant was
not prepared to release the goods to its customer until payment. Mr Rowbotham
said that it was understood between him and Prime that the terms would be short
term credit which was why it was his responsibility to chase up his customers.
We find it surprising that such a variation of the terms specified on the
invoice was agreed orally without at least a memorandum being made by the
appellant to record the variation, if that is what he meant had happened. In
fact what Mr Rowbotham said was that it was “understood” those were the terms
and during his evidence he repeatedly referred to understandings which it
appeared had come about not as a result of specific agreements, even oral
agreements, but rather simply because everyone concerned knew that was what
would happen. Even if we accept that there was an oral agreement or some
generally understood arrangement it is even more surprising that for deals of
the size and number involved in this case the vendor would deal on terms that
the purchaser would just be left to endeavour to secure the payment as soon as
possible with an open ended credit being informally allowed.
71. Demravale’s
invoice stated “amount due in full” and “goods released on full payment only”.
Despite that, the goods were shipped to Pro-Choice, the appellant’s customer,
before payment was made to Demravale. Indeed, contrary to the appellant’s
terms as described by Mr Rowbotham, Pro-Choice then sold some of the goods on
to its customer (VPA) before it had paid for them though it seems possible that
Pro-Choice did not actually release the goods until its customer paid.
Demravale were not paid until at least 19 days after they had released the
goods. This was a deal in which Demravale made a gross profit of £5,700 on an
investment of £2,025,900 though we accept that Mr Rowbotham did not know those
figures.
72. K&M issued
standard terms which were admittedly somewhat confusing because they stated
goods remain the property of K&M until payment in one clause but also
contained a clause stating the buyer shall be entitled to resell or use the
goods in the ordinary course of its business. Whatever K&M’s terms were,
the appellant again dealt with the goods on entirely different terms which Mr
Rowbotham said they understood because of a verbal agreement.
73. We find that the
appellant dealt with each of its suppliers on terms entirely different from
those expressed in their documents and that despite the large sums involved and
the lack of any prior trading history or any adequate knowledge of those suppliers
the appellant was prepared to do so without even recording the terms that had
been agreed orally. The terms as allowed in practice were more rather than
less favourable to the appellant than those expressed in the documents and so
it might be said that it was not surprising that Mr Rowbotham was prepared to
deal on those terms. But given that the appellant was aware that the deals
were supposed to be done “back to back” on “ship on hold” terms it must have
been obvious to Mr Rowbotham that the suppliers’ willingness to extend credit
to him and to risk losing control of the goods before payment was a very
questionable fact.
74. The rationale of
the market in which the appellant operated was supposed to be that there were
opportunities to be taken from the daily or almost daily price fluctuations in
a fast moving market. It must also therefore have been obvious to Mr Rowbotham
that his suppliers could not be reasonably expected to take the risk that their
sales would fall through, if the appellant’s customers did not pay for the
goods, on terms that the appellant was then entitled to return the goods and
cancel the deal without any penalty; which is what Mr Rowbotham claims was
agreed. The length of time before payment was received referred to in [71] above
is also at variance with the stated market rationale or business model described
by Mr Rowbotham as that adopted by the appellant.
75. When pressed, Mr
Rowbotham said concerning the possibility that he would have to return goods if
his customer did not pay him: “I suppose it’s like any contract. It’s breakable
isn’t it. But I would be morally obliged to find another buyer for the goods
like I have done in the past”. That answer was entirely inconsistent with his
statements that the parties had agreed that the goods could be returned if the
customers did not pay. Even if the agreement was that the goods could be
returned there was a serious risk that the purchasers, about which very little
was known, would simply abscond with the goods. Given the value of the goods,
even if that risk was small, it is surprising that the appellant was prepare to
deal with buyers without making full enquiries about them and their Freight
Forwarders. Mr Rowbotham also said that the vendors always knew and agreed to
the destination of the goods. It is even more surprising that they were
prepared to relinquish control of the goods before payment and contrary to
their normal terms as expressed in their documents because if any buyer
absconded with the goods they would risk losing very considerable sums.
76. Nor did Mr
Rowbotham have an answer to the question why, if the vendors knew the
destination of the goods, they did not deal with the appellant’s customers
directly and keep more of the total profit available within the chain of
transactions for themselves.
77. Mr Rowbotham
accepted that his company had been in a privileged position by being able to
deal on ship on hold terms and on terms that it did not have to pay for the
goods until it had been paid. Apart from asserting that was how his business
model worked he was unable to give what we regard as a satisfactory explanation
of why he was allowed that privileged position.
78. Mr Rowbotham
agreed when he was cross-examined that, although he felt he had succeeded in
avoiding dealing with people who went missing, he had in fact dealt with
fraudulent people. He asserted that that conclusion was only with the benefit
of hindsight. We accept that some of the facts that show the other people
involved in the transactions were involved with fraud were outside Mr
Rowbotham’s knowledge. An example is the low level of profits made by the
people who sold goods to the appellant. That was a fact that he did not know.
79. However, other
facts known to Mr Rowbotham and therefore to the appellant are such that it
should have been obvious that the transactions were connected with fraud. We
next set out some examples.
80. It seems
obvious that given that the appellant found its trading partners, both sellers
and buyers, from the same readily accessible sources, those trading partners
ought to have been able to find each other thus cutting the appellant out of
the transaction and increasing their potential profit by 6% or thereabouts.
81. The goods also
made an apparently unnecessary journey to and from the UK which allowed the appellant to make an approximately 6% gross profit with a relatively small
employment of capital over a relatively short period. Goods were stored at a
facility 316 miles from the Channel Tunnel making the journey to and from the UK less efficient and more costly than might otherwise have been the case.
82. The way in which
the transactions were carried out on unrecorded verbal terms which contradicted
the extraordinarily vague written terms was remarkable (at least) given the
enormous value of the goods involved. As with the question of trading with
counterparties before due diligence was carried out, we find it significant
that the appellant was prepared to deal on vague terms understood between the
parties but not recorded, is evidence of contrivance and of the fact that the
appellant, through Mr Rowbotham, must have been well aware of that contrivance.
83. The fact that
everyone involved appeared to know how the deals should be done despite the
contradiction between the terms on which they were done and the written terms
shows that there was a cadre of traders who understood how the system worked
and it must have been obvious to Mr Rowbotham that the way these deals worked
was fundamentally similar to the types of deals he claimed to have avoided from
a desire to avoid becoming involved in fraudulent transactions.
84. Mr Rowbotham was
asked at the end of his evidence for an explanation of how the appellant’s
counterparties came to know what were the special terms on which they dealt with
the appellant. He then claimed that he spelled out to those counterparties
what the terms were. He had not given that explanation earlier in his evidence
and we reject it. We find that the parties knew how the transactions worked
because they were in that cadre of traders who knew how the system worked. The
truthfulness of Mr Rowbotham’s evidence as a whole comes into question because
of that untruthful assertion.
85. We find that
those facts were objectively an indication that the transactions were connected
with fraud. That is the more so as it was well known at the time that fraud
was a particular and common feature of the market in which the appellant
claimed to be operating and that these transactions were very similar to those of
the type known to Mr Rowbotham to be fraudulent. We do not agree that the mere
fact that he dealt with importers meant that he could be sure that these
transactions were not connected with fraud.
86. Two fundamental
questions arise from the transactions as they have been described to us.
First, is the question why so many traders were prepared to allow the appellant
the privilege of making large profits in transactions which appear to have had
no rational explanation? Why did some of those traders bring the goods to the
UK and sell them to the appellant then some other traders buy them from the
appellant in the UK for export in such short periods when it would appear they
could have avoided dealing with the appellant altogether and probably also to
have avoided bringing the goods to the UK in the first place? Secondly, why
were all the relevant parties prepared to deal on such vague and inconsistent
terms depending, as they did, on unrecorded allegedly oral variations to such
written terms as they had or on understandings that were not even actually
spelled out in the context of the individual transactions. We find that the
explanation is that the parties had prior knowledge of a scheme of trading and
how it operated.
87. Given that Mr
Rowbotham was an experienced businessman and an intelligent person and given
that we do not find his evidence was entirely truthful we also find that those
facts and the points we have made about trading before receipt of due diligence
and trading on terms different from those shown in the documents; all show that
he subjectively knew that the transactions were connected with fraud not just
that the objective characteristics of the transactions meant that he ought to
have known that fact (though we do also find that was the case).
88. We therefore
find that the appellant knew that its transactions were connected with fraud
and so the appeal is dismissed and the respondents were entitled to refuse to
give credit for the input tax in question.
89. This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
RICHARD BARLOW
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 31 March 2011