

## Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA)

### Decision notice

**Date:** 9 August 2022

**Public Authority:** Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis  
**Address:** New Scotland Yard  
Broadway  
London  
SW1H 0BG

### Decision (including any steps ordered)

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1. The complainant has requested information about the costs of providing personal security and protection to former Prime Ministers, from the Metropolitan Police Service (the "MPS"). The MPS said that some information was not held. It would neither confirm nor deny (NCND) holding the remaining information, citing the exemptions at sections 24(2) (National security), 31(3) (Law enforcement), 38(2) (Health and safety) and 40(5) (Personal information).
2. The Commissioner's decision is that the MPS was entitled to rely on section 24(2) FOIA. No steps are required.

### Request and response

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3. On 9 June 2021, the complainant wrote to the MPS and requested information in the following terms:
  - "1) Please provide the total costs of providing personal security and protection to former Prime Ministers in each of the last ten financial years and the current financial year to date.
  - 2) Please provide a breakdown of the costs or each former Prime Minister and the former Deputy Prime Minister, for each of these years. This should be costs incurred for each of:
    - a) John Major

- b) Tony Blair
- c) Gordon Brown
- d) David Cameron
- e) Nick Clegg
- f) Theresa May

for each year.

The costs provided should be the centrally recorded costs for their protection, which could include costs such as salary of staff, flights and accommodation and any associated administration costs. This list is not exclusive. If centrally recorded information is only held for a period shorter than ten years, please provide as many years of information as is held and accessible within the cost limit".

- 4. On 29 June 2021, the MPS responded. It advised that it would only confirm providing protection to serving Prime Ministers, which meant that, within the last 10 years, both David Cameron and Theresa May had served as Prime Ministers so would have received protection. However, it went on to explain that no information was held on individual costs as information was not recorded at this level; costs are only estimated for budgetary purposes at the start of a financial year, with an overall total budget being assigned to the Operational Command Unit providing the service.
- 5. With regard to the remainder of the request, the MPS would neither confirm nor deny ('NCND') whether protection was afforded to former Prime Ministers and a Deputy Prime Minister, citing the following exemptions:
  - Section 24(2) - National security
  - Section 31(3) - Law enforcement
  - Section 38(2) - Health and safety
  - Section 40(5) - Personal information
- 6. The complainant requested an internal review on 16 July 2021.
- 7. The MPS provided an internal review on 11 August 2021 in which it maintained its original position.

### **Scope of the case**

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- 8. The complainant contacted the Commissioner on 3 September 2021, to complain about the way his request for information had been handled. He said:

"It is not clear how a NCND response can be maintained for this request. It is widely known that the Metropolitan Police provides security to former prime ministers, whether they confirm this fact in writing or not. This has been widely reported.

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51383104>

<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1399748/former-pm-tony-blair-costs-taxpayers-millions-to-be-guarded-by-armed-cops-because-of-his-knowledge-of-nations-secrets/>

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1218408/Your-2m-year-guard-Tony-Blair-Former-PM-15m-leaving-office.html>

As such, maintaining an NCND position is irrational, as the information they are trying to withhold is already in the public domain, and as such maintaining this position could serve no practical public interest in maintaining national security or the security of former PMs, as any party wishing to cause a former PM harm already has this information to hand.

Turning to the public interest in transparency about the sums involved, the request is for high level total values, not granular financial records, and as such no logical inference between this figure and practical ways to exploit weaknesses in the security of former PMs could be drawn.

The force's public interest test focuses on the public interest in protecting national security, and assertions that disclosure could serve as some kind of "mosaic" effect of compromising this security.

While clear issues of public interest, with the kind of information requested it seems impossible that disclosure would "aid understanding of what resources the police use in protecting members", as per the wording of the Commissioner's previous decision the police force references.

The disclosure would provide no information about the number of security officers (which may well vary by location, event and time of year), their experience or salaries, or the kind of physical or technological resources the Met deploys to ensure the security of former PMs, which might reasonably assist someone looking to cause a former PM harm.

It is therefore impossible to draw a logical connection from the disclosure of this high level financial information to an increased threat in practice to any former PM from either a fanatic determined

to cause them harm or a more pragmatic terrorist looking to target them at a moment of maximal vulnerability, even in a mosaic sense.

On the other hand, recent lobbying scandals make the disclosure of this information important, to allow for the proper accountability of former PMs. David Cameron enjoys the privileges of former office, including publicly funded security, while engaging in widespread lobbying for personal gain. There have also been previous concerns about how Tony Blair has conducted himself while being supported [sic] taxpayer-funded security in pursuing international commercial roles with countries with questionable human rights records”.

There is therefore a clear public interest that the total cost of protecting former PMs [Prime Ministers] is made public, to allow their actions once they leave office to be seen in the light of the ongoing cost of supporting their public lives. This would ensure that future PMs could be held better accountable for their activities when they leave office given that this would be done in the context of a better public awareness of the level of public support they continue to enjoy after they step down as PM in terms of security.

This could lead to conduct with greater attention to the this [sic] fact and the public interest, rather than their own”.

9. The Commissioner advised the complainant that he considered the complaint to be about the NCND exemptions being relied on by the MPS. Therefore, the focus of his investigation would be to look at whether the MPS was entitled to NCND holding the requested information.
10. The Commissioner also told the complainant that his grounds of complaint referred to any `continuing' costs of those named **subsequent** to their being in post, and that the complainant had not queried the MPS' response in respect of it not holding any costs for David Cameron or Theresa May **during** their periods as serving Prime Ministers (which had occurred within the 10 years time span of his request). The complainant was invited to contact him if he disagreed with this scoping of the complaint. No contact was made so the Commissioner has only considered the NCND provisions being relied on.

## Reasons for decision

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### Neither confirm nor deny (“NCND”)

11. Section 1(1)(a) of FOIA requires a public authority to inform a requester whether it holds the information specified in the request.

12. The decision to use a NCND response will not be affected by whether a public authority does, or does not, in fact hold the requested information. The starting point, and main focus for NCND in most cases, will be theoretical considerations about the consequences of confirming or denying whether or not a particular type of information is held.
13. A public authority will need to use the NCND response consistently, over a series of separate requests, regardless of whether or not it holds the requested information. This is to prevent a single instance of refusing to confirm or deny being taken by requesters as an indication of whether or not information is in fact held.
14. The MPS has taken the position of neither confirming nor denying whether it holds any of the requested information in its entirety, citing sections 24(2) (National security), 31(3) (Law enforcement), 38(2) (Health and safety) and 40(5) (Personal information) of FOIA. The issue that the Commissioner has to consider is not one of disclosure of any requested information that may be held, it is solely the issue of whether or not the MPS is entitled to NCND whether it holds any information of the type requested by the complainant.
15. Put simply, in this case the Commissioner must consider whether or not the MPS is entitled to NCND whether it holds any cost information about protection it may or may not have provided for any of the parties named.
16. In conducting his investigation, the Commissioner has not found it necessary to know whether or not the MPS holds any information falling within the scope of the request. In his view, a decision can be made without knowledge of the existence (or otherwise) of the requested information. However, it is noted that the MPS advised the complainant that protection costs cannot be attributed to particular individuals, as it does not hold the information in such granular detail. Further clarification on this point can be found in the 'Other matters' section at the end of this decision notice.
17. The MPS has also said that the information described in the request, if it was held, would be fully exempt from disclosure.

## **Section 24 – National security**

18. Section 24(2) provides an exemption from the duty to confirm or deny where this is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
19. The FOIA does not define the term national security. However in *Norman Baker v the Information Commissioner and the Cabinet Office* (EA/2006/0045 4 April 2007) the Information Tribunal was guided by a House of Lords case (*Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman* [2001] UKHL 47) concerning whether the risk posed by a

foreign national provided grounds for his deportation. The Information Tribunal summarised the Lords' observations as follows:

- 'national security' means the security of the United Kingdom and its people;
  - the interests of national security are not limited to actions by an individual which are targeted at the UK, its system of government or its people;
  - the protection of democracy and the legal and constitutional systems of the state are part of national security as well as military defence;
  - action against a foreign state may be capable indirectly of affecting the security of the UK; and,
  - reciprocal co-operation between the UK and other states in combating international terrorism is capable of promoting the United Kingdom's national security.
20. The approach that the Commissioner takes to the term 'required' as it is used in this exemption is that this means 'reasonably necessary'. In effect, this means that there has to be a risk of harm to national security for the exemption to be relied upon, but there is no need for a public authority to prove that there is a specific, direct or imminent threat.
21. Therefore, section 24(2) is engaged if the exemption from the duty to confirm or deny is reasonably necessary for the purpose of safeguarding national security. The Commissioner considers that section 24(2) should be interpreted so that it is only necessary for a public authority to show that **either** a confirmation **or** a denial of whether requested information is held would be likely to harm national security. It is not necessary to show that harm would flow from both.
22. In its refusal notice, the MPS explained the following in respect of its NCND stance:
- "To confirm or deny that the MPS affords personal security and protection to former prime ministers and a deputy prime minister, could undermine the safeguarding of national security, allowing those with a criminal intent to gain an operational advantage over the MPS and place those who are afforded protection, protection officers and members of the public at risk".
23. When asking for an internal review, the complainant expressed the view that it is "well known that the Metropolitan Police provide close protection for former Prime Ministers, and as such none of the NCND exemptions are triggered". He said that: "Confirming that this

information is held cannot therefore have the effect of infringing national security ... as this is information which is already in the public domain whether your force takes an NCND response to this request or not".

24. In countering this view, the MPS advised the Commissioner that it had contacted its Royalty and Specialist Protection Command (RaSP)<sup>1</sup> prior to responding to his investigation enquires. RaSP confirmed:

"We do not (as long standing principle) disclose who receives protection other than Her Majesty the Queen and the current Prime Minister. The MPS do not confirm or deny protection regarding other individuals. We do this so as not to aid or assist in anyway [sic] at all with those who may wish to do harm to that individual and could in receipt of that information plan or prepare to do an act which may undermine or harm our protective security arrangements. Maintaining a neither confirm nor deny removes any consideration a would be attacker or hostile group may or may not have around protection leaving ambiguity and in that sense adds an additional layer of protection in itself. If it is simply not know what protection individuals have then it would be much more difficult to plan to target those individuals successfully or otherwise as the capability of what you may be up against is not known".

25. RaSP additionally stated that:

"... it is irrelevant what may or may not be thought or disclosed through court or the media re protection arrangements particularly in the historical sense as we will not confirm or deny that in the present and hence remain consistent and retain that additional layer of protection in ambiguity".

26. The MPS also contacted its Directorate of Media and Communications (DMC) to confirm if any press lines had been issued regarding police protection. DMC also advised that, as a matter of policy, it did not confirm the identity and/or roles of anybody who may receive close police protection. It said:

"The only two exceptions to this are that we do acknowledge that we provide the Queen and the serving Prime Minister with police protection. We do not comment on whether or not former Prime Ministers do or do not receive such protection and our position with

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<sup>1</sup> RaSP are responsible for protecting the Sovereign and other persons of importance including visiting dignitaries

the media is that we do not discuss matters of security relating to this”.

27. The MPS stressed:

“For avoidance of doubt, the MPS have never confirmed or commented on police protection concerning former Prime Ministers.

Media articles do not constitute as ‘official’ confirmation and may be wholly or partially inaccurate as these articles are “unofficial in nature” and not formally disclosed or ratified by the MPS itself”.

28. Therefore, whilst the complainant is of the view that it is widely known that some previous Prime Ministers have received protection, the MPS has advised that it has never made any such formal statement. Whilst the complainant included links to newspaper articles with his request, the MPS advised him: “The news articles you have referenced do not relate to official MPS press statements. The MPS has not placed information into the public domain related to the protection of former Prime Ministers and any associated costs”.

29. The complainant is also of the view that it is not clear how the high-level financial information he has requested could be of use to terrorists or to those intending harm to a former Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister. When requesting an internal review he said:

“The disclosed information would provide only a total cost, with no practically useful information reasonably extrapolate-able from this figure to the scope or type of security provided to these individuals, about which there would be a limited public interest in disclosure. Therefore, its disclosure would only serve to improve transparency, at no additional risk to the persons protected.

Crucially, it would allow the public to assess the appropriateness of actions of former PMs after their terms of office, with an understanding of the scale of the continued burden on the taxpayer they represent for their security”.

30. However, the Commissioner notes that it is not the costs per se that are being withheld. The MPS is refusing to confirm or deny whether or not the individuals named are afforded any protection at all. The issue being considered is therefore the extent of any protection that the MPS may or may not provide, not any financial burden.



31. The MPS also drew attention to a previous decision notice<sup>2</sup> which, although based upon a request for annual costs of Royalty Protection Command, it found to be directly relevant to this request. It said the First-tier Tribunal emphasised during that case that:

“... when it came to preventing attacks on those persons who received protection, confidence and perception were often much more important than an accurate picture of the situation, i.e. a potential attacker was very often deterred because he or she might not regard the chances of success as being particularly attractive. Any such confidence that might otherwise be felt had therefore to be minimised; that could only be achieved by the attacker remaining uncertain about the levels of protection”.

32. The Commissioner accepts that confirming or denying whether information is held would give a genuine insight into how the police approach the protection of those named in the request, if indeed they are afforded protection. However, any level of protection has never been confirmed by the MPS and to do so by way of an FOI request would place previously unknown information into the public domain. Such confirmation would affect not only those named but, by extension, could lead to inferences being made regarding other political figures and whether or not they also receive police protection.

33. The Commissioner accepts that this reasoning is relevant to section 24; undermining the ability of the police to provide protection for political figures would be harmful to national security. He also notes that the terrorist threat level was, at the time of the request, classified as “substantial” meaning that the Home Office considered that such an attack was “likely”, thereby potentially increasing the extent of any prejudice following disclosure, or acknowledgement of, information in respect of national security. He agrees with the MPS that it is reasonable to proceed on the basis that this threat includes those named in the request.

34. The next step is to consider whether there would be a causal link between disclosure of the information in question and the predicted outcome of undermining the ability of the police to provide effective protection. This could be, for example, by worsening or extending the threat of a terrorist attack. The Commissioner accepts that there is a reasonable likelihood of there being individuals or groups who would seek to exploit this information to plan attacks.

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<sup>2</sup><https://informationrights.decisions.tribunals.gov.uk/DBFiles/Decision/i685/20120224%20Decision%20corrected%2013032012%20EA20110186.pdf>

35. The Commissioner recognises, for example, that terrorists can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather intelligence. He acknowledges that gathering information from publicly available sources may be a strategy used by those planning terrorist activities or other criminal attacks on the high profile political figures named in the request.
36. The MPS has also explained:

“It remains the case that confirming whether any security / protection arrangements have been in place in respect of former Prime Ministers and Deputy Prime Ministers would place these and other individuals in a position of direct vulnerability. Confirming or denying regarding any security / protection costs for former Prime Ministers and Deputy Prime Ministers would by default be a risk to national security. Confirming or denying whether protection information is held would increase the risk of former Prime Ministers being a target which is in effect an attack on the interests of the United Kingdom and render security measures less effective if disclosure allows the public to ascertain who the MPS may protect. It may also compromise possibly ongoing or future protection arrangements to safeguard the security and infrastructure of the UK.

To routinely confirm or deny individuals protected by the MPS at any point in time, would increase the risk of harm to the individuals concerned, as well as other individuals. To disclose which individuals may or may not be in receipt of protection would provide those seeking to attack the UK and high profile individuals with operational knowledge of who is and who is not deemed ‘at risk’ and in need of protection. This can lead criminals to change their targets based on details disclosed under the Act.

To avoid prejudice to the security of any individual in any given political or high profile position (whether they have or have not been provided protection), the MPS is required to neither confirm nor deny whether information is held.

Any threat to the well-being of former Prime Ministers may affect other political individuals as well as current Ministers. Should a former or current cabinet Minister or another political individual come to harm due to an adverse FOIA disclosure, this could result in both a constitutional, as well as a national and or international crisis.

... Any threat to the wellbeing of former prime ministers may affect current and/or former politicians. Should a former or current Prime Minister or another political individual come to harm due to an

adverse Freedom of Information disclosure, this could result in both a constitutional, as well as a national and/or international crisis and may worsen the existing threat from terrorism.

Therefore, the MPS considers the personal safety of former Prime Ministers is inextricably linked to the national security of the UK. To publicly acknowledge whether or not protection is afforded under Freedom of Information legislation in accordance with our duty under Section 1(1)(a), would be likely to prejudice the safeguarding of our national security.

Confirmation or denial of the information requested would provide individuals intent on committing acts of terrorism with valuable information as to the level of resistance they might encounter when undertaking such an act. There remains the possibility of a mosaic effect being established through continual confirmation or denial of protection arrangements under FOIA, whereby disclosed information could be coupled with other available information enabling comparisons to be made with other individuals that may or may not be in receipt of protective security arrangements. It remains the case that there is evidence that those planning terrorist attack [sic] have made use of a wide range of sources when gathering information on their targets, including press reports, which were combined with physical reconnaissance to build a picture of an individual's protection level. To begin confirming or denying protection in respect of specific individuals who would be considered as possible targets for terrorism would be highly irresponsible.

This harm would be particularly pertinent if the MPS were to state that *no* protection is provided as this acknowledgement alone would be likely to increase the likelihood of criminal activity against former Prime Ministers, including the threat of, or actual physical assault. If the MPS were to continually confirm that protection **was** indeed provided in a particular instance, then by a process of elimination one could identify those individuals that are likely to be in receipt of protection and those that are not. To enable this type of deduction through FOIA requests increases the threat of or actual physical harm to a particular individual being likely to occur".

37. In reaching his conclusion in this case, the Commissioner does not dispute the very real risks which exist around the security of former Prime Ministers and other high profile individuals. It follows that, when considering the application of section 24, the Commissioner recognises that there may be grounds for issuing a NCND response in respect of what, on the face of it, appears to be harmless information. For example, it may be necessary to NCND holding information on the basis

that confirmation (or otherwise) of its existence it may assist terrorists or lone individuals when pieced together with other information they may obtain from other sources. Furthermore, were an attack planned on one of those named in the request, this may have wider safety implications for the general public, depending on the proposed location of such an attack.

38. In view of the above, the Commissioner finds that it is reasonably necessary for the purpose of national security for the MPS to NCND whether or not the requested information is held. His conclusion is, therefore, that the exemption provided by section 24(2) of FOIA is engaged.

### **The public interest test**

39. Having found that the exemption is engaged, the next step is to consider the balance of the public interest. In forming a conclusion on the balance of the public interest in this case, the Commissioner has taken into account the considerable public interest inherent in the maintenance of the exemption, as well as specific factors that apply in relation to the requested information.

### **Public interest arguments in favour of confirming or denying whether information is held**

40. The Commissioner has taken into consideration the complainant's views, which are included above.
41. The MPS advised that to confirm or deny whether the information is held would increase public awareness of the cost of any security / protection arrangements in respect of high profile individuals. It would allow the MPS to be held to account for its expenditure and the deployment of its resources.
42. It also accepted that confirmation or denial would: "provide an accurate picture of any MPS engagements in this area, allowing scrutiny of MPS actions and decisions within their national security remit".

### **Public interest arguments in favour of maintaining the exemption**

43. The MPS argued that confirming or denying whether it held the requested information would provide intelligence to would-be criminals which would assist them in planning activities and put both the named parties, and those in their vicinity, at risk. Confirming or denying could also be used by them to identify areas where police activity is, or is not, focused on personal protection for individuals.

44. The MPS has argued that its maintenance of an NCND position is vital as it enables it to "efficiently and effectively employ or maintain policing tactics" to counter threats to the security of any person.

45. It further explained that:

"Confirming or denying the requested information [sic] would render security measures less effective by revealing levels of personal protection afforded to individual(s). Such a disclosure under the Act would mean that in order to counter this prejudice the MPS would need to employ additional resources to protect individuals from harm. In this case there is a strong public interest in preserving the MPS ability to disrupt any such threats.

If information were held and this fact were disclosed, it could be utilised as intelligence by those who seek to cause harm to any person who may be in receipt of protection for whatever reason. Similarly if the information were not held and this fact were disclosed, it would also provide intelligence to those who may seek to cause harm to particular people who may be high profile but not in receipt of protection".

46. It added: "It is vital that those who would seek to cause harm are kept guessing as to whether or not any particular individual is in receipt of protection".

47. The MPS explained that confirming or denying any policing arrangements, which refer to the personal protection of specific individuals, would render security measures less effective. It said:

"Personal protection is provided by the MPS to a number of people where it is in the national interest or where intelligence (information) suggests protection is necessary. Specific protection arrangements are applied in order to safeguard national security by ensuring that appropriate safety and security is provided to key figures such as the Queen and the Prime Minister. The disclosure of any other information would ultimately increase the risk of harm to those afforded personal protection and to the general public within that vicinity.

Persons/groups would be able to ascertain which individuals the MPS considers to be currently at most harm, and therefore which threats or campaigns to undermine UK security the police believe to be most pertinent".

48. It also argued that:

"To begin confirming or denying whether such information is held would require a review of protection arrangements and in all

likelihood it would require an increase in the number of protection officers employed. Risks to security arrangements and individual(s), particularly at the public expense, would not be in the public interest”.

### **The Commissioner's view**

49. Covering those factors in favour of confirmation or denial, the Commissioner recognises that there is a public interest in disclosure of this information, owing to its subject matter. The Commissioner's view is that any information that concerns the efforts of the police to ensure the safety and security of high profile figures will improve the public's knowledge and understanding of the work being undertaken by the police in this vital area.
50. Furthermore, any such protection would be paid for by the public purse. Accordingly, the Commissioner's view is that there is a valid public interest in confirming or denying whether any information is held in order to aid public understanding of what resources the police use in such protection.
51. Turning to the public interest in favour of maintenance of the exemption, in any situation where section 24(2) is found to be engaged, the Commissioner must recognise the public interest inherent in this exemption. Safeguarding national security is a matter of the most fundamental public interest; its weight can be matched only where there are also fundamental public interests in favour of confirmation that the requested information is held.
52. In this case the public interest in the maintenance of the exemption concerns preserving the ability of the police to provide effective security for high profile political figures and the wider public, which may be put at risk were its security arrangements widely known. Clearly, that public interest weighs very heavily in favour of maintaining the exemption.
53. In conclusion, the Commissioner has recognised the valid public interest in favour of disclosure, given the subject matter of the requested information. He does not, however, believe that it matches the weight of the public interest in avoiding a disclosure that could be detrimental to national security. The finding of the Commissioner is, therefore, that the public interest in the maintenance of the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure and so the MPS was not obliged to confirm or deny whether the requested information is held.
54. As the Commissioner has determined that this exemption is properly engaged he has not found it necessary to consider the other exemptions cited.

## Other matters

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55. Although they do not form part of this notice the Commissioner wishes to provide the following information which he gathered during his investigation and which may be of assistance.

56. To aid his understanding, the Commissioner asked the MPS the following:

“If requested, as you have confirmed that you provide personal security and protection to the current PM, would you be able to calculate the current costs? I do not need to know whether you would disclose the amount, just whether you would be able to ascertain the costs”.

57. The MPS responded thus:

“No we would not be able to calculate the costs for the current PM due to the following reasons:-

We would not be able to calculate (or estimate to any level of accuracy) the cost of providing MPS personal security and protection at Principal level.

We do not have the Finance, Expenses, Uniform, ICT [Information and Communications Technology] and HR [Human Resources] systems to track the exact cost of each Principal. Information is not held in an electronic format or in hard copy which would allow us to easily identify all cost information in relation to overall security costs for the Met Police. There is no system which allow the MPS to collate all costs accurately by Principal. The majority of cost information is recorded on Police Standard Operating Platform (PSOP) but the system is not set up in a way that we can get all the necessary details / breakdown to separate out costs specific to any Principals. PSOP is a system, which deals with Human Resources, Training, Finance, Commercial and Purchasing services.

In addition there are a large number of support functions that would need apportioning such as SEG [Special Escort Group], Duties, Events team, any ministerial residences, Downing Street etc. and then we would need to review the ARVs [Armed Response Vehicle] in MO19 [Met Operations 19 Specialist Firearms Command], Accommodation, SSCL [Shared Services Connected Ltd], CTPHQ [Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters], Overheads etc. A range of apportionments and assumptions would need to be considered to go through these. It is very difficult to provide service

/ activity costings when the MPS does not operate like that through cost centres”.

58. In view of the time period of the request, ie 10 years, the Commissioner also asked the following:

“How long do you retain costings for personal security and protection generally – please provide records management extracts to support your position”.

59. The MPS responded:

“We do not hold specific personal security and protection costs at Principal level as explained above. We only hold costs at a cost centre level. For this level of costs I refer you to the MOPAC’s [Mayor's Office for Policing And Crime] Retention, Review and Disposal Policy. Under the Finance Section, page 8:-

[https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/02\\_-\\_retention\\_review\\_disposal\\_policy\\_draft.pdf](https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/02_-_retention_review_disposal_policy_draft.pdf)

- Finance reports Quarterly budget reports, working papers - Destroy when admin use complete
- Approvals/purchase year Purchase/sales orders - Destroy 7 years after end of financial year.
- Expenditure Invoices, receipts, bank statements, vouchers, ledger - Destroy 8 years after end of financial year
- Payroll Claim forms, pay/tax records - Destroy 7 years after the end of financial year”.



## Right of appeal

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60. Either party has the right to appeal against this decision notice to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights). Information about the appeals process may be obtained from:

First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights)  
GRC & GRP Tribunals,  
PO Box 9300,  
LEICESTER,  
LE1 8DJ

Tel: 0203 936 8963

Fax: 0870 739 5836

Email: [grc@justice.gov.uk](mailto:grc@justice.gov.uk)

Website: [www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/general-regulatory-chamber](http://www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/general-regulatory-chamber)

61. If you wish to appeal against a decision notice, you can obtain information on how to appeal along with the relevant forms from the Information Tribunal website.

62. Any Notice of Appeal should be served on the Tribunal within 28 (calendar) days of the date on which this decision notice is sent.

**Signed .....**

**Carolyn Howes**  
**Senior Case Officer**  
**Information Commissioner's Office**  
**Wycliffe House**  
**Water Lane**  
**Wilmslow**  
**Cheshire**  
**SK9 5AF**