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United Kingdom Information Tribunal including the National Security Appeals Panel |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Information Tribunal including the National Security Appeals Panel >> Jamal v IC [2008] UKIT EA_2008_0082 (19 December 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKIT/2008/EA_2008_0082.html Cite as: [2008] UKIT EA_2008_0082, [2008] UKIT EA_2008_82 |
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Information Tribunal Appeal
Number EA/2008/0082 Information Commissioner’s Ref:
FS50130697 |
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Heard at Procession House, London, EC4
Decision
Promulgated
On 1 December 2008
19 December 2008 |
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BEFORE
CHAIRMAN
ANNABEL
PILLING
and
LAY MEMBERS
JACQUELINE BLAKE ROGER
CREEDON |
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Between
MRS J JAMAL
Appellant
and
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent |
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Subject matter:
Information Tribunal
(Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2005 Application for striking out, Rule
9
Cases:
Bennett v ICO EA/2008/0033 |
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1 |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082 |
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Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs J Jamal
For the Respondent: Adam Sowerbutts |
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Decision
The Tribunal grants the
application of the Information Commissioner and this Appeal is struck out
under Rule 9 of the Information Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules
2005. |
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2 |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082
Reasons for Decision
Introduction
1. The Appellant has an
on-going complaint involving Halifax plc and Halifax Insurance Ireland
Ltd. This Appeal concerns a request for information made to the Financial
Services Authority (the ‘FSA’), an independent non-governmental body which
takes its powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000.
The Request for Information
2. By letter dated 1 August
2006, the Appellant made a request for information under the Freedom of
Information Act (the ‘FOIA’) that the FSA provide her with answers to a
number of questions regarding the handling of her mortgage account and
associated insurance by Halifax plc and Halifax Insurance Ireland Ltd. The
Appellant’s request consisted of some forty questions, some with multiple
parts.
3. The following day, the
Appellant wrote to the Information Commissioner (the ‘Commissioner’)
asking the Commissioner to approach the FSA and compel it to respond to
her request for information.
4. The Commissioner made
enquiries and the FSA advised that the request for information had not
been received. On 11 September 2006 the Commissioner provided the FSA with
a copy of the Appellant’s request and asked the FSA to provide the
Appellant with a response within twenty working days of
receipt.
5. The FSA replied
substantively on 11 October 2006 by way of a sixteen page letter. Where
the questions raised by the Appellant related to, or were within, the
FSA’s remit, answers were provided, save for three of them. In respect of
the remaining questions (which related to the Appellant’s individual
issues with either Halifax plc or Halifax Insurance Ireland Ltd), the FSA
referred the Appellant either back to the relevant company or to the
Financial Ombudsman Service (the ‘FOS’), as the appropriate complaints
body.
6. However, the FSA refused
to confirm or deny that information was held in relation to question 10 of
the Appellant’s request, citing section 31 of FOIA (law
enforcement).
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082 |
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It regarded question 13 as
hypothetical and also refused to provide the information in what the
Commissioner has referred to as the second part of question 40 (the latter
requests having no numbering in the original letter), claiming that the
information was exempt from disclosure under sections 21 (accessible by
other means), 43 (commercial interests) and 44 (prohibition on disclosure)
of FOIA. Those questions were:
“10. How many complaints or
investigation have FSA undertaken against Halifax PLC and Halifax
Insurance Ireland Limited?;
13. Would FSA release any
other correspondences and where necessary forward copies of them for my
attention?;
40. … [The first part of question 40 was addressed by the
FSA]…
Furthermore, I would also
request for you to forward to me copies of any Halifax correspondences and
any documents that Halifax PLC & Halifax Insurance Ireland Limited
send to FSA.”
7. On 13 October 2006 the
Appellant requested an internal review of the FSA’s decision.
8. The FSA completed its
internal review and communicated its findings to the Appellant on 10
January 2007. The internal review upheld the decision to rely on section
31 of FOIA to neither confirm nor deny that information was held in
relation to question 10 and upheld the application of the exemptions under
sections 21, 43 and 44 of FOIA to the withheld information.
The complaint to the Information
Commissioner
9. On 31 January 2007 the
Appellant contacted the Information Commissioner to complain about the
decision of the FSA to withhold information.
10. The Commissioner began
his investigation in April 2008. Due to the wide scope of the original
forty questions, the Commissioner wrote to the Appellant to clarify
matters and to explain that the information withheld by the FSA under
sections 21, 31 and 44 of FOIA related to the information requested in
questions 10, 13 and the
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082 |
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second part of question 40. The
Commissioner informed the Appellant that, consequently, he would be
focusing his investigation on the handling of those three information
requests unless the Appellant made representations to the contrary. She
did not do so. The Commissioner noted that the FSA had complied with the
bulk of the forty requests made by the Appellant.
11. The Commissioner also
began correspondence with the FSA, asking it to provide a copy of the
withheld information and for further explanation regarding the application
of the exemptions.
12. The FSA responded, and
with regard to question 40, indicated that it now considered that this
information was also exempt under section 12 of FOIA. Section 12 of FOIA
provides that a public authority is not obliged to comply with a request
for information if it estimates that the cost of complying with the
request would exceed the appropriate cost limit, as set by The Freedom of
Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations
2004.
13. During the course of the
correspondence, the FSA concluded that, although it had initially regarded
question 13 as a hypothetical question rather than an actual request for
information, it now considered that the cost of complying would exceed the
appropriate cost limit and therefore was exempt under section 12 of
FOIA.
14. The FSA further stated
that whilst it would take less time to comply with question 10, it had
concluded that all the information was exempt under section 12 of FOIA in
light of Regulation 5 of The Freedom of Information and Data Protection
(Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004. This provides that where
two or more requests for information are made by the same person and
relate, to any extent, to the same or similar information, the estimated
cost of complying with any of the requests is to be taken to be the total
costs of complying with all of them.
15. The FSA provided
information as to the quantity of the withheld material. Although the
initial request was for information regarding Halifax plc or Halifax
Insurance Ireland Ltd, following a merger in September 2001, both these
brands had become part of the HBOS PLC Group, divided into a number of
business units or divisions. The FSA holds a large amount of information
concerning the Halifax brand, both in paper and electronic format; in
paper format at least 62 files (of several hundred |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082 |
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pages each) in relation to the
Halifax brand alone, and over 1500 electronic files containing documents
with the word “Halifax” in. The FSA estimated that it would take 20
minutes to locate and retrieve the information from each paper file and 3
minutes for each electronic file, making a total of 96 hours, therefore
exceeding the appropriate cost limit.
16. The Commissioner
concluded that the FSA had correctly applied section 12 of FOIA in
relation to the withheld information.
17. However, the
Commissioner found that the FSA were in breach of section 1(1)(a) and
1(1)(b) of FOIA in initially treating the Appellant’s question 13 as a
hypothetical rather than actual request for information.
18. The Commissioner also
found that the FSA were in breach of section 17(5) of FOIA by failing to
inform the Appellant in its initial refusal notice that it was also
seeking to rely on section 12 of FOIA.
19. The Commissioner also
found that the FSA failed in its obligation to provide advice and
assistance to the Appellant in accordance with the provisions of section
16 of FOIA and the Code of Practice under section 45 of FOIA by not
inviting the Appellant to refine her request.
20. A Decision Notice, dated
4 September 2008, was served setting out the Commissioner’s
conclusions.
21. Although he did not find
that there had been a breach of section 16 of FOIA, the Commissioner
required that the FSA to offer further advice and assistance to the
Appellant in order to assist her in bringing the remaining elements of her
information request within the appropriate limit and should then provide
the information requested or issue a refusal notice compliant with section
17 of FOIA.
The Appeal to the Tribunal
22. On 30 September 2008 the
Appellant appealed to the Tribunal against the Decision Notice. “Some” of
the grounds of appeal were set out. The Appellant provided a further
letter containing submissions dated 27 October 2008. |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082
23. The Information
Commissioner served a Reply dated 27 October 2008 submitting that the
Notice of Appeal disclosed no valid grounds of appeal and applying for the
appeal to be struck out under Rule 9 of the Information Tribunal
(Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2005.
24. The Tribunal issued
Directions dated 5 November 2008. The Appellant was given the opportunity
to provide written representations as to:
i) what reasonable grounds of
appeal were disclosed in the Notice of Appeal such that the appeal should
not be struck out under Rule 9;
ii) whether the Appeal has a
realistic prospect of success such that the appeal should not be dismissed
summarily under Rule 10;
iii) whether an oral hearing
would be necessary if she disagreed with the Information Commissioner’s
view that the matter could properly be dealt with by way of a paper
hearing.
25. The Appellant was also
provided with a copy of The Freedom of Information and Data Protection
(Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004. This was to ensure that she
understood that the FSA and the Commissioner had applied the relevant
Regulations as to the application of the appropriate limit under section
12 of FOIA. In respect of the FSA, under Regulation 3(2), the appropriate
limit referred to in section 12 of FOIA is £450.00. Under Regulation 4(3),
in estimating the cost of complying with a request, a public authority may
take account only of the costs it reasonably expects to incur in relation
to the request in
(a) determining whether it holds the
information,
(b) locating the information, or a document which may
contain the information,
(c) retrieving the
information, or a document which may contain the information,
and
(d) extracting the information from a document containing
it.
Regulation 4(4) prescribes the
rate to undertake those tasks at £25.00 per person per hour. This means
that the estimate of the time taken to comply with the
request
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082 |
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would have to be less than 18
hours otherwise a public authority could, if it chose, rely on the
exemption at section 12 of FOIA.
26. The Appellant responded
by letter dated 10 November 2008. She stated that she enclosed the grounds
of appeal, submitted that the Appeal had a realistic prospect of success
and agreed that the Appeal should be dealt with by way of written
submissions.
The Powers of the Tribunal
27. The Tribunal’s powers in
relation to appeals under section 57 of the FOIA are set out in section 58
of the FOIA, as follows:
(1) If on an appeal under
section 57 the Tribunal considers-(a) that the notice against which the
appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or
(b) to the extent that the
notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he
ought to have exercised his discretion differently,
the Tribunal shall allow the
appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the
Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the
appeal.
On such an appeal, the
Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question
was based.
28. Under Rule 4 of the
Information Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2005, an appeal against a
Decision Notice must be made in writing and must state the grounds of
appeal.
29. The Commissioner’s
Decision was that the FSA dealt with the application of section 12 in
accordance with FOIA and that the cost of complying would exceed the
appropriate limit - it is therefore this Decision that the Appellant is
appealing against. There was no consideration of the exemptions raised
earlier by the FSA (that is, sections 21, 31, 43 and 44 of
FOIA).
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082
The Issues for the Tribunal
30. The Information
Commissioner has applied for the appeal to be struck out under Rule 9 of
the Information Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2005 on the basis
that the Notice of Appeal discloses no reasonable grounds of appeal. The
material parts of Rule 9 provide as follows:
9. (1) ……. where the
Commissioner is of the opinion that an appeal does not lie to, or cannot
be entertained by, the Tribunal, or that the notice of appeal discloses no
reasonable grounds of appeal, he may include in his reply under Rule 8(2)
above a notice to that effect stating the grounds for such contention and
applying for the appeal to be struck out.
(2) An application under
this rule may be heard as a preliminary issue or at the beginning of the
substantive appeal.
(3) ……
31. There is little guidance
provided for the Tribunal on the circumstances in which it will be
appropriate to strike out an appeal under Rule 9. We have adopted the
approach taken by a differently constituted panel of this Tribunal in the
case of Bennett v Information Commissioner EA/2008/0033, which, in
fact, consisted of two of the same members of the panel for this
Appeal.
32. The Tribunal did not
consider it to be in the interests of either party, or in the wider public
interest, for this matter to proceed to a full hearing in light of the
application made by the Information Commissioner for the appeal to be
struck out. We reiterate what was said in Bennett, that although
there may be occasions in which it is considered appropriate to direct
that the parties prepare for the substantive hearing before the
application under Rule 9 is determined, bearing in mind the inevitable
costs and time that would be expended, we are of the opinion that these
occasions will be rare.
33. Although no procedure
for the determination of an application under Rule 9 is prescribed by the
Rules, the Tribunal considered it appropriate in this case, as in
Bennett, to adopt the procedure prescribed under Rule 10. As
outlined above, the |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082 |
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Appellant was notified that the
Tribunal proposed to determine the issue, she was given the opportunity to
make written representations against the proposal and to request the
Tribunal to hear oral representations
34. The Tribunal must
consider whether the grounds of appeal advanced by the Appellant contain a
reasonable ground of appeal under the test established in
Bennett:
a reasonable ground of appeal
is one that is readily identifiable from the Notice of Appeal, relates to
an issue the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide and is realistic not
fanciful.
35. If there is no
reasonable ground of appeal, the Tribunal must grant the application of
the Information Commissioner for the appeal to be struck out under Rule
9.
36. We have considered each
of the eight grounds that can be identified from the letter submitted by
the Appellant as her Notice of Appeal.
37. We note that the
Appellant is not legally represented and it may be that she does not fully
understand the jurisdiction and remit of the FSA, the Commissioner’s
Office and this Tribunal. We have, for example, no powers to order the FSA
or the FOS to conduct any further investigation into her original
complaints about her mortgage provider.
1. That neither the FSA nor
the ICO “have fully taken into account the quality of the responses made
by either the FSA and/or ICO.”
38. Our role as a Tribunal
is not quality checking the work of the Commissioner, although it would be
a matter of concern to us if the Commissioner came to a decision on the
basis of inadequate consideration of the issues. That is not the case
here.
39. While the submissions do
not specifically address the findings of the Commissioner in respect of
the application of section 12 of FOIA, we note that we are satisfied that
the Commissioner did fully consider the responses of the FSA with regard
to the calculations used to estimate the time that it would take to comply
with the request. It is clear from the large volume of material that the
FSA holds, that to locate and |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082 |
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retrieve the information
requested would take considerably longer than the 18 hours envisaged by
the Regulations.
40. We also note that the
Commissioner was not, in fact, satisfied with the quality of the FSA’s
responses and found that the FSA had breached provisions of FOIA and that
he requested the FSA to comply with the requirement under section 16 to
provide further advice and assistance to the Appellant to refine her
request to bring it within the cost limit.
41. This does not amount to a ground of
appeal.
2. That the
Appellant either does not understand, or disagrees with, the application
of a calculation for the costs of complying with her request based upon a
rate of £25.00 per person per hour, and a total of £450.00. She wishes to
have the “criteria”, “procedure” and “methodology” used in reaching those
figures explained.
42. The Tribunal hopes that
now the Appellant has been provided with a copy of The Freedom of
Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations
2004 she understands how the FSA came to apply those figures. These
Regulations are part of the statutory framework governing the way in which
requests for information to public authorities made under FOIA are dealt
with. The prescribed limits set by the Regulations apply to all public
authorities, not just the FSA. The fact that the Appellant disagrees with
the fact that the FSA have calculated the cost of complying with the
request for information in accordance with the statutory guidance does not
relate to any issue this Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide and is not a
ground of appeal against the Decision Notice.
3. That the FSA
should have anticipated that it would receive RFIs from “customers”, like
the Appellant and, consequently, should organise its records in such a way
that all information it holds was readily available and free of charge to
“customers”, like the Appellant.
43. It appears that the
Appellant has misunderstood the role and remit of the FSA and perhaps
confused it with the FOS. The FSA is an independent
non-governmental
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082 |
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body, wholly financed by the
financial services industry, that is, the firms it regulates. Its funding
is not provided by private individuals or the tax payer. It does not deal
with private individual’s complaints about specific financial
institutions; such complaints are dealt with by the FOS.
44. As stated above, the
FSA, as a public authority falling within the category at Regulation 3(2)
of The Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and
Fees) Regulations 2004, was entitled to rely upon the exemption at section
12 of FOIA if it estimated that the cost of complying with the request
would exceed the appropriate limit. We have seen no evidence to suggest
that the FSA proposed to charge for the communication of information as it
could choose to do under section 13 of FOIA. To do so would not give rise
to a reasonable ground of appeal.
45. This does not therefore
amount to an issue the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide and is not a
reasonable ground of appeal against the Decision Notice.
4. That the FSA should have
organised its filing and retention system to be able to deal specifically
with RFIs such as that pursued by the Appellant. Also that the Appellant
should have been told both the time and cost of copying the information
held onto memory disk.
46. The FSA are limited in
how they reach the estimate of the cost of complying with the request.
Under Regulation 4(3), a public authority can only take account of the
estimated time taken to carry out the prescribed tasks and no other. The
Appellant appears to be criticising the FSA for organising their filing
systems in such a way that to locate and retrieve every document that fell
within the wide request made by her would take longer than 18 hours. This
is not a matter within our jurisdiction; we have no power to order a
public authority to keep its business records in a particular
way.
47. The Appellant also
submits that the FSA should have addressed the time and cost of copying
the information held onto a memory disk. Whilst it is open to an applicant
to request that information be provided in an electronic format, a public
authority is required by section 11 of FOIA to give effect to that
preference “so far as reasonably practicable”, having regard to all the
circumstances, including the
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082
cost of doing so. In this case it
is clear that the prior cost of locating and retrieving the information
requested from the electronic and paper files would exceed the appropriate
limit.
48. This submission does not
relate to an issue the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide and is not a
reasonable ground of appeal against the Decision Notice.
5. That the FSA
have chosen to set up and maintain their information system “without any
input from their customers who have already paid for this and I should not
be forced to pay for it.”
49. Again, the Appellant
appears to have misunderstood the role of and nature of her relationship
with the FSA.
50. How the FSA set up and
maintain their information system is not a matter this Tribunal has
jurisdiction over and does not amount to a reasonable ground of appeal
against the Decision Notice.
6. That neither
the FSA nor the Commissioner have “fully accounted for the supervisory
quality of the FSA in its dealing of ensuring the full disclosure of
information from them and FOS.”
51. This is a compliant
about the supervisory quality of the FSA and/or the FOS and not a matter
that this Tribunal has any jurisdiction over. It does not amount to a
reasonable ground of appeal against the Decision Notice.
52. We note that the
Commissioner states in his Reply that the “Commissioner satisfied himself
that the quality of the FSA’s responses as they related to the Appellant’s
information request and the application of FOIA were satisfactory.” We
find this statement to be misleading in light of the breaches of FOIA
found by the Commissioner in the Decision Notice. It is clear that the
Commissioner was far from satisfied with some of the responses by the FSA
and required that it take further action to comply with its duties under
section 16 of FOIA. |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082
7. “As to why contents of my letters of… a
(date), b (date), c (date) and d (date)”
53. This ground does no more
than identify four letters and makes no further statement, assertion or
submission. Accordingly we cannot identify any issue that this ground
relates to and conclude that it does not amount to a reasonable ground of
appeal against the Decision Notice.
8. The FSA and
companies complained about are hiding behind sections of the law to avoid
doing the right thing which means that there is no accountability from the
FSA and/or companies complained about. “Some of these include FSA:-(a)
Have not given me a specific figure as to how much it would take to
print and
supply a stamped addressed envelope.
(b) Are unwilling to supply definitions of what
“reasonably accessible” is.
(c) Are not using these
sections to avoid carrying out its ethical, moral and legal obligations to
investigate the complaint.
(d) Whether they are not
simply flogging me off by hiding behind sections 21, 31 (and 44) and
section 348 of the FSMA 2000, regardless of whether there are any merits
in my complaint.
(e) Have not addressed
many of the issues and questions that I have raised with them. The two
prime example are:
(a) Exit fees charged by the mortgage
lender
(b) How much time did FSA
spend on points 8 and 5 of my letter of 13.10.06 and 4.11.06
respectively?
54. We are of the opinion
that the submissions made in relation to this ground relate, in the main,
to the substantive complaint the Appellant has against her mortgage
provider. In particular points (a), (b), (c) and (e) above clearly relate
to the primary grievance and are not matters that this Tribunal has any
jurisdiction over. This Tribunal is concerned with the complaint about the
Commissioner’s decision in the Decision Notice. |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082
55. The Commissioner submits
that this ground appears to be based upon a serious misunderstanding of
the Commissioner’s statutory role and the powers devolved to him under the
terms of FOIA.
56. Neither the FSA nor the
Commissioner nor this Tribunal are permitted to disregard the operation of
legislation in order to consider “the wider picture” or “be creative” as
the Appellant suggests, however it may be perceived by any party,
including the Commissioner himself.
57. We note that with regard
to point (d) above, the Appellant appears to be challenging the FSA’s
initial decision to refuse to provide information on the basis of
exemptions in other sections of FOIA. This Tribunal is concerned with the
decision of the Commissioner in the Decision Notice. The Commissioner
concluded that the FSA was correct in its application of section 12 of
FOIA and he did not go on to consider the possible application of the
exemptions claimed previously.
58. In responding to this
particular ground of appeal, the Commissioner, in his Reply, states that
“he is satisfied that the provisions of FOIA have been applied in this
case”. As we have already noted in relation to a similar submission, we
find this statement to be misleading in light of the breaches of FOIA
found by the Commissioner in the Decision Notice. It is clear that the
Commissioner was far from satisfied that all the provisions of FOIA had
been applied in this case, and required that the FSA take further action
to comply with its duties under section 16 of FOIA.
59. For the reasons given,
we are not satisfied that any of the matters raised by the Appellant in
relation to Ground 8 amount to a ground of appeal.
60. We have also considered
the submissions made to the Tribunal by the Appellant in her letters of 27
October 2008 and 10 November 2008. Some of these are submissions about the
substantive complaint about the Appellant’s mortgage lender, some about
bodies following Rules and Regulations. We do not consider it necessary or
appropriate to respond to each submission in turn but we do have some
observations. |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0082
61. In her letter of 27
October 2008, the Appellant refers to subsequent requests for information
which are outside the scope of this Appeal. She also raises the question
of “compensation” which is not a matter this Tribunal has any power to
order.
62. In her letter of 10
November 2008, the Appellant appears to challenge the estimate made by the
FSA that it would take over 18 hours to comply with the request but
without providing any submissions as to the basis for that challenge. As
we have stated above, it is clear from the volume of material identified
by the FSA that it would take considerably longer than 18 hours to comply.
This does not amount to a realistic ground of appeal.
Conclusions
63. It would appear that the
Appellant does not fully understand the limited jurisdiction of this
Tribunal. We have no power to order the FSA or any other party to
investigate her complaint against a mortgage lender.
64. We are satisfied that
the Appellant has been provided with a copy of The Freedom of
Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations
2004.
65. Although the Appellant
would wish it otherwise, the Tribunal, as well as the FSA and the
Commissioner, must apply the legislation; we cannot be “creative” as the
Appellant suggests.
66. For the reasons set out
above, we have concluded that the Notice of Appeal discloses no reasonable
ground of appeal and accordingly the appeal must be struck out under Rule
9 of the Information Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules
2005.
67. Our decision is
unanimous.
Signed:
Annabel Pilling
Deputy Chairman
Date: 19 December
2008 |
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