

O/707/22

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

**IN THE MATTER OF
TRADE MARK APPLICATION NO. UK00003650321
BY GET-NET UK LTD AND ARTEM ZAITCEV
TO REGISTER:**

wolLeto

**AS A TRADE MARK
IN CLASSES 9 & 36**

AND

**IN THE MATTER OF OPPOSITION THERETO
UNDER NO. 600002027
BY WOLLET LTD**

BACKGROUND AND PLEADINGS

1. GET-NET UK LTD and Artem Zaitcev (“the applicants”) applied to register the trade mark shown on the cover page of this decision in the UK on 2 June 2021. The application was accepted and published in the Trade Marks Journal on 20 August 2021 in respect of the following goods and services:

Class 9: *Multifunction Prepaid/ Debit card.*

Class 36: *Merchant acquiring; Wire transfers; Electronic Money Issuer.*

2. On 17 November 2021, Wollet Ltd (“the opponent”) filed a notice of opposition under the fast track opposition procedure on the basis of section 5(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”). The opposition is directed at the applicants’ mark in its entirety. The opponent relies on the following trade marks:

Wollet

WOLLET

(Series of two marks)

UK registration no. UK0000360167

Filing date 25 February 2021; date of entry in register 2 July 2021

Relying on all the goods and services listed in the **Annex** to this decision.

(“the opponent’s registration”)

3. The opponent submits that there is a likelihood of confusion because the applicants’ mark is similar to its own mark and the respective services are identical or similar.

4. The applicant filed a defence and counterstatement denying the claims made.

5. Rule 6 of the Trade Marks (Fast Track Opposition)(Amendment) Rules 2013, S.I. 2013 No. 2235, disapplies paragraphs 1-3 of Rule 20 of the Trade Marks Rules 2008 (“TMR”) but provides that Rule 20(4) shall continue to apply. Rule 20(4) states that:

“(4) The registrar may, at any time, give leave to either party to file evidence upon such terms as the registrar thinks fit”.

6. The effect of the above is that parties are required to seek leave in order to file evidence (other than where proof of use evidence is required to be filed with the notice of opposition) in fast track oppositions. No leave was sought in respect of these proceedings.

7. Rule 62(5) (as amended) states that arguments in fast track proceedings shall be heard orally only if (i) the Office requests it or (ii) either party to the proceedings requests it and the Registrar considers that oral proceedings are necessary to deal with the case justly and at proportionate cost. Otherwise, written arguments will be taken. A hearing was neither requested nor considered necessary. Neither party filed written submissions in lieu of a hearing. Both parties represent themselves; GET-NET UK LTD represents both of the applicants. This decision is taken following a careful reading of all of the papers.

8. Although the UK has left the EU, section 6(3)(a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 requires tribunals to apply EU-derived national law in accordance with EU law as it stood at the end of the transition period. The provisions of the Act relied on in these proceedings are derived from an EU Directive. This is why this decision continues to make reference to the trade mark case-law of EU courts.

Section 5(2)(b): legislation and case law

9. Section 5(2)(b) of the Act reads as follows:

“(2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because-

(a) ...

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected,

there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood or association with the earlier trade mark.”

10. Section 5A of the Act states as follows:

“Where grounds for refusal of an application for registration of a trade mark exist in respect of only some of the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is applied for, the application is to be refused in relation to those goods and services only.”

11. An earlier trade mark is defined in section 6 of the Act, the relevant parts of which state:

“(6)(1) In this Act an “earlier trade mark” means –

(a) a registered trade mark, international trade mark (UK) or Community trade mark or international trade mark (EC) which has a date of application for registration earlier than that of the trade mark in question, taking account (where appropriate) of the priorities claimed in respect of the trade marks,

(2) References in this Act to an earlier trade mark include a trade mark in respect of which an application for registration has been made and which, if registered, would be an earlier trade mark by virtue of subsection (1)(a) or (b), subject to its being so registered.”

12. The opponent’s registration qualifies as a series of earlier marks within the meaning of section 6(1) of the Act because it has an earlier filing date than the applicants’ mark. The applicants requested that the opponent provide evidence of proof of use of the opponent’s registration. However, the opponent’s registration completed its registration less than five years before the application date of the applicants’ mark and, as a result, is not subject to proof of use provisions.

13. The following principles are gleaned from the decisions of the EU courts in *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, Case C-251/95, *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc*, Case C-39/97, *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V.* Case C-342/97, *Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG & Adidas Benelux BV*, Case C-425/98, *Matratzen Concord GmbH v OHIM*, Case C-3/03, *Medion AG v. Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany & Austria GmbH*, Case C-120/04, *Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas v OHIM*, Case C-334/05P and *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, Case C-591/12P:

(a) The likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impression created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) however, it is also possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;

(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;

(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings to mind the earlier mark, is not sufficient;

(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense;

(k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public will wrongly believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Comparison of the goods and services

14. The opponent's goods and services can be found in the **Annex** to this decision. The applicants' goods and services can be found in paragraph 1. I note that no evidence or submissions have been provided by either party to assist me in the goods and services comparison.

15. When making the comparison, all relevant factors relating to the goods and services in the specifications should be taken into account. In the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU") in *Canon*, Case C-39/97, the court stated at paragraph 23 of its judgment that:

"In assessing the similarity of the goods or services concerned, as the French and United Kingdom Governments and the Commission have pointed out, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services themselves should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary".

16. Guidance on this issue has also come from Jacob J. (as he was then) in the *Treat* case, [1996] R.P.C. 281, where he identified the factors for assessing similarity as:

- (a) The respective uses of the respective goods or services;
- (b) The respective users of the respective goods or services;
- (c) The physical nature of the goods or acts of service;
- (d) The respective trade channels through which the goods or services reach the market;
- (e) In the case of self-serve consumer items, where in practice they are respectively found or likely to be found in supermarkets and, in particular, whether they are or are likely to be found on the same or different shelves;
- (f) The extent to which the respective goods or services are competitive. This inquiry may take into account how those in trade classify goods, for instance, whether market research companies, who of course act for industry, put the goods or services in the same or different sectors.”

17. The General Court (“GC”) confirmed in *Gérard Meric v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market*, Case T-133/05, that, even if goods (although it equally applies to services) are not worded identically, they can still be considered identical if one term falls within the scope of another or (vice versa):

“29 In addition, the goods can be considered as identical when the goods designated by the earlier mark are included in a more general category, designated by the trade mark application (Case T-388/00 Institut für Lernsysteme v OHIM – Educational Services (ELS) [2002] ECR II-4301, paragraph 53) or when the goods designated by the trade mark application are included in a more general category designated by the earlier mark”

Class 9

18. “*Multifunctional prepaid/debit card*” in the applicants’ specification and “*financial payment services*” in the opponent’s specification are similar. In my view, the goods and services share users as it is likely that owners of prepaid/debit cards are likely to use them to make financial transactions. The goods and services also share trade channels as a company that provides prepaid/debit cards will most likely provide the service to make payments as well. However, it is my view that the goods and services differ in nature, method of use and purpose. I do not find that the goods and services are in competition nor are they complementary. Therefore, I find the goods and services to be similar to a low degree.

Class 36

19. It is my view that “*wire transfers*” in the applicants’ specification are services that allow for the electronic transfer of money. It is my view that these services fall in the broader category of “*financial and monetary transaction services*” in the opponent’s specification. Therefore, I find the services to be identical on the principle outlined in *Meric*.

20. In the absence of any submissions or evidence to the contrary, it is my view that “*merchant acquiring*” in the applicants’ specification are services for payment execution and processing provided to merchants to enable them to accept credit and debit card payments. Bearing this in mind, it is my view that the applicants’ services fall within the broader category of “*financial payment services*” in the opponent’s specification. Therefore, I find the services to be identical on the principle outlined in *Meric*.

21. It is my view that “*electronic money issuer*” in the applicants’ specification is a service that involves the issuance of money electronically. I note that the applicants’ service is indeed a service and not a good by virtue of it being applied for in class 36. In my view, these services can cover the transfer of money electronically and will fall in the wider category of “*financial and monetary transaction services*” in the opponent’s specification. Therefore, I find the services to be identical on the principle outlined in *Meric*.

The average consumer and the purchasing process

22. As the law above indicates, it is necessary for me to determine who the average customer is for the parties' goods and services. I must then determine the manner in which the goods and services are likely to be selected by the average consumer. In *Hearst Holdings Inc, Fleischer Studios Inc v A.V.E.L.A. Inc, Poeticgem Limited, The Partnership (Trading) Limited, U Wear Limited, J Fox Limited*, [2014] EWHC 439 (Ch), Birss J described the average consumer in these terms:

“60. The trade mark questions have to be approached from the point of view of the presumed expectations of the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect. The parties were agreed that the relevant person is a legal construct and that the test is to be applied objectively by the court from the point of view of that constructed person. The words “average” denotes that the person is typical. The term “average” does not denote some form of numerical mean, mode or median.”

23. The average consumer for the goods and services at issue will be members of the general public or a business user. The goods and services are likely to be obtained by visiting the service provider's physical premises or by visiting their website. Visual considerations are, therefore, likely to dominate the purchasing process. However, given that word-of-mouth recommendations and advice from salespersons may also play a part, I do not discount that there will also be an aural component to the selection of the goods and services.

24. I have no evidence regarding the costs associated with these goods and services. In relation to pre-paid/debit cards, it is my view that the average consumer is unlikely to give much consideration beyond factors such as the type of card or whether there are any overdrafts/charges associated with use. In relation to wire transfers, whilst I am of the view that the average consumer will consider factors such as costs associated with the transfer of funds or the estimated time taken for the money to reach its chosen destination, it is not my view that the average consumer will give much consideration beyond these or similar factors. Consequently, for goods and services such as pre-paid/debit cards and wire transfers I find that the level of attention will be medium. However, for some services such as merchant acquiring, which relates to a business consumer and may be important to the running of their

business and the collection of funds associated with profit/turnover, the level of attention paid will be a higher than medium degree of attention (but not the highest). Overall, I am of the view that the level of attention will range from medium to higher than medium (but not the highest).

Comparison of the marks

	<p>Wollet</p> <p>WOLLET</p> <p>(Series of two marks)</p>
<p>The applicants' mark</p>	<p>The opponent's registration</p>

25. It is clear from *Sabel BV v Puma AG* (particularly paragraph 23) that the average consumer normally perceives a trade mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details. The same case also explains that the visual, aural, and conceptual similarities of trade marks must be assessed by reference to all the overall impressions created by the trade marks, bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components. The CJEU stated, at paragraph 34 of its judgment in Case C-591/12P, *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, that:

“... it is necessary to ascertain, in each individual case, the overall impression made on the target public by the sign for which registration is sought, by means of, inter alia, an analysis of the components of a sign and of their relative weight in the perception of the target public, and then, in the light of that overall impression and all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, to assess the likelihood of confusion.”

26. It would be wrong, therefore, to artificially dissect the trade marks, although, it is necessary to take into account the distinctive and dominant components of the

marks and to give due weight to any other features which are not negligible and therefore contribute to the overall impressions created by the marks.

27. The applicants' mark is a stylised word mark that consists of the text 'Wolleto', presented in black stylised typeface. I consider the text 'Wolleto' to have a greater impact on the overall impression of the mark, with the stylisation playing a lesser role. The opponent's registration is a series of two word only marks that consists of the text 'Wollet' presented in standard typeface and title/upper case respectively. There are no other elements that contribute to the overall impression of the registration.

28. Visually, the opponent's registration is reproduced entirely in the applicants' mark. The only points of visual difference between the marks is the stylisation of the applicants' mark and the addition of the letter 'o' at the end of the applicants' mark. In relation to the stylisation of the applicants' mark, fair and notional use of the opponent's registration enables the opponent's registration to be used in the similar typeface of the applicants' mark. Further, the registration is able to be used in upper/lower case or in a combination of the two and still be in line with notional and fair use of the mark. Consequently, I consider the marks to be visually similar to a high degree.

29. Aurally, the opponent's registration will be pronounced WOLL-ETT and the applicants' mark will be pronounced WOLL-ETT-OH. The only point of aural difference between the marks is the addition of 'o' at the end of the applicants' mark. Therefore, I find the marks to be aurally similar to a high degree.

30. Conceptually, both the words 'Wollet' and 'wolleto' will have no meaning. However, in my view, the average consumer will view the word 'Wollet' as a misspelling of the word 'Wallet'. It is also my view that the average consumer will associate 'wollet' in 'wolleto' with the word 'wallet'. The word 'Wollet' in both marks will convey the same conceptual meaning. Taking this into account, I find the marks to be conceptually similar to a high degree.

The distinctive character of the opponent's registration

31. In *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV*, Case C-342/97 the CJEU stated that:

“22. In determining the distinctive character of a mark and, accordingly, in assessing whether it is highly distinctive, the national court must make an overall assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of the mark to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 May 1999 in Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 *Windsurfing Chiemsee v Huber and Attenberger* [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 49).

23. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including the fact that it does or does not contain an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has been registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations (see *Windsurfing Chiemsee*, paragraph 51).”

32. Registered trade marks possess varying degrees of inherent distinctive character through use, ranging from the very low, because they are suggestive or allusive of a characteristic of the goods and services, to those with a high inherent distinctive character, such as invented words which have no allusive qualities.

33. The opponent has not pleaded enhanced distinctive character through use and has not filed evidence to support such a claim, therefore, I have only the inherent position to consider.

34. The opponent’s registration consists of the word ‘Wollet’ which, as I have explained, is not an English word. However, it is my view that the average consumer will perceive the mark as a deliberate misspelling of the word ‘Wallet’. In my view, the registration is likely to be perceived by the average consumer of financial goods and services as an allusive term that suggests a form of good or service used for the

storage of money. Given that all of the opponent's services at issue are related to finance, overall, I find that the opponent's registration can be said to have a low degree of inherent distinctive character.

Likelihood of confusion

35. Confusion can be direct or indirect. Direct confusion involves the average consumer mistaking one mark for the other, while indirect confusion is where the average consumer realises the marks are not the same but puts the similarity that exists between the marks and the goods and services down to the responsible undertakings being the same or related. There is no scientific formula to apply in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion; rather, it is a global assessment where a number of factors need to be borne in mind. The first is the interdependency principle, i.e. a lesser degree of similarity between the respective trade marks may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the respective goods and services or vice versa. As I mentioned above, it is necessary for me to keep in mind the distinctive character of the opponent's trade mark, the average consumer for the goods and services and the nature of the purchasing process. In doing so, I must be mindful to the fact that the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them that he has retained in his mind.

36. I have found the marks to be visually, aurally and conceptually similar to a high degree. I have found the opponent's registration to be inherently distinctive to a low degree. I have found the average consumer to be a business user or member of the general public, who will select the goods and services at issue predominately via visual means, however, I do not discount that there will also be an aural component to the selection of the goods and services. I have concluded that the average consumer's degree of attention will vary from medium to higher than medium (but not the highest). I have found the goods and services at issue to vary in similarity from a low degree of similarity to identical.

37. I bear in mind the decision of the CJEU in *L'Oréal SA v OHIM*, Case C-235/05 P, in which the court confirmed that the weak distinctive character of the earlier trade mark does not imply that there is no likelihood of confusion.

38. While I have found the opponent's registration to have a low degree of distinctive character, being a factor in the applicants' favour, this does not automatically give rise to a finding of no likelihood of direct confusion between the parties. I consider that the differences between the marks are insufficient to avoid confusion, even when the principle of imperfect recollection is considered. I am of the view that the average consumer will overlook or misremember the differences between the marks. This is particularly the case given that 'Wollet' and 'Wolletto' are the dominant elements of the marks respectively, and I have found the marks to be visually, aurally and conceptually similar to a high degree. Further, as mentioned in paragraph 28, as the opponent's registration is a series of word only marks they can be used in line with notional and fair use. Therefore, the opponent's registration may be used in the similar font to the applicants' mark as the font used by the applicants' mark is not particularly stylised. Therefore, it is likely that the marks will be misremembered or mistakenly recalled as each other, even when a higher than medium (but not the highest) degree of attention is applied. Therefore, I find that there is a likelihood of direct confusion between the marks. In respect of the goods that I have found to be similar to a low degree, I consider that the high degree of aural, visual and conceptual similarity will offset the low similarity of the goods. Further, I note that as the goods and services operate within the same broad industry, being the financial sector, it is not unheard of for undertakings to look to expand within the same sector, this further offsets the low similarity of the goods. As a result, my finding of direct confusion applies to goods that I find to be similar to a low degree as well. I will now proceed to consider the likelihood of indirect confusion.

39. I bear in mind that it is possible that differences between the marks may still be overlooked when it comes to indirect confusion. On this basis, I am of the view that while the typeface in the applicants' mark may be noticed on the basis that it plays a role in the applicants' mark. I am of the view that the differences between the 'Wollet' and 'Wolletto' elements will be overlooked for the same reasons set out in paragraph 38 above. As a result, I consider that the use of the typeface in the applicants' mark will be seen as indicative of an alternative mark or sub brand from the same or economically linked undertaking. Consequently, I consider that there is a likelihood of indirect confusion between the marks. I consider that this finding will also apply to

those goods that I have found to be similar to a low degree for the reasons I have outlined in paragraph 38 above.

Conclusion

40. The opposition succeeds in full. As a result, the application is refused in its entirety.

Costs

41. The opponent has been successful and is entitled to a contribution towards its costs. The award of costs in fast track proceedings are governed by TPN 2/2015. The opponent is not professionally represented and on 15 June 2022 was sent a costs proforma by the Tribunal to complete. The opponent did not provide a completed costs proforma, therefore, the only costs that it is entitled to is the official fee for filing its opposition. This sum is calculated as follows:

Official fee	£100
Total	£100

42. I therefore order GET-NET UK LTD and Artem Zaitcev to pay a total sum of £100 to Wollet Ltd. The sum should be paid within twenty-one days of the expiry of the appeal period or, if there is an appeal, within twenty-one days of the conclusion of the appeal proceedings.

Dated this 19th day of August 2022

A Klass

**For the registrar,
the Comptroller-General**

Annex

Class 9: Software.

Class 36: Financial services;Financial credit services;Financial exchange services;Financial sponsorship services;Financial appraisal services;Financial consultation services;Financial analysis services;Financial research services;Financial management services;Financial clearing services;Financial savings services;Computerised financial services;Financial grant services;Financial valuation services;Financial consulting services;Financial investigation services;Financial nominee services;Financial planning services;Financial guarantee services;Financial brokerage services;Financial advisory services;Financial consultancy services;Financial investment services;Financial loan services;Financial intermediary services;Insolvency services [financial];Financial payment services;Financial affairs services;Financial transaction services;Financial information services;Charitable services, namely financial services;Personal financial planning services;Financial credit scoring services;Economic research services [financial];Financial clearing house service;Financial investment management services;Financial risk assessment services;Financial management advisory services;Financial risk management services;Financial data base services;Card operated financial services;Financial market information services;Financial investment research services;Financial investment fund services;Banking and financial services;Financial pre-payment services;Electronic financial trading services;Personal financial banking services;Financial guarantees [surety services];Computerised financial data services;Economic financial research services;Financial strategy consultancy services;Financial guarantee assessment services;Financial clearing house services;Commodity trading [financial services];Computerised financial advisory services;Financial and monetary services;Financial information retrieval services;Financial economic advisory services;Brokering of financial services;Financial investment advisory services;Financial customs brokerage services;Real estate settlement services [financial services];Financial information services relating to financial bond markets;Financial information services relating to financial stock markets;Financial services relating to airports;Financial clearing and

settlement services;Financial services provided to partnerships;Financial services relating to bonds;Financial credit services for exporters;Financial services relating to investment;Financial consulting and advisory services;Financial consultancy and information services;Financial advisory and management services;Personal financial planning advisory services;Financial services relating to travel;Financial services relating to insurance;Financial advisory services for individuals;Financial services relating to securities;Financial services relating to stocks;Financial services relating to business;Financial advisory services for companies;Financial services relating to property;Financial and investment consultancy services;Financial analysis and research services;Financial services, namely, debt settlement;Emergency financial services for travellers;Financial information and advisory services;Financial advice and consultancy services;Financial services relating to pensions;Brokerage services in financial markets;Financial services relating to mortgages;Financial services relating to savings;Financial advisory and consultancy services;Financial consultancy and advisory services;Financial and monetary transaction services;Computerised financial services for retail businesses;Financial information management and analysis services;Financial planning services relating to taxation;Financial evaluation services relating to insurance;Financial management services relating to hospitals;Financial information services relating to currencies;Financial services relating to cash disbursement;Automatic recording services for financial transactions;Advisory services relating to financial planning;Advisory services relating to financial investment;Advisory services relating to financial investments;Consultancy services relating to financial investment;Financial analysis services relating to investments;Financial exchange;Studies (Financial -);Financial underwriting;Sponsorship (Financial -);Financial valuations;Financial advice;Financial consultancy;Financial planning and investment advisory services;Financial advisory services relating to tax;Financial database services relating to shares;Financial services relating to credit cards;Financial services relating to motor vehicles;Actuarial services relating to financial transactions;Financial brokerage services for real estate;Financial services provided by building societies;Financial services rendered by insurance companies;Financial advisory services relating to securities;Financial services relating to wealth management;Financial services provided via the Internet;Financial services related to real estate;Financial services related to house purchase;Financial services relating to international securities;Brokerage services on

the financial markets;Financial database services relating to stocks;Brokerage services relating to financial instruments;Financial database services relating to commodities;Estate planning services [arranging financial affairs];Financial information services relating to individuals;Consultation services relating to financial matters;Financial consultancy relating to credit services;Financial consultancy services relating to investments;Financial advisory services provided for bankers.