

O/995/22

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

IN THE MATTER OF TRADE MARK APPLICATION NUMBER 3673691

BY TEXDECOR

TO REGISTER THE FOLLOWING TRADE MARK:

MAISON JANETTE

IN CLASSES 1, 2, 4, 16, 18, 20, 21, 24, 27 AND 34

AND

AN OPPOSITION THERETO UNDER NUMBER 428094

**BY MAISONETTE PAZARLAMA ITHALAT IHRACAT VE TICARET ANONIM
SIRKETI**

BACKGROUND AND PLEADINGS

1. On 27 July 2021, TEXDECOR (“the applicant”) applied to register the trade mark shown on the cover page of this decision in the UK. The application was published for opposition purposes on 10 September 2021 and registration is sought for goods in classes 1, 2, 4, 16, 18, 20, 21, 24, 27 and 34.¹

2. On 9 November 2021, Maisonette Pazarlama Ithalat Ihracat Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (“the opponent”) opposed the application in respect of some goods in classes 18, 20, 24 and 27, based upon section 5(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”). The opponent relies upon an International Registration (“IR”) designating the UK: number 1560469 (“the earlier mark”), which has an international registration date of 8 July 2020 and was granted protection in the UK on 16 March 2021. The IR is registered for goods and services in classes 24, 25 and 35, all of which are relied upon for this opposition.² A representation of the IR is as follows:



3. Under section 5(2)(b), the opponent claims that there is a likelihood of confusion on the basis that the marks are highly similar and the goods and services are either identical or similar.

4. In accordance with section 6A of the Act, the earlier mark is not subject to proof of use and so the opponent may rely upon all the goods and services for which it is registered.

¹ The opposed goods are listed in the goods and services comparison; the remainder of the specification is listed in the Annex to this decision.

² These will be listed in the goods and services comparison.

5. The applicant filed a defence and counterstatement denying a likelihood of confusion on the basis that the visual and conceptual dissimilarity between the marks outweighs the low degree of phonetic similarity between them and outweighs any identity or similarity between the goods.

6. The opponent is represented by Foot Anstey LLP and the applicant by Graham Watt & Co LLP. Neither party filed evidence, requested a hearing or filed written submissions in lieu. This decision is taken following a careful perusal of the papers that have been filed.

DECISION

Relevance of EU law

7. Although the UK has left the EU, section 6(3)(a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 requires tribunals to apply EU-derived national law in accordance with EU law as it stood at the end of the transition period. The provisions of the Act relied upon in these proceedings are derived from an EU Directive. This is why this decision continues to make reference to the trade mark case law of EU courts.

Section 5(2)(b)

8. Section 5(2)(b) of the Act states that:

“A trade mark shall not be registered if because –

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected,

there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.”

Relevant law

9. The following principles are gleaned from the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, Case C-251/95, *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc*, Case C-39/97, *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V.* Case C-342/97, *Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG & Adidas Benelux BV*, Case C-425/98, *Matratzen Concord GmbH v OHIM*, Case C-3/03, *Medion AG v. Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany & Austria GmbH*, Case C-120/04, *Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas v OHIM*, Case C-334/05P and *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, Case C-591/12P.

The principles

(a) The likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) however, it is also possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a great degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;

(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;

(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient;

(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense;

(k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public might believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Comparison of goods and services

10. The competing goods and services are shown below:

The earlier specification	The contested specification
<i>Class 24: Woven or non-woven textile fabrics; textile goods for household use, not included in other classes: curtains, bed covers, sheets (textile), pillowcases, blankets, quilts, towels; flags, pennants, labels of textile; swaddling blankets; sleeping bags for camping.</i>	<i>Class 18: Clutch bags (evening handbags); handbags; shopping bags; garment bags; shoulder bags; school bags; shopping bags made of textile; beach bags; bags for sports; travelling bags; weekend bags; bags of cloth; clutch bags; make-up sets; vanity cases; travelling sets [leatherware]; fake fur;</i>

<p>Class 25: <i>Clothing, including underwear and outerclothing, other than special purpose protective clothing; socks, mufflers [clothing], shawls, bandanas, scarves, belts [clothing]; footwear, shoes, slippers, sandals; headgear, hats, caps with visors, berets, caps [headwear], skull caps.</i></p> <p>Class 35: <i>The bringing together, for the benefit of others, of a variety of goods, namely, woven or non-woven textile fabrics, textile goods for household use, curtains, bed covers, sheets (textile), pillowcases, blankets, quilts, towels, flags, pennants, labels of textile, swaddling blankets, sleeping bags for camping, clothing, including underwear and outerclothing, other than special purpose protective clothing, socks, mufflers [clothing], shawls, bandanas, scarves, belts [clothing], footwear, shoes, slippers, sandals, headgear, hats, caps with visors, berets, caps [headwear], skull caps, enabling customers to conveniently view and purchase those goods, such services may be provided by retail stores, wholesale outlets, by means of electronic media or through mail order catalogues.</i></p>	<p><i>covers for suits, shirts and dresses; shoe covers; parasol covers; luggage covers; small pouches; purses; drawstring pouches: pouches for make-up, keys and other personal items; tote bags.</i></p> <p>Class 20: <i>Cushions; decorative cushions; chair cushion pads; settees; chairs; armchairs; seats; sofas; garment covers [storage]; pre-formed fabric covers for furniture; pouffes.</i></p> <p>Class 24: <i>Fabrics; fabrics for textile use; upholstery fabrics; fabrics for wall coverings; fabrics for design of interior decor; fabrics for curtains; wall hangings of textile; wall tapestries of textile; curtains; net curtains; bed and table blankets; bed linen; household and table linen; materials for covering cushions; covers for cushions; furniture coverings of textile.</i></p> <p>Class 27: <i>Textile wallpaper.</i></p>
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11. In *Gérard Meric v OHIM*, the General Court (“GC”) confirmed that even if goods/services are not worded identically, they can still be considered identical if one term falls within the scope of another (or vice versa):³

“29. In addition, the goods can be considered as identical when the goods designated by the earlier mark are included in a more general category, designated by trade mark application (Case T-388/00 *Institut fur Lernsysteme v OHIM*- Educational Services (ELS) [2002] ECR II-4301, paragraph 53) or where the goods designated by the trade mark application are included in a more general category designated by the earlier mark.”

³ Case T-133/05

12. Some of the goods in the contested specification are identical to some of the goods in the earlier specification. For example, the applicant's *fabrics* and *bed linen* would include and therefore be identical to the opponent's *woven or non-woven textile fabrics* and *bed covers, sheets (textile), pillowcases*, respectively. I do not consider it necessary to undertake a full comparison of the remaining goods and services. The opposition will, therefore, proceed on the basis that some of the contested goods are identical to those covered by the earlier specification. If the opposition fails even where the goods are identical, it follows that the opposition will also fail where the goods and services are only similar, regardless of the degree.

The average consumer and the purchasing act

13. As the case law above indicates, it is necessary for me to determine who the average consumer is for the respective parties' goods and services. I must then determine the manner in which the goods and services are likely to be selected by the average consumer. In *Hearst Holdings Inc, Fleischer Studios Inc v A.V.E.L.A. Inc, Poeticgem Limited, The Partnership (Trading) Limited, U Wear Limited, J Fox Limited*, [2014] EWHC 439 (Ch), Birss J. described the average consumer in these terms:

“60. The trade mark questions have to be approached from the point of view of the presumed expectations of the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect. The parties were agreed that the relevant person is a legal construct and that the test is to be applied objectively by the court from the point of view of that constructed person. The words “average” denotes that the person is typical. The term “average” does not denote some form of numerical mean, mode or median.”

14. The average consumer of the goods at issue is a member of the general public who, during the purchasing process, will consider factors such as aesthetics, durability and material. I consider all of the goods will be selected with an average level of care and attention. The goods are likely to be self-selected from the shelves of a retail outlet or their online or catalogue equivalent. Visual considerations are, therefore, likely to

dominate the selection process. However, given that advice may be sought from retail assistants, I do not discount an aural component to the purchase.


Comparison of marks

15. It is clear from *Sabel* that the average consumer normally perceives a trade mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details. The same case also explains that the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the trade marks must be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the trade marks, bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components. The CJEU stated at paragraph 34 of its judgment in *Bimbo*, that:

“...it is necessary to ascertain, in each individual case, the overall impression made on the target public by the sign for which registration is sought, by means of, inter alia, an analysis of the components of a sign and of their relevant weight in the perception of the target public, and then, in the light of that overall impression and all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, to assess the likelihood of confusion.”

16. It would be wrong, therefore, to dissect the trade marks artificially, although it is necessary to take into account the distinctive and dominant components of the trade marks and to give due weight to any other features which are not negligible and therefore contribute to the overall impressions created by the marks.

17. The trade marks to be compared are as follows:

Earlier mark	Contested mark
 <p>The earlier mark consists of the word "MAISONETTE" in a serif font. Above the text are two horizontal lines of decreasing length. Below the text is a semi-circular graphic composed of three concentric, semi-circular lines.</p>	<p>MAISON JANETTE</p>

18. Both parties have made detailed submissions on the comparison of the marks. I have taken them into account and will refer to them, where necessary, in my decision.

19. The earlier mark is figurative and comprises the word element 'MAISONETTE', above it, two horizontal lines – the top one shorter than the bottom one – and below it, the outline of the bottom half of a semicircle containing three semi-circular lines, creating a segmented semicircle. The opponent submits that the dominant and distinctive element of its earlier mark is the word 'MAISONETTE'. However, in figurative marks, it is not the case that word elements must always be considered to be dominant.⁴ Given the size of the semicircle in relation to the other components I consider it to be as dominant in the mark as the word 'MAISONETTE', both components playing an equal role in the overall impression. The two horizontal lines above the word 'MAISONETTE' play a much lesser role.

20. The contested mark contains the two words 'MAISON JANETTE'. I consider neither word to dominate the other, with both playing an equal role in the overall impression of the mark.

Visual comparison

21. Visually, the marks coincide in their letters 'M-A-I-S-O-N-E-T-T-E', which is the entirety of the word element in the earlier mark. The letters appear in the same order in the contested mark, though not consecutively: the letters are broken up by the letters '-J-A-N-'. This creates a clear visual difference. The figurative elements in the earlier mark create further visual differences. Taking everything into account, I find the marks to be visually similar to a low degree.

Aural comparison

22. The word 'MAISONETTE' in the earlier mark will be pronounced as the ordinary dictionary word with three syllables. The contested mark will be pronounced as four syllables: 'MAI-SO-N-JAN-ETTE'. Depending on the consumer's pronunciation of the

⁴ See *L&D SA v OHIM* [2008] E.T.M.R. 62 and *Metamorfoza d.o.o. v EUIPO*, Case T-70/20, EU:T:2021:253.

word 'JANETTE', the emphasis may either be on the first or the second syllable of that word. The marks share three syllables when spoken aloud, though, as with the visual comparison, these are broken up by the syllable 'JAN' in the contested mark, which has no counterpart in the earlier mark. Overall, I consider the marks to be aurally similar to a medium degree.

Conceptual comparison

23. For a conceptual message to be relevant it must be capable of immediate grasp by the average consumer. This is highlighted in numerous judgments of the GC and the CJEU including *Ruiz Picasso v OHIM*.⁵ The assessment must be made from the point of view of the average consumer.

24. The concept immediately grasped by the average consumer for the earlier mark is the ordinary meaning of the word 'MAISONETTE'. I agree with both parties that the word, despite being of French origin, will be understood by the average consumer in the UK as "a set of rooms for living in, typically on two storeys of a larger building",⁶ or a similar definition.

25. For the contested mark, there are several possible concepts depending on the consumer's own knowledge. The word 'MAISON', as highlighted by the opponent, is a French word meaning 'house'. Unlike 'MAISONETTE', which is a defined word in the English dictionary, 'MAISON' is not a word in the English language and, therefore, its meaning will only be known to those who understand the English translation of the French word. I have no evidence on the matter but it seems likely, to me, that a large proportion of UK consumers will be aware of the meaning. I have to consider, however, that there will be consumers who see 'MAISON' as a foreign or invented word and attribute no meaning to it. For the word 'JANETTE' I consider consumers will most likely see it as a name, whether a foreign name or not. As for the immediate concept of the contested mark as a whole, for consumers who understand 'MAISON' as meaning 'house', the mark will conjure the idea of 'Janette's house' or 'House of

⁵ [2006] e.c.r.-I-643; [2006] E.T.M.R. 29

⁶ See paragraph 4 of the opponent's statement of grounds and paragraph 4 of the applicant's counterstatement.

Janette', for example. For consumers who see 'MAISON' as a foreign or invented word, the combination of 'MAISON' and 'JANETTE' will either create no clear meaning, or consumers will focus on 'JANETTE' and its likely connection with a name, that being the concept of the mark for those consumers. Of all the aforementioned concepts of the contested mark, there is only a slight overlap with the concept of the earlier mark in circumstances where consumers understand 'MAISON' as 'house', resulting in a low degree of conceptual similarity. In all other circumstances, the marks are conceptually dissimilar.

Distinctive character of the earlier mark

26. In *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer* the CJEU stated that:

“22. In determining the distinctive character of a mark and, accordingly, in assessing whether it is highly distinctive, the national court must make an overall assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of the mark to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 May 1999 in Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 *Windsurfing Chiemsee v Huber and Attenberger* [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 49).

23. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including the fact that it does or does not contain an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has been registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations (see *Windsurfing Chiemsee*, paragraph 51).”

27. Registered trade marks possess varying degrees of inherent distinctive character, ranging from the very low, because they are suggestive or allusive of a characteristic of the goods/services, to those with high inherent distinctive character, such as invented words which have no allusive qualities. The distinctiveness of a mark can be enhanced by virtue of the use that has been made of it.

28. I have no evidence from the opponent from which to make an assessment as to an enhanced distinctive character and so I will assess only the inherent distinctive character of the earlier mark. It consists of the word 'MAISONETTE' combined with figurative elements. As highlighted at [24] and confirmed by both parties, 'MAISONETTE' will be understood by the average consumer as a type of dwelling in which people live. Bearing in mind the goods for which the mark is registered, i.e. various clothing items and textile goods predominantly for household use, as well as services which bring together and sell such goods, the mark has an allusive nature. However, the semicircle device is equally dominant in the mark and adds to the distinctive character which, overall, I consider to be between a low and medium degree.

Likelihood of confusion

29. In determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, all of the above factors need to be borne in mind. They must be considered globally (*Sabel*) from the perspective of the average consumer. In making my assessment, I must keep in mind that the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has retained in his mind (*Lloyd Schuhfabrik*). The factors considered above have a degree of interdependency (*Canon*): for example, a lesser degree of similarity between the respective trade marks may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the respective services and vice versa.

30. I have found the marks to be visually similar to a low degree, aurally similar to a medium degree and, depending on the consumer's understanding of 'MAISON', either conceptually similar to a low degree or conceptually dissimilar. I have found the earlier mark to have a low to medium degree of inherent distinctive character. I have identified

the average consumer to be a member of the general public who, paying an average degree of attention, selects the goods predominantly by visual means, though there may be an aural element to the purchase. As explained at [12], I will consider the matter based on the identical goods.

31. Confusion can be direct or indirect. The difference between these two types of confusion was explained in *L.A. Sugar Limited v By Back Beat Inc.*, BL O/375/10, where Iain Purvis QC, sitting as the Appointed Person, explained that:

“16. Although direct confusion and indirect confusion both involve mistakes on the part of the consumer, it is important to remember that these mistakes are very different in nature. Direct confusion involves no process of reasoning – it is a simple matter of mistaking one mark for another. Indirect confusion, on the other hand, only arises where the consumer has actually recognised that the later mark is different from the earlier mark. It therefore requires a mental process of some kind on the part of the consumer when he or she sees the later mark, which may be conscious or subconscious but, analysed in formal terms, is something along the following lines: ‘The later mark is different from the earlier mark, but also has something in common with it. Taking account of the common element in the context of the later mark as a whole, I conclude that it is another brand of the owner of the earlier mark’.

17. Instances where one may expect the average consumer to reach such a conclusion tend to fall into one or more of three categories:

(a) where the common element is so strikingly distinctive (either inherently or through use) that the average consumer would assume that no-one else but the brand owner would be using it in a trade mark at all. This may apply even where the other elements of the later mark are quite distinctive in their own right (“26 RED TESCO” would no doubt be such a case).

(b) where the later mark simply adds a non-distinctive element to the earlier mark, of the kind which one would expect to find in a sub-brand

or brand extension (terms such as “LITE”, “EXPRESS”, “WORLDWIDE”, “MINI”, etc.).

(c) where the earlier mark comprises a number of elements, and a change of one element appears entirely logical and consistent with a brand extension (“FAT FACE” to “BRAT FACE” for example).”

32. I bear in mind that the beginnings of marks tend to have more visual and aural impact than the ends⁷ and that both marks begin with ‘MAISON-’. However, these are not two word marks to be compared; there are other elements in the earlier mark which have no counterpart in the contested mark: in particular, the large semicircle device which I have found to be equally dominant. In addition, the contested mark contains two words as opposed to the earlier mark’s one and contains three letters in the middle of its mark which are not contained within the earlier mark and will not go unnoticed. For me to conclude that the marks may be recalled as one another would require me to find that the average consumer would forget that the earlier mark consisted of two words, forget the letters ‘-J-A-N-’ and instead see ‘MAISONETTE’ rather than ‘MAISON JANETTE’, or forget the figurative elements in the earlier mark. Given that direct confusion involves no process of reasoning, I find it highly unlikely that the average consumer would mistake one mark for the other. Even for identical goods, I do not consider there to be a likelihood of direct confusion.

33. I turn now to indirect confusion. The opponent has not provided an explanation as to why it considers the average consumer will put the similarity between the marks (the non-consecutive letters ‘M-A-I-S-O-N-E-T-T-E’) down to the responsible undertakings being linked. The opponent simply contends that “there exists a strong likelihood of direct and indirect confusion”.⁸

34. In *Liverpool Gin Distillery Ltd & Ors v Sazerac Brands, LLC & Ors* [2021] EWCA Civ 1207, Arnold LJ referred to the comments of James Mellor QC (as he then was), sitting as the Appointed Person in *Cheeky Italian Ltd v Sutaria* (O/219/16), where he

⁷ *El Corte Inglés, SA v OHIM*, Cases T-183/02 and T-184/02.

⁸ See paragraph 7 of the opponent’s statement of grounds.

said at [16] that “a finding of a likelihood of indirect confusion is not a consolation prize for those who fail to establish a likelihood of direct confusion”. Arnold LJ agreed, pointing out that there must be a “proper basis” for concluding that there is a likelihood of indirect confusion where there is no likelihood of direct confusion.

35. In order to find indirect confusion in this case, it would be necessary to conclude that the average consumer will see the letters ‘M-A-I-S-O-N-E-T-T-E’ and conclude that the presence of those letters, with the letters ‘-J-A-N-’ separating ‘MAISON’ from ‘ETTE’, in the contested mark must mean that it is a brand of the owner of the earlier mark, or vice versa. The low to medium degree of distinctiveness in the earlier mark is a result of a combination of the word element and the figurative elements, particularly the large, segmented semicircle. The word ‘MAISONETTE’ for the goods and services of the earlier registration is not particularly distinctive. In any case, the word does not appear in the same manner in the contested mark: it is separated by three other letters. To my mind, this is not at all logical with a brand extension, sub-brand or re-branding. Even for consumers who see a slight overlap in concept between the marks, I do not consider ‘MAISONETTE’ to be so strikingly distinctive that consumers would assume any undertaking incorporating the letters of that word, with other letters, must be related. I do not envisage a scenario, either falling into one of the three categories identified in the case law above or otherwise, whereby consumers see the shared letters in the marks and assume the undertakings are linked. Even for identical goods, I do not consider there to be a likelihood of indirect confusion.

CONCLUSION

36. The opposition under section 5(2)(b) has been unsuccessful and the application may proceed to registration.

COSTS

37. The applicant has been successful and is entitled to a contribution towards its costs, based upon the scale published in Tribunal Practice Notice 2/2016. Since no evidence was filed in these proceedings, no hearing took place and no submissions in

lieu were filed, I consider an appropriate award to be **£200** for considering the opponent's statement and preparing a counterstatement.

38. I therefore order Maisonette Pazarlama Ithalat Ihracat Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi to pay TEXDECOR the sum of **£200**. This sum should be paid within 21 days of the expiry of the appeal period or, if there is an appeal, within 21 days of the final determination of the appeal proceedings.

Dated this 14th day of November 2022

E FISHER (née VENABLES)

For the Registrar

Annex

- Class 1 *Adhesives for paperhanging; glue for industrial purposes; size for finishing and priming.*
- Class 2 *Paints.*
- Class 4 *Candles; perfumed candles.*
- Class 16 *Printed matter; stationery; adhesives for stationery or household purposes; glue for stationery or household purposes; materials for artists; paintbrushes; office requisites (except furniture); paper; boxes of paper or cardboard; posters; albums; cards; calendars; writing instruments; handkerchiefs of paper; face towels of paper; table linen of paper; bags [envelopes, pouches] of paper or plastics, for packaging; painters' brushes; note books; writing or drawing books; agendas; painters' rollers.*
- Class 20 *Furniture; coffee tables; mirrors; picture frames; stools; arbors (furniture); boxes of wood or plastic; indoor window blinds and accessories for curtains and blinds.*
- Class 21 *Brushes; pails; sponges; cleaning instruments, hand-operated.*
- Class 34 *Matches; matchboxes.*
- Class 27 *Wallpaper; wallpaper of plastics; vinyl wallpaper; non-textile wallpaper; wallpaper in the form of decorative adhesive wall coverings; wall hangings; wall hangings other than of textile; wall hangings, not of plastics; carpets; door mats; mats; linoleum; floor coverings other than tiles and paints.*