

Judgment of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the Appeal of Tiru Krishnama Chariar and others v. Krishnasawmi Tata Chariar and others, from the High Court of Judicature at Madras; delivered 18th March 1879.

Present:

SIR JAMES W. COLVILLE.

SIR MONTAGUE E. SMITH.

SIR ROBERT P. COLLIER.

THIS is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras rejecting a plaint under the 32nd section of the Code of Civil Procedure as containing no cause of action, a proceeding equivalent to what in this country would be called judgment on demurrer. The only question before their Lordships is whether or not the plaint discloses any cause of action. Of course we have nothing to do with the question whether the cause of action, if any is stated, be well founded, or what may be the merits of the case. The declaration is by a large number of persons belonging to the Tenkalai sect, against other persons belonging to the Vadakalai sect. The substance of the plaint, which undoubtedly is not very clear, may be thus stated: It begins by declaring that the Plaintiffs have the exclusive right to the Adhyapaka mirass of reciting certain religious texts, hymns, or chants in a certain pagoda and its dependencies, and deny the right of the Defendants to recite them. Then comes an allegation which appears important: "The Plaintiffs and the Brahmins of the Plaintiffs' Tenkalai sect have been for a long time past and up to this day discharging all the

" duties appertaining to the said Adhyapaka
 " mirass right, and enjoying the incomes of the
 " Adhyapakam, save those mentioned in Schedules
 " B. and C." The plaint goes on to allege that
 the Defendants, holding the office of Dharmakarta
 of the pagoda, in combination with other persons in
 rivalry with the Plaintiffs, recited the Vadakalai
 invocations, chants, and other religious prayers, the
 exclusive right to recite which was incident to the
 Plaintiffs' Adhyapaka mirass; that thereupon a
 complaint was preferred to the magistrate and
 a report made, and for a time the Defendants
 ceased to recite the chant and prayers in ques-
 tion, but that they again wrongfully recited them,
 and injured the exclusive right of the Plain-
 tiffs and others to recite them; but there is no
 allegation that the Plaintiffs did not themselves
 perform or were prevented from performing
 these rites. On the contrary, the allegation is that
 they did perform them. Section 6 goes on to
 say, " The Defendants having withheld the pay-
 " ment to the Plaintiffs of some of the several
 " incomes of the Adhyapaka Mirass due to the
 " Plaintiffs in the said Devaraja Swamis Pagoda,
 " as well as in all the Sannidhis attached to it,
 " the Plaintiffs instituted suit No. 66 of 1865, on
 " the file of the District Munsif's Court of
 " Conjeveram, against the Defendants, and this
 " litigation went up as far as the High Court,
 " and continued until March 1873, when a
 " decision was passed in favour of the Plaintiffs."
 The plaint further alleges (and this is the present
 cause of action), " The Defendants have with-
 " held the payment to the Plaintiffs and the
 " others of the Tenkalai sect of the amount of
 " income mentioned in Schedule C. for the six
 " years from the date of the said suit No. 66 up
 " to this day, to which the Plaintiffs and the
 " others of the Tenkalai sect are entitled, as also
 " of the incomes which are mentioned in Sche-

" dale B, and which were being enjoyed by the
 " Plaintiffs and the others of the Tenkalai
 " sect from the date of the said suit
 " No. 66 until the final decree was passed
 " by the High Court, save such as are now
 " being enjoyed. They have also withheld from
 " the Plaintiffs, and the others of the Tenkalai
 " sect, the honours mentioned in Schedule A.
 " from April 1873." There follows a prayer
 that the Court will pass a decree directing
 the Defendants and others to abstain from
 reciting, and establishing the exclusive right
 of the Plaintiffs, and also seeking to recover
 the value of various items stated in the schedules.
 Schedule C., which is to be found at the end
 of the schedule attached to the plaint, is in these
 terms: " Amount due for six years from October
 " 1870 up to the current month at the annual
 " rate of Rs. 57. 5. 9, as mentioned in the decree
 " in the original suit No. 66 of 1865 on the
 " file of the District Munsif's Court of Con-
 " jeveram, Rs. 344. 2. 6." On reference to
 the Record, this suit appears to have been
 brought by substantially the same Plaintiffs (with
 some changes) against substantially the same
 Defendants. The Munsif, before whom the case
 was originally tried, affirmed the claim of the
 Plaintiffs to the Adhyapakam mirass, and decreed
 that the sum of Rs. 57. 5. 9., as wages for the
 duty performed, should be paid to them by the
 Defendants, these "wages" being in fact the
 money value placed by the Court on certain
 payments in kind chiefly in the shape of food.

- On appeal this decision of the Munsif was
 reversed by the District Judge, being the first
 Court of appeal, on the ground that no suit
 would lie in respect of the matter complained
 of. His decision was reversed by the High
 Court of Madras, who remanded the case,
 observing, "The claim is for a specific pe-

“ cuniary benefit to which Plaintiffs declare
“ themselves entitled on condition of reciting
“ certain hymns. There can exist no doubt
“ that the right to such benefits is a ques-
“ tion which the Courts are bound to enter-
“ tain, and cannot cease to be such a question,
“ because claimed on account of some service
“ connected with religion. If to determine the
“ right to such pecuniary benefit it becomes
“ necessary to determine incidentally the right
“ to perform certain religious services, we know
“ of no principle which would exonerate the
“ Court from considering and deciding the
“ point.” In pursuance of this judgment, which
appears to their Lordships to be perfectly correct,
the cause was again tried by the Court of first
appeal which somewhat increased the amount that
the Munsif had given. The High Court upon
further appeal affirmed the judgment of the
Munsif, re-establishing the amount by way of
annual payment at Rs. 57. 5. 9. It therefore
appears that the Plaintiffs in the present suit,
having recovered in the former suit up to the
date of the commencement of that suit the sum
of Rs. 57 for certain services performed, are now
seeking to recover the amount of wages that have
accrued due to them for six years since the date of
that suit at the same annual amount in respect
of the same services which they allege them-
selves to have continued to perform, their perfor-
mance not having been prevented, although
possibly to a certain extent interfered with by the
Defendants. So much with respect to Schedule C.

Schedule B. relates to another class of pay-
ments, as they are described in the schedule, in
kind; that is, in the shape of rice and other
food which are described as due to the Plain-
tiffs. The first item in the schedule is to this
effect: “ One Poli (circular cake made of wheat,
“ flour, Bengal grain, sugar, and ghee) due to

“ Adhyapakam at the close of the Tirupparvai ;” Most of the other items are of the same character. Their Lordships do not understand these articles as consisting of mere presents made by the devout, but as certain payments in kind of the same nature as those comprised in Schedule C., which are now claimed by the Plaintiffs from the Dharmakartas of the temple, which the Defendants are, in respect of services performed. At the close, however, of this schedule their Lordships observe a statement of an approximate sum claimed for presents made annually to the Adhyapakas by the adjoining villagers for the Tenkalai people. It may be that no action will lie for the recovery of this last item, or in respect of the honours mentioned in Schedule A., and alleged to have been withheld from the Plaintiffs ; but that circumstance would not justify the rejection of the whole plaint, if it discloses a good cause of action in respect of Schedule C. and the greater part of Schedule B.

The judgment of the High Court, now appealed against, which rejects this plaint, is in these terms :
 “ We think the plaint was properly rejected
 “ under the 32nd section of the Code of Civil
 “ Procedure. The allegations rejecting the
 “ ‘ Mirass of reciting prayers,’ and the exclusive
 “ right of recital in a stated form and order which
 “ the Plaintiffs ask the Court to establish and to
 “ protect from infringement by the Defendants,
 “ do not disclose a cause of action ; nor in our
 “ judgment does that portion of the plaint which
 “ alleges the withholding payment of certain
 “ specified sums which are described as ‘ the
 “ value of the incomes mentioned in Schedules
 “ B. and C.’ A reference to the Schedules
 “ discloses nothing more than a list of cakes and
 “ offerings to which a money value is assigned.
 “ Reading the plaint and schedules together
 “ they express no more than this, that presents

“ and offerings usually given have been withheld.
“ If, as now alleged, the Plaintiffs intended to
“ claim emoluments or legal dues of right
“ receivable by them for services rendered, it is
“ sufficient to say they have failed to do this.”

Their Lordships are unable to concur in this judgment. For the reasons which have been stated they take a different view of the plaint and of the schedules which have been referred to. It appears to them that the schedules are more than a mere list of cakes and offerings to which a money value is assigned, that they disclose a claim, whether well founded or ill founded, as of right to certain dues for services performed: Schedule C. to an annual payment for wages which has been assessed in the previous suit, and adjudicated upon as due to them. Schedule B. to certain other payments in kind, presumably capable of a money value, which had been made to them up to the judgment in the former suit, but which had been since withheld.

This being so, the action falls within the principle of the judgment by which the former suit was remanded, and of other cases to which their Lordships' attention has been called. They are therefore of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and the case remanded for the purpose of trial, and that the Appellant is entitled to the costs of this Appeal; and they will humbly advise Her Majesty to this effect.