

*Judgment of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the Appeal of Rughoobur Dyal Sahoo and others v. Maharajah Kishen Pertab Sahee, from the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal; delivered 25th June 1879.*

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Present:

SIR JAMES W. COLVILLE.

SIR BARNES PEACOCK.

SIR MONTAGUE E. SMITH.

SIR ROBERT P. COLLIER.

THE facts of this case are very clearly stated in the judgment of their Lordships upon the remand in the year 1873. It is clear that in 1837 a settlement of the lands in dispute was made with the predecessors of the Plaintiff. That settlement was made at a revenue of Rs. 842 3 annas. In 1847 the settlement was renewed, and the predecessors of the Plaintiff continued in possession of the lands from 1837, when the settlement was first made with them, down to the expiration of the settlement of 1847. Prior to the renewal of that settlement in 1857 the River Gunduck, which was to the south of the Plaintiff's zemindari and to the north of the Defendant's, had so completely changed its course that the lands in dispute, which were formerly on the north side of the river, were capable of being identified on the south side of it.

A question arose as to the renewal of the settlement of 1847, and the lands being then on the south side of the river, which was the acknowledged boundary between the districts of Sarun and Tirhoot, were then in the district of

Sarun. Mr. Lautour, who was the Collector of Tirhoot, and who had formerly settled the lands when they were on the north side of the river, and were then in his district, had some doubt whether he had jurisdiction to re-settle them. The question was referred to the Commissioner, Mr. Tayler, who decided in favour of Mr. Lautour's jurisdiction, and directed him to renew the settlement with the owners of the Plaintiff's zemindari, Sohagpoor, upon which an appeal was presented to the Board of Revenue, and they ordered the settlement not to be made with the owners of the Plaintiff's zemindari but with the owners of that of the Defendant on the southern side of the river. It is in consequence of that order that differences have arisen between the parties as to whether the Plaintiff was entitled to a renewal of the settlement in 1857 or whether the Defendant was entitled to it.

The rule under the first clause of the fourth section of Regulation XI. of 1825 is that land gained by gradual accession, whether from the recess of a river or of the sea, is to be considered as an increment to the tenure of the person to whose land or estate it is thus annexed, "whether such land or estate be held immediately from Government by a Zemindar or other superior land-holder, or as a subordinate tenure by any description of under-tenant whatever." The Plaintiff claimed that the lands in dispute were formerly an increment to his estate by gradual accession, and that they had been settled with the owners of Sohagpore upon that basis. By the second clause of the fourth section the rule before mentioned was not to be considered applicable to cases in which a river by a sudden change of its course breaks through and intersects an estate without any gradual encroachment, or by the violence of its stream separates a considerable piece of land from one estate and

joins it to another estate without destroying the identity and preventing the recognition of the land so removed. The change of the course of the River Gunduck on the last occasion was a sudden change, and the land which had originally been settled with the Plaintiff on the north side of the river was capable of being identified on the south side of the river. Therefore this land which had been in the possession of the Plaintiff for 20 years and had been brought into cultivation by him, did not, according to the 4th section of Regulation XI. of 1825, belong to the owner of the zemindari on the south side of the river as having been gained by gradual accession. But a question arose whether in consequence of an established usage the river, however its course might be changed, was not to be considered as the boundary between the two zemindaries as it was between the two districts. The second section of the Regulation of 1825 was relied upon by the Defendant. By that section it was enacted that, "Whenever any clear and definite usage of Shekust pywust respecting the disjunction and junction of land by the encroachment or recess of a river may have been immemorially established for determining the rights of the proprietors of two or more contiguous estates, divided by a river (such as that the main channel of the river dividing the estates shall be the constant boundary between them, whatever changes may take place in the course of the river by encroachment on one side and accession on the other), the usage so established shall govern the decision of all claims and disputes relative to alluvial land between the parties whose estates may be liable to such usage." The Sudder Board of Revenue thought that there was a clear and definite usage that under all circumstances the river should be the

boundary between the zemindaries on the one side and those on the other. They say, "At the time of the permanent settlement, and since then, there has been, the Board observe, a distinct and clear usage that the main channel of the Gunduck should be the constant boundary between the two districts of Sarun and Tirhoot, and between the zemindaries on each bank divided by the river." They accordingly ordered a settlement to be made with the Defendant, and in conformity with those directions a summary settlement of the lands, which are the subject of this Appeal, was made with the Defendant, the Maharajah of Hutwa, who obtained possession of the lands. Thereupon the Plaintiff in January 1860 commenced this suit. He contended that the lands having been settled as an accretion to his zemindari on the north side of the river were his by virtue of proprietorship; and that being capable of identification, notwithstanding the change of the river, they belonged to him under clause 2 section 4 of the Regulation of 1825, and not to the Defendant; and then the question arose whether there was such a custom as that which the Board of Revenue stated, namely, a custom that the river should be the boundary, not only of the districts, but of the zemindaries on either side.

The Principal Sudder Ameen tried the case, and he dismissed the Plaintiff's suit upon some technical objections, and also upon the ground that the decision of the Board of Revenue that the settlement should be made with the Plaintiff was final and conclusive. Upon appeal to the High Court they reversed that decision, and remanded the case to the Principal Sudder Ameen for re-trial.

The case afterwards came before this Board upon appeal, and their Lordships in their judgment

of remand, alluding to the trial of the case by the Principal Sudder Ameen after the remand by the High Court, say: "The opinion thus intimated clearly implies that the principal if not the only questions between the parties were whether the change in the course of the river having been sudden, and the lands being capable of identification, the case fell within the second clause, or whether the recession of the stream having been gradual, it had taken from the Tirhoot estate what had once belonged to it, and given what it so took to the Sarun estate by accretion in the proper sense of the term. The High Court seems to have assumed that the Plaintiffs may once have had the permanent and proprietary interest in the lands, and altogether to have ignored the existence of the alleged usage as an element in the case. This seems to have misled the Principal Sudder Ameen who tried the cause on remand, for although in one part of his judgment he treats the temporary settlements with the Maliks of Sohagpoor—that is, the Maliks of the zemindari on the north side of the river—as having been made with reference to some such usage as that alleged, and therefore to have given them only a limited tenure, he omitted to try the issue whether the usage existed in fact." Their Lordships afterwards went on to say: "The first settlement certainly purports to have been made with the then Maliks of Sohagpoor in the character of proprietors of the alluvial land settled; but in their Lordships' opinion it is doubtful whether they were treated as proprietors by reason of the alleged usage, or because the Deara land was supposed to have formed by gradual accession on their estate, and to have become an increment thereto within the mean-

" ing of the first or of the latter part of the third  
 " clause of section 4 of Regulation 11 of 1825.  
 " Their Lordships have not before them the  
 " whole settlement proceedings, and the Board  
 " of Revenue, which presumably had access to  
 " them, has stated that the settlements were  
 " made in accordance with the supposed usage.  
 " The proceedings which are before their Lord-  
 " ships are not altogether inconsistent with  
 " this proposition. On the contrary, they  
 " contain passages which seem to favour it,  
 " though they do not, taken as a whole, support  
 " the finding on this point of the Principal  
 " Sudder Ameen. From what has been said  
 " above, it plainly appears that the material  
 " thing to be determined in this case was the  
 " existence of the alleged usage, yet the issue  
 " upon that point has never been tried."  
 Their Lordships finally remanded the case  
 in order that two new issues should be tried;  
 " first, whether the land in dispute was settled  
 " in 1837 with the then Maliks of Mouzah  
 " Sohagpoor as the proprietors of alluvion  
 " which had become an increment to their  
 " estate by gradual accretion, or upon what  
 " other grounds such settlement was made;  
 " the burden of proving the affirmative of  
 " the first part of this issue to be on the  
 " Plaintiffs. Secondly, whether there was at  
 " the date of the permanent settlement, and  
 " has since been, a clear and definite usage that  
 " the main channel of the River Gunduck should  
 " be the constant boundary, not only between  
 " the districts of Sarun and Tirhoot, but also  
 " between the zemindaries on each bank divided  
 " by the river. The burthen of proving the  
 " affirmative of this issue to be on the Defen-  
 " dant."

The case then went down and was re-tried upon  
 those issues, and further evidence was given on the

part of the Defendant to show that there was such a usage. The Subordinate Judge, upon the evidence, found that no such usage had been proved; and he also found on the first issue that the settlement in 1837 was not made upon the ground of the alleged usage under section 2, Regulation XI. of 1825, but on the ground of their proprietary title under the provisions of clause 1, section 4 of that Regulation, that is to say, that the land was settled in 1837 with the owners of Sohagpore as the proprietors of alluvion which had become an increment to their estate by gradual accretion. An appeal was preferred from that judgment to the High Court, and that Court overruled the decision of the Lower Court upon the finding on the first issue, and they abstained from coming to any conclusion upon the second issue. There certainly is no sufficient evidence to justify their Lordships in finding that there was such a clear and definite usage as that stated in the second issue, and in overruling the decision of the Lower Court upon that issue upon which the High Court have expressed no opinion.

Mr. Justice Kemp, one of the learned Judges of the High Court who decided the case upon appeal, held that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in finding that the lands had been settled with the owners of Sohagpore in 1837 upon the ground of their proprietary title under clause 1, section 4 of the before-mentioned Regulation. At page 237 of his judgment he does not quite accurately state what the issue really was. Speaking of their Lordships' judgment on remand, he says: "They then remark, 'that if it should appear that the alleged usage, that is, the usage set up by the Defendants, namely, that the River Gunduck is the boundary between the two zillahs of Sarun and Tirhoot, exists, and that

“ ‘ the settlements were made on the basis of  
 “ ‘ that usage, or ’ (and these observations are  
 “ ‘ very important) ‘ for any other reason the  
 “ ‘ interest of the maliks of Sohagpoor in the  
 “ ‘ land in dispute was of a limited and tem-  
 “ ‘ porary character and had expired, that would  
 “ ‘ be fatal to the Plaintiff’s suit.’ ” There  
 was no doubt that the river was the boundary  
 between the two zillahs of Sarun and Tirhoot;  
 but the real question was whether there was a  
 clear and established usage that that river should  
 be the constant boundary between the zemindaries  
 on either side. That was the question as to  
 usage which their Lordships intended to be  
 decided.

On reversing the decision of the Lower Court  
 upon the first issue, Mr. Justice Kemp says:  
 “ Then comes the document to be found at  
 “ page 33, Appendix 1, which is a proceeding of  
 “ the Deputy Collector of Tirhoot, Mr. Edward  
 “ De Rozario, dated 28th November 1837. At  
 “ page 35 he says that, ‘ Having held a local  
 “ ‘ inquiry and examination I effected a tem-  
 “ ‘ porary settlement for seven years from 1245  
 “ ‘ to 1251 Fusli, with Jugdeo Narain, the pro-  
 “ ‘ prietor of the bureri lands above mentioned,  
 “ ‘ that is, the lands of Sohagpoor.’ ” That does not  
 affect the case at all. He merely says that he had  
 made a temporary settlement with the owners of  
 Sohagpoor. Mr. Justice Kemp proceeds, “ Then  
 “ follows, at page 41, a copy of the report of the  
 “ same officer, viz., Mr. Edward De Rozario,  
 “ the Deputy Collector of Tirhoot, to his imme-  
 “ diate superior, Mr. Campbell. Before referring  
 “ to this report we notice a passage in the settle-  
 “ ment proceeding of Mr. De Rozario, which is  
 “ to be found at page 39, Appendix 1. He says  
 “ ‘ The proprietors of Mouzah Bhukain, &c., per-  
 “ ‘ gunnah, Goa, Zilla Sarun, were given to under-  
 “ ‘ stand that a settlement of the land that has



“ ‘ accreted from the Gunduck cannot be made  
 “ ‘ contrary to the line of demarkation, namely,  
 “ ‘ the River Gunduck.’ Returning to the Report  
 “ of Mr. De Rozario, submitting his proceeding  
 “ to his immediate superior, we find at page 42.  
 “ paragraph 6, of that Report that the petition  
 “ of the Maliks of Bhukain, in which they had  
 “ claimed for an exception to the established usage  
 “ of the recognised boundary of the main channel  
 “ of the Gunduck to be made in their favour, was  
 “ opposed to all regulation and was inadmissible.”  
 Those two documents are set out in the present  
 record, first at page 44, in which Mr. Rozario says.  
 “ Therefore the proprietors of Mouzah Bhukain,  
 “ &c., pergunnah, Goa, Zilla Sarun, were given to  
 “ understand that a settlement of the land that  
 “ has accreted from the Gunduck cannot be made  
 “ contrary to the line of demarkation, namely, the  
 “ River Gunduck.” He does not say that a clear  
 and definite usage existed that the River Gunduck  
 was to be the boundary between the two zemindaries.  
 The other document to which the learned Judge  
 refers is at page 47 of the Record, and is con-  
 tained in a letter to Mr. Campbell, who was the  
 Deputy Collector in charge of Khas and resumed  
 mehals in Tirhoot. That letter was dated the  
 16th February 1838, and contains the passage to  
 which the learned Judge refers: “ The petition of  
 “ the Maliks of Bhukain, &c., Zillah Sarun, for  
 “ exception to the established boundary of the  
 “ main channel of the Gunduck in opposition to  
 “ all regulation was inadmissible, and their  
 “ unfounded officiousness pointing out the per-  
 “ manently assessed land as portion of the  
 “ alluvion from a puerile motive.” To say  
 the least of it, it is very ambiguous what  
 was meant by that statement. But in the  
 last paragraph of that letter, at page 48 of  
 this Record, paragraph 9, he says: “ These  
 “ lands established as an alluvion of the estate

“ registered in the name of Futteh Sing, descend-  
“ ing on his demise to his sons Gunga Persad  
“ and Jugdeo Narain Sing, with the latter as the  
“ surviving proprietor, I have, under Regulation  
“ XI. of 1825, effected a temporary settlement for  
“ seven years, from 1245 to 1251 Fusli inclusive,  
“ on the Sudder jumma of sicca Rupees 789 9,  
“ or Co’s. Rupees 842 3. 2., which I now have  
“ the honour to submit to your approval.”  
If Mr. De Rozario had relied upon a clear and  
established usage that the river was, under all  
circumstances, to be the boundary between the  
two zemindaries, it was unnecessary to say that it  
had been established that the lands were an  
alluvion of the estate, &c. It would have been  
sufficient to say they are to the north of the river,  
and consequently, according to the established  
usage, are part of the zemindari on the northern side  
of it. It appears, therefore, to their Lordships  
that the lands were settled with the predecessors  
of the Plaintiffs as an alluvion of their estate,  
and that, as far as the statements in the letters  
go, they do not establish that it was made with  
the Plaintiff upon the ground of there being an  
ancient and established usage that under all  
circumstances the River Gunduck should be  
treated as the boundary between the two  
zemindaries. Having referred to those docu-  
ments, Mr. Justice Kemp proceeds to say that the  
settlements were merely temporary. He says,  
“ These are all the proceedings of any importance  
“ with reference to the first temporary settle-  
“ ment made with the Plaintiffs by the revenue  
“ authorities. The second settlement was made  
“ for ten years with the Plaintiff, from 1846  
“ to 1856 by Mr. Deputy Collector. At page 45  
“ will be found the proceeding of that officer  
“ with reference to this second temporary  
“ settlement made with the Plaintiff. That  
“ proceeding was before their Lordships of the

" Privy Council." It does not appear that the second settlement at all affected the case; it was merely a renewal of the settlement of 1837, and if the settlement of 1837 had been made on the principle of established usage, the second settlement followed upon the ground of that usage. If, on the contrary, it was made with the Plaintiff as the proprietor of an estate to which the lands had become an accretion by gradual accession, then the second settlement was made upon the same principle. Mr. Justice Kemp proceeds, " The next proceeding is at page 55. This was not before the Privy Council, but was subsequently filed after the remand by the Plaintiffs. It is merely a letter of the Collector forwarding the proceedings connected with the temporary settlement concluded with the Plaintiffs. But a passage has been referred to in it by the pleader for the Plaintiffs, in which the Collector says that a settlement has been concluded for a period of ten years with the heirs of Gunga Persad and Jugdeo Narain as Maliks of the Kurrari Mehal." That shews that the settlement was made with them, not in consequence of any known and established usage, but upon the ground of the ordinary Rule under Regulation XI. of 1825. Then he says, " Having reviewed the documents filed by the Plaintiffs both before and after remand, we come to the decision upon the first issue laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council; and as after a careful consideration we have come to a conclusion different to that which the Subordinate Judge has arrived at, we shall confine our decision to the finding on the first issue laid down, inasmuch as we consider it unnecessary to enter into the second issue laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council. We are of opinion that the

“ settlements made with the Plaintiffs were  
 “ temporary settlements, and were made on the  
 “ basis that the Gunduck was the boundary  
 “ line, not only of the two zillahs Sarun and  
 “ Tirhoot, but of the estates appertaining to  
 “ those districts; that the land in dispute was  
 “ settled with the Plaintiffs on temporary leases,  
 “ and that those settlements were of a limited  
 “ and temporary character. Such being the  
 “ case, to use the words of their Lordships,  
 “ this finding is fatal to the Plaintiff's suit.”

With reference to the settlements being of a  
 temporary character, we must consider what  
 the law is upon the subject. If this accretion  
 belonged to the Plaintiffs by virtue of the  
 first clause of section 4 of Regulation XI. of  
 1825 as lands which had been gained by  
 gradual accession to their estate, then by virtue  
 of the first clause of that section it became an in-  
 crement to the Plaintiff's estate, and the property  
 became his property. The words are: “ When  
 “ land is gained by gradual accession, whether  
 “ from the recess of a river or of the sea, it shall  
 “ be considered an increment to the tenure of  
 “ the person to whose land or estate it is thus  
 “ annexed, whether such land or estate be held  
 “ immediately from Government by a Zemindar  
 “ or other superior landowner, or as a subor-  
 “ dinate tenure of any description of under-  
 “ tenant whatever; provided that the increment  
 “ of land thus obtained shall not entitle the  
 “ person in possession of the estate or tenure  
 “ to which the land may be annexed to a right  
 “ of property or permanent interest therein  
 “ beyond that possessed by him in the estate  
 “ or tenure to which the land may be annexed,  
 “ and shall not in any case be understood to  
 “ exempt the holder of it from the payment to  
 “ Government of any assessment for the public  
 “ revenue to which it may be liable under the

“ provisions of Regulation 11, 1819, or of any  
 “ other regulation in force.” Assume it to be a  
 case within this section, the land became the  
 property of the predecessors of the Plaintiff’s  
 liable to be assessed by the Government for  
 revenue; but there was no obligation on the  
 part of the Government to assess it permanently,  
 nor would it have been proper to do so, because  
 at the time when it was first annexed it was  
 mere sandy soil scarcely culturable, and was so  
 reported by Mr. D’Rozario. In his report at  
 page 45. He says, “At first he”—that is,  
 Jugdeo Narain Sing, the Plaintiff’s predecessor  
 —“raised a number of pleas as to his inability  
 “ to pay the rent,”—that is, the revenue,—  
 “ and that the diara will not remain in  
 “ existence, owing to the force of the River  
 “ Gunduck. Upon this he was made to under-  
 “ stand that the whole of the land is somewhat  
 “ like a sandy desert, and, of course, after the  
 “ lapse of some time it will become culturable,  
 “ and yield a great profit.” Then he assented  
 to take it at the revenue, which the Government  
 fixed at the time, of Co.’s Rs. 842, and began  
 to cultivate it; but the Government only assessed  
 temporarily that which was his permanent pro-  
 perty. A temporary assessment did not reduce  
 to a temporary estate, or to an estate of a limited  
 and temporary character, the interest of the Plain-  
 tiff in the accretion, which was permanent, as  
 being an increment to an estate which was perma-  
 nent, but it merely fixed the period during which  
 the increment should be subject to the revenue of  
 Rs. 832, so that the Government at the expiration  
 of the settlement might be at liberty to raise it  
 according to the value of the land. At the ex-  
 piration of the settlement of 1837 they renewed the  
 settlement at a revenue of Rs. 1,500. The land  
 had then become improved. The Plaintiff re-  
 mained in possession of the land under temporary

settlements from the year 1837, for a period of nearly 20 years, down to the year 1857, and during the whole of that time he paid revenue to Government, partly during the time when the land was little better than a sandy desert. The Plaintiff and his predecessors cultivated the land, and so improved it that in 1847 it was assessed at Rs. 1,500. The Plaintiff was during 20 years in occupation of the land, when at the expiration of the settlement of 1847, in consequence of a sudden turn of the River Gunduck, it was on the southern side of the river capable of being identified, and still belonged to the Plaintiff, unless there was a clear and definite usage that the River Gunduck was to be the boundary, not only between the two districts, but between the zemindaries on either side.

Such a custom has not been proved ever to have existed. The Subordinate Judge has found that there was no such usage. The High Court has not considered the evidence or reversed the finding of the Subordinate Judge upon the second issue, and their Lordships are of opinion that the established usage was not made out. The usage not having been proved, their Lordships are of opinion that there was no sufficient evidence to justify the finding of the High Court that the revenue settlements were made on the basis that the River Gunduck was the boundary line not only of the two zillahs, Sarun and Tirhoot, but of the estates appertaining to those districts; on the contrary, they are of opinion that the settlements, though temporary, were made with the predecessors of the Plaintiff as an alluvion to the estate of Sohagpoor, which in 1837 was registered in the name of Futteh Sing, and upon the ground that the predecessors of the Plaintiff were the Maliks and proprietors of the estate, and consequently that the finding of the Lower Court upon the first issue, under

the remand from this Board, was a correct finding, and that the reversal of that finding by the High Court was erroneous.

They will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty that the decree of the High Court be reversed, that it be declared that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the lands in dispute, and to have a settlement made with them, and that it be ordered that the Plaintiffs do recover possession of the said lands, with mesne profits, from the date of the institution of the suit, such mesne profits to be assessed in execution of the decree; and that the Respondent do pay the Plaintiffs the costs in all the Lower Courts and the costs of the former Appeal to Her Majesty in Council as already taxed as part of the costs in the cause; and their Lordships order that the Respondent do pay the costs of this Appeal.

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