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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Special Commissioners of Income Tax Decisions >> Netherline Ltd v York [2005] UKSPC SPC00457 (17 January 2005) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSPC/2005/SPC00457.html Cite as: [2005] UKSPC SPC457, [2005] UKSPC SPC00457 |
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SPC00457
NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS IR35 computer services heading a team supporting and maintaining a computer system under a series of six monthly contracts whether hypothetical contract would be an employment contract yes appeal dismissed
THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONERS
NETHERLANE LIMITED Appellant
- and -
SIMON YORK Respondent
Special Commissioner: DR JOHN F. AVERY JONES CBE
Sitting in public in London on 15 and 16 December 2004
A D Robertson FCA CTA for the Appellant
Mike Faulkner, HM Inspector of Taxes, Inland Revenue Southern England Regional Appeals Unit, for the Respondent
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2005
DECISION
Findings of fact
(1) Mr Martin J Renshaw left University in 1979 and became employed by Hambro Life (which later became Allied Dunbar) as a trainee computer programmer. He remained employed by Allied Dunbar until 1997 at which time he had attained the status of IT Project Manager.
(2) The Appellant company was incorporated on 10 June 1997. Throughout its existence Mr Renshaw has been the sole director and has held 60% of the shares. Mr Renshaw's wife holds the remaining 40% of the shares.
(3) For the purposes of this appeal, and subject to any amendment to returns necessitated by the Commissioner's decision, it is agreed that, with the assistance of a chartered accountant, the Appellant has complied with its obligations under company, business and taxation law. In particular it has done the following:
(a) Prepared annual accounts in compliance with company law and accounting standards;
(b) Submitted its accounts to Companies House and to the Inland Revenue;
(c) Prepared and submitted corporation tax returns each year;
(d) Written up payroll records, prepared payslips and submitted PAYE/NI returns to the Inland Revenue;
(e) Maintained a register of its fixed assets;
(f) Registered for VAT and submitted VAT returns;
(g) Required MJR to submit formal expense claims in respect of company business expenses incurred by him on NL's behalf;
(h) Prepared and submitted to the Revenue forms P11D and P11D(b);
(i) Invoiced its services to clients such as RML on credit terms using formal VAT invoices;
(j) Maintained a sales ledger to control the collection of customer debts;
(k) Maintained insurance cover for employer's liability, public liability, products liability and professional indemnity risks.
(4) The Appellant was offered a contract by a company called Resource Matters Ltd (RML) which required NL to provide IT services at the Cardiff premises of their client NPI Limited (NPI) (which later became AMP).
(a) The first contract commenced around 1 September 1997 and was for a period of 26 weeks.
(b) Shortly before the end of this term, a fresh 26 week contract was agreed and this pattern continued until June 2001.
(c) AMP notified Mr Renshaw in June 2001 that they would not have any further use for his services after 28 September 2001 and would not be prepared to offer a further 26 week contract as in the past but offered a 4 week contract instead. The reason given was that it was the policy of AMP (having taken over NPI) to use company employees to perform these services.
(5) AMP worldwide restructured in 2003. The UK operations are now part of HHG plc.
(6) The contract between Mr Renshaw and the Appellant for the 26 week period to 25 August 2000 and signed by Mr Renshaw on 9 February 2000 consisted of a double sided sheet of A4 paper. One side is headed "Resource Matters Ltd Contract for Services by I.T. Consultant". The other side is headed "Contract Assignment Schedule" and contained details of the actual assignment.
(7) Subsequent contracts consisted of a seven page "Contract Supply Agreement" that, other than the date and signatories, did not change from contract to contract plus a single page "Assignment Schedule" similar, but not identical, to the "Contract Assignment Schedule" of the old contract. The first new contract between Mr Renshaw and the Appellant also covers the 26 week period to 25 August 2000. It is dated 3 April 2000 but signed by the Appellant on 3 May 2000 and by RML on 8 May 2000.
(8) RML made a corresponding series of 26 week contracts with NPI to supply Mr Renshaw's services to NPI. Each contract consisted of 2 pages that, other than the date, did not change from contract to contract together with a single page schedule that contained the details of the assignment.
(9) Summaries of the information on the Mr Renshaw/the Appellant and NPI/RML schedules for the relevant period are attached [not included as these are summarised below].
(a) Although the schedule to the 20 July 2000 NPI/RML agreement shows the rate per working day inclusive of VAT paid RML to be £664.53, the rate actually paid was £650.95.
(10) A decision under S8 of the Social Security Contributions (Transfer of Functions, etc) Act 1999 for the period 6 April 2000 to 23 February 2001 was made on 9 September 2003 and appealed, with an election for the appeal to be heard by the Special Commissioners, on 25 September 2003.
(1) In 1997 Mr Renshaw decided to seek higher potential rewards by setting up as a freelance IT consultant finding work through recruitment agencies who expected him to operate through a company. He formed the Appellant of which he is the sole director and owner of 60 % of the shares, the other 40% being owned by his wife. At its peak he would earn two or three times what he would earn as an employee (although I imagine that this figure did not take fringe benefits into account).
(2) The recruitment agency the Appellant used in the relevant period was RML who from the beginning in 1997 found work with NPI. During the period in question the Appellant entered into the following contracts with RML (the lower level contracts): (a) 26 February 2000 to 25 August 2000, (b) from 26 August to 23 February 2001, (c) 24 February 2001 to 24 August 2001, and (d) a final one month contract 27 August 2001 to 28 September 2001. Strictly, only contracts (a) and (b) are in issue but as the parties have agreed that the decision will apply up to 28 September 2001 I have included information about the whole of the period.
(3) As stated above, there are two versions of contract (a) covering the identical period, one signed on 9 and 17 February 2000 but undated at the start, and the other signed on 3 and 8 May 2000, and dated 3 April 2000 at the start. The second version seems to have arisen from changes, which are set out in a letter to Mr Renshaw, made to the standard form on account of the IR35 legislation. The changes include that the Appellant will not engage in any conduct detrimental to the RML or the client, instead of that it will give priority to the Services over all other business activities; that the Appellant may (rather than shall) provide services at the location of the client; changing references to time sheets to work sheets; deletion of a clause requiring the Appellant to obey all lawful and reasonable directions of RML or the client; addition of a new provision that the Appellant will provide at its own expense any training that Mr Renshaw may require in order to perform the consultancy, that that it will provide all necessary equipment as is reasonable for the adequate performance by Mr Renshaw (subject to any agreement to the contrary specified in the Assignment Schedule) [which there is not]; the restriction of the Appellant's limitation of liability to £1m rather than its being unlimited; the addition of the type of insurance cover required; addition of a disclaimer that RML makes no representation and takes no responsibility for ensuring that the terms of the contract are an accurate reflection of the relationship between the client and the Appellant, and also that RML accepts no liability for any liabilities "whether by reason of tax or other statutory or contractual liability to any third party arising from the Assignment." In the Assignment Schedule, 35 hours per week is replaced by 5 professional working days; under payment terms on invoice is changed to 7 days/weekly; references to a notice period of 4 weeks (which does seem to relate to anything in the contract) and to overtime are deleted. No changes were made to the upper level contract (see paragraph 4(5)) at the same time. In what follows, references to contract (a) are to the later version, although the earlier version was in force until the amendment. Mr Summers said (and I accept) the amendment was agreed in principle in March 2000 but he did not say that it was agreed by the Appellant, and Mr Renshaw merely said that that it was varied with effect from 3 April 2000 although signed later. Since the amended version was sent to him with a covering letter of 17 April 2000 explaining the changes I find that the amendment was made at the date of signature on 3 and 8 May 2000.
(4) The lower level contracts were in standard form with an "Assignment Schedule" specific to the particular work. Each contract provides for the Appellant to start on a specified date and continue to provide the services for the duration of the assignment with the contract automatically terminating on completion of the assignment. In other words it envisages a specific assignment. However the Assignment Schedule does not refer to a particular assignment but describes the assignment as "consultant" (contract (a)) or "software consultant" (the other contracts) and also specifies an end date. The Schedule therefore seems to me to change the nature of the contract from carrying out an assignment to a fixed term contract for the provision of consultancy services. The contracts contain the following terms:
(a) The Appellant is to provide the services set out in the Assignment Schedule, but the schedule does not refer to any services other than the assignment. The services are to be provided on the terms of the agreement and the terms of the upper level contract are incorporated "where applicable."
(b) The Appellant is named as "consultant"; and Mr Renshaw is named as "Personnel". No changes are to be made to the personnel without RML's consent, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. All personnel must be employees of the Appellant.
(c) They provide for "5 professional working days" (contract (a)) or 35 hours per week (the other contracts).
(d) NPI or AMP is named as the client. In each contract he is described as "reporting to" Mike Clark (contracts (a) and (b)) or Matthew Brown (contracts (c) and (d)).
(e) The Appellant is required to make good at its expense any services not carried out to the client's satisfaction. There is no evidence that this ever occurred and this provision is not reproduced in the upper level contract. It would mean that no payment would be made for the time spent on correcting work and it is not suggested that this occurred.
(f) The contracts can be terminated immediately by RML if the client no longer requires the Appellant to provide the services.
(5) During the period in question RML entered into the following contracts with National Provident Institution (NPI) (the upper level contracts): (a) 26 February 2000 to 31 August 2000, (b) 1 September 2000 to 23 February 2001, (c) 24 February 2001 to 31 August 2001, and (d) a final one month oral contract 27 August 2001 to 28 September 2001. Except for a few days difference in the dates there are therefore equivalent lower and upper tier contracts every six months, with a final month. They include the following terms:
(a) Mr Renshaw is named as the consultant.
(b) RML confirms that Mr Renshaw will obey any lawful instructions given by NPI.
(c) The supervising manager is named as Mike Clark (contracts (a) and (b)), or Matthew Brown (contract (c)) who were not based in Cardiff. Mr Clark provided a witness statement but did not give oral evidence. I accept his evidence but bear in mind that he was not cross-examined. He sets out a table of the differences between an employee who was IT Project Manager as an employee, and a Contract IT Project Manager such as Mr Renshaw adding "The roles themselves were essentially the same, requiring the same skills and experience and focused on the same objectives and deliverables." The differences in his table were that the employee had flexible start and finish times with the ability to build up credit and take off up to one day per month; was paid monthly; was paid holiday and sick leave; was a member of the company's non-contributory pensions scheme; had private medical insurance, performance related annual bonus and share option scheme; was employed under a permanent contract until resignation, redundancy, dismissal etc; and was subject to annual performance and competency review, a personal development plan including company-financed training. In contrast Mr Renshaw worked a minimum 7 hours per day (I accept Mr Renshaw's evidence that there was some flexibility here in reality) and could not build up credit; was paid at a daily rate monthly against timesheets; had no paid holiday or sick leave; was not in the pension scheme; had no private medical insurance, bonus or share options; was engaged on typically a 6 months short-term contract, with the offer of a subsequent contract being dependant on business need, satisfactory performance and agreement of rates, contracted via an intermediary who put forward suitable candidates, assisted with rate negotiations and managed the time sheets and invoicing; there were no formal performance reviews, no personal development or training other than on-the-job training of company specifics to enable completion of agreed tasks.
(d) The assignment is described as team leader (contract (a)), or project management/leader (contract (c))
(e) The place of work is in NPI's office in Cardiff. The nature of his work on the computer system necessitated his being on site during normal working hours but occasionally it was necessary for him to visit other sites, for example to talk to accounts staff if action needed to be taken to computer systems affecting them. Some work such as writing reports would be done on the train or at home, and he would also make phone calls away from the office using his own mobile phone. He also used his own laptop computer to work on the train.
(f) A rate of pay per working day is given. Working day is defined as "A working day is normally 7 hours, but the Consultant may be required to work beyond 7 hours on any particular day to ensure the completion of an agreed task." Overtime was not in fact paid although the contract provides for this if requested by NPI, and contract (a) states after "term leader" "(including hours of work and reference to overtime, if applicable)". In practice he normally worked more than 7 hours, particularly when changes were needed, for example on the introduction of stakeholder pensions, or when severe problems needed fixing. There was some flexibility; for example, there was no problem about leaving early if the work was complete, and hours might be varied by agreement with Mr Clark. In practice he would be paid for a half-day of 3.5 hours; there are three examples of this in the summary of time sheets from 9 April 2000 to 6 April 2001. Weekly time sheets (later work sheets, which are virtually identical) were completed with 7 hours even if more were worked and certified by someone at NPI. There was a separate record of the true time spent of each job for planning purposes but I was not shown an example. The only occasion when a separate additional payment was negotiated was over the Millennium when he had to cover New Year's eve.
(g) Payment was made against time sheets (the change to describing these as work sheets made in the lower level contract was not made in the upper level contract). Invoicing was monthly with payment within 30 days.
(h) The contract was terminable immediately by NPI during the first six weeks and thereafter on four weeks notice. I accept Mr Summers' evidence that this provision was something that RML negotiated for, which they did not need so far as the lower level contract was concerned as this was terminable immediately on termination of the upper level contract. Contact (c) was also terminable on four weeks' notice by RML.
(i) Although there is no provision for holidays, in practice during the period from 9 April 2000 to 6 April 2001 he did not work for five weeks plus a few additional days which were presumably holidays, as he said that he did not have any absence for sickness. He would give NPI notice if he were away and some of his work would be covered by a member of the team.
(j) Contract (c) envisages that NPI may novate the contract with AMP (UK) Services Limited.
(k) The final month, contract (d), was a hand-over period after NPI or AMP had decided and informed him in June 2001 that the function would in future be dealt with by permanent employees and run from another location. Mr Renshaw was offered the job but declined it as he did not want to be an employee.
(6) Mr Renshaw's work consisted of leading a team that supported and maintained (including updating to deal with legislative changes) two NPI mainframe computer systems dealing with group pensions, originally the West system and then the Alice system. The work was primarily "fix on fail." Users would report faults to a help desk which logged calls and initially categorised them into four levels of severity based on company guidelines, depending for example on whether the problem affected the whole system or only one person. Such reports might happen 20 times in a day. Mr Renshaw received the log, worked out what needed to be done and he might change the priority categorisation before passing it to a member of his team of six or seven technical programmers to take action (the team was smaller at the end of the period as more of the work was outsourced). The six monthly contracts did not coincide with any particular aspect of the work; there would be computer problems to fix at the beginning and end of each contract. He would give a statistical report every fortnight to Mr Clark, who would also be informed immediately of problems falling into the most urgent category. Mr Clark might sometimes suggest that he copy reports to others who might be affected. Poor performance by a member of the team would in the last resort be discussed with Mr Clark. He discussed salary reviews of members of the team with management. He was not otherwise concerned with career development of members of the team which would be dealt with by a manager. He described as typical day as including considering a print-out of outstanding problems on the train; having an early morning meeting with representatives of the various departments to pick-up on problems; talk to his team to arrange priorities; attend meetings and deal with phone calls; progress problems to a result; negotiate with managers for a suitable time to fix software problems if this meant that the system would be unavailable; he would deal with paper work and phone calls on the train on the way home using his own mobile phone.
(7) Mr Renshaw had never seen the upper level contracts the terms of which are incorporated by reference into the lower level contracts until the papers were prepared for this appeal. He did not ask to see these at the time they were entered into. While I expect that RML might not want to show him the figures which would show their mark-up they could hardly have refused to show him the terms that were incorporated into the lower level contracts if he had asked. While accepting that he was unaware of them, as the Appellant entered into the lower level contract incorporating its terms I shall take it and Mr Renshaw as having agreed to these terms.
Legislation
"These Regulations apply where
(a) an individual ("the worker") personally performs, or is under an obligation personally to perform, services for the purposes of a business carried on by another person ("the client"),
(b) the performance of those services by the worker is carried out, not under a contract directly between the client and the worker, but under arrangements involving an intermediary, and
(c) the circumstances are such that, had the arrangements taken the form of a contract between the worker and the client, the worker would be regarded for the purposes of Parts I to V of the Contributions and Benefits Act [the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992] as employed in employed earner's employment by the client."
"Intermediary" is defined in Regulation 5 and it is common ground that the Appellant is an intermediary for this purpose.
Preliminary points
"The officer dealing with the case should establish all the facts necessary to form an opinion of the status. This fact finding exercise is likely to take a variety of forms and may include field visits, interview(s), and examination of documents and contracts."
Mr Robertson interpreted this as requiring the Revenue to obtain all the facts themselves. It seems to me that his contention is based on a misunderstanding of the law. If the taxpayer wants an opinion it is up to the taxpayer to provide all the information so that the Revenue can form an opinion. In the words of Bingham LJ in R v IRC ex p. MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd [1989] STC 879, 892f, he must "put all his cards face upwards on the table." If Mrs Gibb did not have enough information to form an opinion she would merely have said that. She was given enough information that, in her view, she could give an opinion, and she was willing to receive more information. In doing so she was acting absolutely correctly. The situation is that the taxpayer knows everything, and the Revenue knows nothing, of the facts. The manual envisages that the Revenue will help by interviewing people but that is where the taxpayer requests the interviews. It is not for the Revenue to go looking for facts that are in the taxpayer's knowledge, particularly so in this case when Mr Renshaw declined to attend an interview (as he is perfectly entitled to do). Any other system would be unworkable.
Reasons for my decision on whether IR35 applies
(1) A series of three six months' contracts and a final one month contract.
(2) Description of the work as team leader, or project management/leader in charge of managing a team, but with no stated assignment.
(3) Working at NPI's office in Cardiff.
(4) Reporting to a named supervising manager.
(5) Working on continuing computer support and maintenance rather than on a specific assignment with a finite life.
(6) Obliged to obey any lawful instructions of NPI.
(7) Paid a daily rate for days worked (in practice applied to half a day).
(8) Working at least 7 hours per day but may be required to work longer to ensure the completion of an agreed task.
(9) Paid against time sheets or work sheets monthly within seven days (the time limit in the lower level contract).
(10) Terminable by NPI on four weeks' notice after the first six weeks of each contract, and immediately during the six weeks. Although I have accepted that this was included at the insistence of RML who are not a party to the notional contract, I consider that it should be included in the notional contact as NPI had conceded it and commercially it is of benefit to Mr Renshaw. Since the lower level contracts provide for immediate termination if the client (NPI) does not require the services, the upper level contract must take priority because if NPI no longer required the services of the Appellant it would have to give RML the contractual notice in the upper level contract.
(11) Not containing any of the usual features of contracts with employees listed by Mr Clark (see paragraph 4(5)(c)).
Mutuality of obligation. Mr Robertson contends that there was no obligation on the parties to renew the contracts at the end of each six months' term, which is common ground. Mr Faulkner contended that there was full mutuality here. It does not seem to me to be relevant that there was no obligation to enter into another contract on termination of each one. This factor may be relevant to determine whether someone is employed under a single contract where there is an umbrella contract but there are breaks in work when the employer is free not to offer work and not to pay, as in Carmichael v National Power [1999] 1 WLR 2042. In this case mutuality is satisfied by NPI's obligation to pay a rate for a working day throughout each of the upper level contracts subject to their being able to terminate it on four weeks' notice after the first six weeks of each contract. The reality was that there was plenty of work requiring Mr Renshaw's continuing services in managing the team supporting and maintaining the computer system, and this factor points towards an employment relationship.
Personal service and right of substitution. Mr Robertson contends that there was a right of substitution in the lower level contact which should be treated as incorporated into the hypothetical contract. Mr Faulkner said that this fell short of being a right. Mr Renshaw was the only employee of the Appellant and is the named consultant in both the lower and the upper level contracts. Any change would require (a) the Appellant taking on another employee, (b) obtaining RML's consent (not to be unreasonably withheld) as envisaged by the lower level contract, and (c) renegotiation of the upper level contract. I do not consider that I should imply that the lower level contract term be included in the hypothetical contract because RML did not agree such a term with NPI, although it meant that the two contracts were different, and so there is no evidence that NPI would have agreed if the question had been put to them. More importantly, however, even if the same provision had been in the hypothetical contract it would not have amounted to a right of substitution; it was no more than a possibility envisaged by the contract to which NPI might or might not have agreed, although their consent was not to be unreasonably withheld, and if the Appellant had taken on another employee. The reality was that only Mr Renshaw would do the work. I have accepted Mr Summers' evidence was that even if the Appellant had proposed a substitute, RML would have tried to bring in its own substitute. Mr Robertson also made the point that the contracts did not provide for holidays but in practice these were taken and some of Mr Renshaw's work had to wait for his return, so this cannot be used as an argument in support of substitution. This factor points to an employment relationship.
Control. Mr Robertson contended that control could cover what, where, when and how the work was done. He contended that NPI merely set the objectives; the nature of he work required most of it to be done in Cardiff; there was no control over the days worked, or how the work was done. Mr Faulkner drew attention to the control clause in the upper level contract. The upper level contract provided that Mr Renshaw must obey any lawful instructions given by NPI and work a seven hour day at NPI's office in Cardiff. Mr Renshaw was left to arrange how his and his team's work would be done but he reported to Mr Clark fortnightly and Mr Clark was kept informed about serious computer problems. In this respect Mr Renshaw was similar to a senior employee who was not told how to do his work but made regular reports of the state of the work. Clearly some control over Mr Renshaw was necessary as he was in charge of a team of NPI's employees.
In business on own account. Mr Robertson contended that the Appellant was certainly carrying on business and had other letting activities. Mr Faulkner said that the Appellant's other activities would not be relevant to the hypothetical contract. I agree. Mr Renshaw did not do other work at the same time. His only work from 1997 to September 2001 was for NPI. This factor points to an employment relationship.
Business risk. Mr Robertson pointed to the need to renegotiate the rate of payment in each six monthly contract, Mr Renshaw might have been required to work additional hours without extra payment, there was a risk attached to 7 days credit, he took risks as a director of the Appellant, the contract might have been terminated, and he took out his own insurance. Mr Faulkner contended that these were minor risks. In my view as he could not earn more by working longer hours because the Appellant was effectively paid a daily rate, this is more like an employment relationship. The other factors are unusual for an employee (although an employee paid in arrears takes some risk of non-payment) and point towards self-employment.
Provision of equipment. This is not a factor that is relevant to this type of work as he was working on NPI's mainframe computer. However, he provided his own laptop and mobile phone, which is more indicative of self-employment.
Length and number of engagements, and exclusivity. Mr Faulkner contends that the contracts in question are continuous and follow other contracts between the same parties starting in 1997. Mr Robertson contends that lengthy engagements are neutral as long relationships are regularly found in self-employment. I accept that there are genuinely a series of separate contracts with no obligation to renew them. In this case, however, no work was done for other clients and the work does not consist of a series of finite assignments. This factor points towards an employment relationship under a series of separate contracts.
Payment terms. Mr Robertson contended that the rate of remuneration was higher than for an employee. Although there is no evidence of what an employee would have earned for the same work and one would need to know the cost to the employer of the fringe benefits that an employee would receive, I can accept that NPI paid more under the actual contract that it would have paid an employee because it had the flexibility of taking on the Appellant on a six-month basis as opposed to taking on a permanent employee. But I do not think that helps to categorise the hypothetical contract. Mr Renshaw was paid a daily rate when working and not paid for holidays and sickness which is indicative of self-employment. On the other hand, the daily rate was more similar to an employee in that he could not earn more by working longer hours, which a self-employed person would normally be able to do.
Provision of benefits. He did not receive any of the fringe benefits listed by Mr Clark. This is indicative of self-employment.
Rights of termination. I have explained above why I consider that the upper level contract notice period should apply to the hypothetical contract, which is accordingly terminable on four weeks notice after the first six weeks of each contract. This is a slight pointer towards an employment relationship because termination on notice is less usual in self-employment.
Intention of the parties. It is not possible for the parties to have any intention over a hypothetical contract. However, the actual contracts were necessarily not employment contracts.
Part and parcel of the orgainsation. Mr Robertson contended that working with NPI's staff was dictated by the nature of the work and so this factor was neutral. Mr Faulkner contended that Mr Renshaw was fully integrated in the NPI organisation working with a team and in reporting to a manager. It seems to me that Mr Renshaw was very much part and parcel of NPI's organisation being the in-house person in charge of a team of people, not only in carrying out the work but being involved with salary reviews and poor performance of members of the team, although not with their career development more generally. He was working on a continuous process of computer support and maintenance rather than being engaged for a particular assignment. The six monthly contracts did not coincide with any particular assignment. This factor is a strong pointer towards an employment relationship. The work was identical to that of an employee; as Mr Clark put it: "The roles themselves were essentially the same, requiring the same skills and experience and focused on the same objectives and deliverables." He was eventually replaced by an employee.
Concluding remarks
JOHN F. AVERY JONES
SPECIAL COMMISSIONER
RELEASE DATE: 17 January 2005
SC 3125/03
Authorities referred to in skeletons and not referred to in the decision:
R v IRC ex p. Professional Contractors Group Ltd 74 TC 393
Express & Echo Publications v Tanton [1999] IRLR 367
FS Consulting Ltd v McCaul [2002] STC (SCD) 138
Future on Line v Faulds [2004] EWHC 2597
Hall v Lorimer 66 TC 349
Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173
Massey v Crown Life Insurance [1978] 1 WLR 676
McManus v Griffiths 70 TC 218
Morren v Swinton and Pendlebury BC [1965] 1 WLR 576
Mrs MacFarlane and Mrs Skivington v Glasgow CC EAT/1277/99
Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner [1984] ICR 612
Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497
Secretary of State for Employment v McMeechan [1997] IRLR 353
Synaptek Ltd v Young 75 TC 51
Usetech v Young [2004] STC 1671
Global Plant Ltd v Secretary of State for Social Security [1971] 1QB 139
WHPT Housing Association v Secretary of State for Social Services [1981] ICR 737
Stevedoring & Haulage Services Ltd v Fuller [2001]EWCA Civ 651
Montgomery v Johnson Underwood [2001] IRLR 269
Propertycare Ltd v Gower [2003] EAT/547
Clark v Oxfordshire Health Authority [1997] EWCA 4792
Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] AC 296
Ansell Computer Services Ltd v Richardson [2004] STC (SCD) 472
Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Payroll Tax [1984] ICR 286
Byrne Brothers (Formwork) Ltd v Baird [2002] IRLR 96
Lime IT v IRC [2003] STC (SCD) 15
Horner v Hasted 67 TC 439
Tilbury Consulting Ltd v Griffiths [2004] STC (SCD) 1