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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> UK Social Security and Child Support Commissioners' Decisions >> [2008] UKSSCSC CIS_102_2008 (22 May 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSSCSC/2008/CIS_102_2008.html Cite as: [2008] UKSSCSC CIS_102_2008 |
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[2008] UKSSCSC CIS_102_2008 (22 May 2008)
CIS/102/2008
DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER
The decision of the Social Security Commissioner in outline
The background to this case
"(9) The condition specified in this sub-paragraph is that the loan was taken out, or an existing loan increased, to acquire alternative accommodation more suited to the special needs of a disabled person than the accommodation which was occupied before the acquisition by the claimant."
"The conditions specified in this sub-paragraph are that the loan was taken out, or an existing loan increased, either-
(a) to make adaptations to an existing property to meet the special needs of a disabled person; or
(b) to acquire alternative accommodation more suited to the special needs of a disabled person than the accommodation which was occupied before the acquisition by the claimaint;
and in this sub-paragraph a disabled person is a person in respect of whom a disability premium, disabled child premium, higher pensioner premium or pensioner premium for persons aged 75 or over is included in his applicable amount or would be so included but for his failure to satisfy other conditions of entitlement to income support."
The Department's decision on the claim for housing costs
The claimant's appeal to the tribunal
The grounds of appeal to the Commissioner
The decision of Mr Commissioner Mesher in CIS/14551/1996
"12. Some propositions are I think clear. First, the fact that the new accommodation is more suited to the special needs of the disabled person need only be one of the reasons for the acquisition. It does not have to be the sole or predominant reason. Second, the new accommodation only has to be more suited: there is no test of whether or not it was reasonable to acquire the new accommodation. Third, the special needs of the disabled person must be needs stemming from the person's disability. That follows from the force of the word "special". "Disabled person" is given quite a wide definition in sub-paragraph (8), including those who are suffering disablements and incapacities which are not permanent (or even, for the over-75s, who have no disability at all apart from the effects of age). I consider that the person's overall mental and physical condition must be taken into account, not merely whatever condition it is that in the circumstances triggers the application of the definition. However, only needs stemming from something which amounts to a specific disease or bodily or mental disablement, i.e. of a kind identified by medical science, or from the effects of ageing for the over-75s, can be special needs of the disabled person. Fourth, within those limits (and any others discussed below), the application of sub-paragraph (8) is a matter of fact for adjudication officers and appeal tribunals. Wide words are used in the sub-paragraph and the adjudicating authorities must apply them to the circumstances as they find them, rather than some legal gloss imposed by Commissioners' decisions."
"13. Difficulty does, however, arise when considering financial factors. Some of the difficulty is removed, as Mr Forsdick recognised, by the application of the third point in paragraph 12 above. Many income support claimants will be under financial stress, which is a cause of anxiety and turmoil. If the claimant concerned happens to be a disabled person, that cannot transform a "trading down" for the sole reason of reducing overall mortgage interest liabilities into something within sub-paragraph (8). It must also be the case that financial factors cannot be ignored, as in practice it will often be difficult to disentangle such factors from the circumstances as a whole. For instance, one can use an example raised during the oral hearing, of a disabled person who cannot afford to heat their accommodation adequately, although it could be heated adequately by someone with enough money. If the person's physical and mental condition is such that there is a special need for heating, I do not think that it would be doubted that smaller or more compact accommodation which costs less to heat to an adequate level is more suited to the disabled person's special needs. Similarly, one can adapt the facts of Commissioner's decision CIS/7273/1995, where the claimant moved to be near her son who could look after her. If the reason why the son could not look after the claimant in their existing accommodation was that he could not afford the traveling expenses, I do not think that that would prevent the application of sub-paragraph (8).
14. Where does the relevance of financial factors stop? Can it extend to bring the pure circumstance of an alleviation of financial stress alleviating mental stress within the scope of sub-paragraph (8)? Mr Forsdick submitted that it could extend that far if the adjudicating authority was satisfied as a matter of fact of a direct link between the characteristics of the new accommodation, including its price, and the special needs of the disabled person. That submission cannot be accepted in its entirety. Without seeking to draw any definite legal lines, I think that two particular considerations point in that direction. First, the question to be asked is whether the accommodation itself is more suited to the special needs of the disabled person, not whether the terms of the acquisition of the new accommodation make the circumstances as a whole more suited to those special needs. The relevant characteristics of the new accommodation could possibly include its running costs, but not the price that had to be paid for it or the size of the loan which had to be taken out. Second, part of the means by which in the present case the claimant expected to be relieved of financial stress (and thereby of mental stress) was by all of the loan interest on his new home being met as an income support housing cost. To allow such an expectation to work in favour of the removal of a restriction on the meeting of all the interest, through the operation of sub-paragraph (8), would be wrong. It would introduce an undesirable circularity of reasoning. Such expectations should not be taken into account."
Subsequent decisions of the Commissioner on the scope of paragraph 4(9)
"The house in Cornwall had a flight of about 17 steep stairs internally and the claimant and his wife had to go on all fours to climb the stairs. There were also steps to the front door and to the back door and between some of the rooms. There was no downstairs toilet. There were three large bedrooms, an upstairs bathroom and toilet, and a kitchen/diner, living room, sun room and porch downstairs. Nobody lived in the accommodation apart from the claimant and his wife. The house was over 9 miles from the GP and approximately 45 miles from the nearest hospital. They have four sons, none of whom lived within easy reach of the house in Cornwall."
"The new house in Somerset has only one step to the front door, has eight shallower steps internally with a banister rail each side, has a downstairs toilet, is much smaller and easier to maintain with one large and two small bedrooms and a bathroom upstairs and a small kitchen, living room and toilet downstairs. The new house is within minutes of both the doctor and the nearest hospital, and within 15 to 20 minutes travelling time of each of the four sons. There is a shower. The claimant has a driving licence but is physically unable to drive. He had a stroke in 1995. His wife has numbness on the left side of her body. Between moving house and the date of the final tribunal hearing the claimant visited the hospital in Somerset between 25 and 30 times."
"9. The key issue is what is meant by the phrase "the special needs of a disabled person". Since the description "a disabled person" states nothing about the nature of the disability, and since the word "special" is used, the regulation can only be referring to the special needs of a particular disabled person, special in the sense that they are special to that person and arise from that particular person's disability. In this case the special needs were to have a house with easier access internally and externally, one in which it was easier to move around and had both upstairs and downstairs toilet facilities, one which was close to medical attention, and one which was within reasonable reach of such members of the family (or any other person) as were willing and able to provide assistance as appropriate. In all of these respects it is quite clear that the accommodation in Somerset was more suited to the special needs of the claimant than had been the accommodation in Cornwall."
"the crucial findings that the new house was not in fact more suitable for the claimant's needs as a disabled person than the one he was already occupying, and that the real purpose of the move had been to acquire accommodation to suit the broader needs of the household rather than his disability specifically, seem to me altogether proper and reasonable on the facts. The evidence here showed that so far from being more suited to the claimant's needs as a disabled person than where he was living before, the new house was in fact impossible for him to live in at all: his token attempt to move in there having hurriedly to be abandoned on medical advice because it was damaging to his health."
"20. There are no time limits in subparagraph (9) and in particular no requirement of immediacy linking the time of acquisition, the time the loan is taken out, and the time the claimant moves. It will depend entirely on the circumstances. What the subparagraph requires for it to apply in this case is:
(a) that alternative accommodation is acquired,
(b) that the acquired accommodation is more suited to the special needs of a disabled person than the accommodation occupied by that person before the acquisition, and
(c) that the loan is taken out to enable the accommodation to be acquired."
The Secretary of State's submissions in the present appeal to the Commissioner
The Rent Act jurisprudence on "suitable alternative accommodation"
The application of the principles from the Commissioners' case law to the present case
The Commissioner's decision in this appeal
(1) the disabled person must meet the statutory definition of that term at the date the loan was taken out (R(IS) 20/98);
(2) there is no requirement of immediacy linking the time the loan is taken out, the time of acquisition and the time of moving in (CIS/3295/2003);
(3) the fact that the new accommodation is more suited to the special needs of the disabled person need only be one of the reasons for the acquisition – it does not have to be the sole or predominant reason (CIS/14551/1996);
(4) the new accommodation only has to be more suited: there is no test of whether or not it was reasonable to acquire the new accommodation (CIS/14551/1996);
(5) the special needs of the disabled person must be needs stemming from the person's disability (CIS/14551/1996);
(6) the statutory test is not whether the new property has been specially adapted in a structural sense (CIS/16250/1996);
(7) although structural modifications may be relevant in appropriate cases, the statutory test may also include consideration of wider social issues, such as better access to local health care services or closer proximity to family members providing care and support (CIS/14551/1996 and CIS/16250/1996);
(8) within the above limits, the application of paragraph 4(9) is ultimately a matter of fact for decision makers and appeal tribunals (CIS/14551/1996 and CIS/3383/2006). As Mr Commissioner Mesher emphasised at paragraph 12 of CIS/14551/1996, "wide words are used in the sub-paragraph and the adjudicating authorities must apply them to the circumstances as they find them, rather than some legal gloss imposed by Commissioners' decisions".
(signed on the original) N J Wikeley
Deputy Commissioner
22 May 2008