Sanchez-Gavito Leon v Council and Commission (International Cotton Advisory Committee - Agreement on the applicant's conditions of departure - Judgment) [2023] EUECJ T-100/21 (08 March 2023)

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(International Cotton Advisory Committee – Decision (EU) 2017/876 – Staff of an international organisation to which the European Union has acceded – Agreement on the applicant’s conditions of departure – Actions for failure to act – Absence in part of invitation to act – No standing to bring proceedings – Inadmissibility – Liability – Causal link)

Maria del Carmen Sánchez-Gavito León, residing in Reston, Virginia (United States), represented by M. Veissiere, lawyer,

Council of the European Union, represented by A. Antoniadis, M. Bauer and A. Boggio-Tomasaz, acting as Agents,

European Commission, represented by T. Lilamand and M. Monfort, acting as Agents,

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of M.J. Costeira, M. Kancheva (Rapporteur) and P. Zilgalvis, Judges,

1 By her action under Articles 265 and 268 TFEU, the applicant, Ms María del Carmen Sánchez-Gavito León, seeks, first, a declaration that the failure to act of the Council of the European Union and of the European Commission was unlawful in so far as those institutions unlawfully refrained from acting following the formal call for action addressed to them by the applicant, a Spanish national and former staff member of the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) to which the European Union acceded by the adoption of Council Decision (EU) 2017/876 of 18 May 2017 on the accession of the European Union to the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) (OJ 2017 L 134, p. 23) and, second, compensation for the harm she allegedly suffered on account of the conduct of the Council, of the Commission and of their agents, which she claims failed to act even though they were aware of the harassment to which the applicant claims she was subjected by the Executive Director of the ICAC (‘the Executive Director’) and that director’s failure to adhere to the agreement on the applicant’s conditions of departure from the ICAC (‘the agreement on the conditions of departure’), and the absence of any means of redress by which the applicant could state her claim.

2 On 18 May 2017, the Council adopted Decision 2017/876 on the basis of Article 207(3) and (4) TFEU.

3 The ICAC is an international organisation of cotton producing, consuming and trading countries headquartered in Washington D.C. (United States).

4 Each member of the ICAC designates a coordinating agency, which serves as the main point of contact with the ICAC Secretariat. The Directorate-General (DG) for International Partnerships of the European Commission and the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union are the coordinating agency for the European Union.

5 Pursuant to Executive Order No 9911 of the President of the United States of 19 December 1947, the ICAC enjoys certain privileges, exemptions and immunities, as provided for in the International Organizations Immunities Act of 9 December 1945, immunity from any form of legal proceedings in particular. The same applies to its directors and employees relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions as ICAC representatives, officers or employees.

6 Furthermore, the ICAC’s Rules and Regulations and its Staff Regulations do not provide for a system to settle disputes relating to the failure to observe, in either substantive or formal respects, the terms of the contract of employment of the civil servants or the provisions of those staff regulations. Similarly, those instruments do not provide that the disputes in question should be subject to the competence of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (ILO), as permitted under Article II(5) of the Statute of that tribunal.

7 The applicant is a Spanish national and former staff member of the ICAC for which, as from 15 October 1995, she worked successively as a bilingual assistant to the Executive Director and then as a business manager, until her resignation on 7 March 2019.

8 On 14 March 2019, the applicant and the Executive Director came to an agreement on the conditions of departure. Under that agreement, the applicant was to leave the premises of the ICAC on 15 March 2019, but would continue to receive her salary until 7 June 2019 and the payment of 480 hours of unused leave and of other benefits in line with the organisation’s standard practice in comparable circumstances.

9 On 31 July 2019, the ICAC’s accountant informed the applicant that he had issued a cheque in the amount of 9 462.08 United States dollars (USD) to the applicant corresponding to the payment for the leave unused by her. In an email of that same day, the applicant reminded the ICAC’s accountant that, under the ICAC’s Staff Regulations, she was also entitled to the other benefits related to that unused leave.

10 By email of 27 September 2019, after providing the documents requested by the accountant of the ICAC in that regard and not receiving an answer from him as to when she would receive the payment corresponding to the benefits related to the unused leave, the applicant asked the Executive Director to take prompt action to ensure compliance with the agreement on the conditions of departure.

11 By email of 30 September 2019, the Executive Director informed the applicant that, after checking with the ICAC’s accountant and its lawyers, the applicant had received all the payments owed to her under the ICAC’s Staff Regulations and that he therefore considered the ‘matter closed’.

12 On 1 October 2019, the applicant sent an email to the various coordinating agencies of the members of the ICAC, including the EU’s coordinating agency, in which she stated that she was contacting the members of the ICAC directly in order to assert her rights, as the Secretariat of the ICAC Standing Committee did not have a human resources office.

13 On 2 October 2019, the EU’s coordinating agency to the ICAC, in the person of a representative of the Commission, replied to the applicant, informing her that her email of 1 October 2019 had received his full attention and that, although staff matters were the responsibility of the Executive Director, as a member of the ICAC, the European Union would ensure that the rule of law was strictly applied. The representative of the European Union also stated that, at that stage, he needed to receive all the explanations from the individuals concerned, such as the accountant and legal advisers of the ICAC.

14 By email of 17 October 2019, the applicant asked the representative of the European Union whether any action had been taken further to the explanations that she had provided as to why, in her view, the ICAC was not complying with the terms of her contract, as provided for in the ICAC Staff Regulations. In response, by an email of 24 October 2019, the representative of the European Union informed the applicant that he thought that she had already received explanations regarding her complaint and that, if there was still a misunderstanding, the applicant should request support from the Chair of the ICAC Finance Committee, which should be able to rephrase the position taken by the ICAC.

15 On 3 February 2020, the applicant sent a letter to the Executive Director detailing her complaints relating to the latter’s behaviour towards her, which she claimed created a hostile working environment and ultimately led to her resignation, and to the failure of the ICAC to comply with the agreement on the conditions of departure. The letter concluded with a formal request that the ICAC pay a lump sum of USD 300 000 to the applicant as compensation for her forced retirement and for the pain and suffering inflicted upon her by the director, which made it impossible for the applicant to retire of her own accord in 2024. The applicant also demanded that the ICAC pay an amount of USD 19 368.13 corresponding to the benefits associated with the unused leave and provide a work experience certificate.

16 On 20 February 2020, the applicant sent her letter of 3 February 2020 to the Members of the Standing Committee of the ICAC and to the representative of the European Union.

17 By letter of 6 March 2020, the ICAC’s lawyer replied to the applicant’s letter of 3 February 2020, disputing her claims.

18 On 26 August 2020, the applicant submitted an ‘ad hoc’ complaint to the Standing Committee of the ICAC, alleging that the Executive Director had breached the agreement on the conditions of departure, that the ICAC and its members had infringed her right to a safe work environment and her fundamental right of access to justice. She requested that the matter be raised and decided upon on 3 September 2020 and that the decision be communicated to her on 21 September 2020.

19 On 17 September 2020, the applicant sent a letter to the Members of the ICAC Standing Committee, including the European Union, requesting urgent consideration of her complaint filed on 26 August 2020

20 By letter of 14 October 2020, the ICAC’s lawyer informed the applicant’s lawyer that the ICAC had reviewed the complaint and conducted an audit of the compensation paid to the applicant in connection with her resignation, and concluded that she had been underpaid in the amount of USD 6 473.92. He stated that the corresponding payment had been made by wire transfer and that all the applicant’s other complaints or claims had been rejected. He also asked that the applicant not engage in any direct communication with the ICAC or its Standing Committee.

21 The ICAC Standing Committee met on 15 October 2020. The meeting minutes contain the following section:

‘[The applicant’s] resignation letter was accepted by the Executive Director in March 2019, the day she was due to be dismissed. She was awarded 3 months of paid salary and payment for 2 months outstanding leave. The amounts owed were confirmed by the ICAC accountants on two occasions and followed the advice of the lawyers. [The director] stated that [the applicant’s] lawyers had refused to engage with the ICAC lawyers and that, following a series of letters sent to delegates and coordinating agencies, he had sought an independent review, which concluded that there had been an underpayment of USD 6 432. This amount had been paid to [the applicant] and her lawyers were also informed. The ICAC lawyers stated that [the applicant] had no legal recourse in the US or indeed anywhere else and [the director] strongly refuted all allegations against him in the letters and he now considered the matter closed as there was nothing else he could possibly do. The Chair noted that the [the director] was responsible for HR issues in accordance with the ICAC [Rules] and Regulations and that employment disputes were not a matter for the Standing Committee. His country had also noted the … willingness [of the director in question] to secure an independent review and, speaking on behalf of his country, he hoped that this would now be the end of the matter. There were no further comments.’

22 By letter of 20 October 2020, the applicant called on the Council and the Commission to adopt various measures to ensure respect for her fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Union (‘the letter of 20 October 2020’).

23 By letter of 9 November 2020, which was also sent to all Members of the ICAC, the applicant’s lawyer replied to the ICAC’s letter of 14 October 2020. He stated, inter alia, that the amount owed to the applicant was USD 19 368.13 and that, therefore, the payment of USD 6 473.92 could not be regarded as satisfactory and would be transferred back to the ICAC. He also stated that the applicant maintained all the claims set out in the complaint of 26 August 2020, including those relating to the Executive Director, and asked the ICAC to settle the dispute by proceeding to arbitration.

– ‘declare unlawful’ the failure to act of the Commission and the Council;

– order the European Union represented by the Commission and the Council, as a member of the ICAC, to take actions against the Executive Director of the ICAC for his misconduct;

– order the immediate suspension of the EU’s financial contribution to the ICAC until the ICAC respects the fundamental human rights as protected by the EU Treaties;

– order the European Union represented by the Commission and the Council to pay her by way of compensation for non-material damage (psychological trauma, massive violation of human rights, damage to her reputation) the amount of EUR 300 000;

– order the European Union represented by the Commission and the Council to pay the applicant by way of compensation for loss of employment, loss of opportunity and damage to her career the sum of USD 103 542.92 (at the current exchange rate in euros) equivalent to one and a half years’ salary based on her last salary slip at the ICAC (USD 69 055.28);

– order the European Union represented by the Commission and the Council to pay the applicant by way of compensation for material damage the amount of USD 19 368.13 (at the current exchange rate in Euro) with a payment of interest at the current legal rate per annum (from June 2019);

– order the European Union to pay the costs, including but not limited to legal costs as per attorney invoice(s).

– in the alternative, reject the claims for failure to act and for compensation as unfounded;

– reject the claims for failure to act and for compensation as inadmissible and unfounded;

The admissibility of the applicant’s second and third heads of claim in the application

27 By the second and third heads of claim in the application, the applicant asks the Court, respectively, to ‘order the European Union represented by the Commission and the Council, as a member of the ICAC, to take actions against the Executive Director of the ICAC for his misconduct’ and to ‘order the immediate the suspension of the EU’s financial contribution to the ICAC until the ICAC respects the fundamental human rights as protected by the EU Treaties’.

28 The Council and the Commission state that, by those heads of claim, the Court is being asked to issue orders to institutions of the European Union and that they must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible, according to the case-law.

29 In that connection, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the Court is not competent to issue directions to an institution in the context of an action based on Article 265 TFEU. All that the Court can do is determine whether there has been a failure to act. It is then for the institution concerned, pursuant to Article 266 TFEU, to take the measures necessary to comply with the order of the Court (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 May 2006, Air One v Commission, T‑395/04, EU:T:2006:123, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

30 The applicant maintains that, as the Court held in the judgment of 20 September 2011, Arch Chemicals and Arch Timber Protection v Commission (T‑400/04 and T‑402/04 to T‑404/04, not published, EU:T:2011:490), her second and third heads of claim should be regarded as impliedly seeking a declaration of the unlawfulness of the Council’s alleged failure to act.

31 However, it must be noted that, in the present case, unlike the circumstances of the case which resulted in the judgment of 20 September 2011, Arch Chemicals and Arch Timber Protection v Commission (T‑400/04 and T‑402/04 to T‑404/04, not published, EU:T:2011:490), the application already contains a head of claim seeking a declaration of the unlawfulness of the Commission and Council’s alleged failure to act.

32 It follows that the second and third heads of claim in the application, in so far as they ask the Court to issue directions to the Council and the Commission, must be rejected on the ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction, in line with the case-law recalled in paragraph 29 above.

33 The applicant submits that, by failing to adopt the acts set out in the letter of 20 October 2020, the Council and the Commission infringed (i) Article 3(5) and (6), Articles 16, 17 and 21 TEU, Articles 151, 205, 207, 314 and 317 TFEU, and the principle of sound financial management, and (ii) Article III, Sections 5(b) and 4(d), Article IV, Section 3(c)(1) of the Rules and Regulations of the ICAC, and Article II, Sections 5 and 10 of the Staff Regulations of the ICAC.

34 By separate document, the Council raised a plea of inadmissibility pursuant to Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court against the application for a declaration for failure to act. Furthermore, although it has not formally raised a plea of inadmissibility within the meaning of that article, the Commission disputes the admissibility of the application.

35 The Council argues that the application for a declaration of failure to act is inadmissible on the ground that the pre-litigation procedure provided for by the second paragraph of Article 265 TFEU was not followed, in that the letter of 20 October 2020 is insufficiently precise as regards the nature of the acts which the applicant asked the Council to adopt; the Council submits that this is borne out by the fact that the applicant herself sought to specify the nature of the acts in question in the application. It also submits that none of the possible legal bases under which it may act imposes on it a legal obligation to act in the present case. The Council observes in that connection that it and the Commission have broad discretion in the management of the external relations of the European Union, which involves complex political and economic assessments, and in the rules and principles governing the implementation of the EU budget. In addition, it argues, as does the Commission, that, in any event, the conditions of an application for a declaration of failure to act established by the third paragraph of Article 265 TFEU are not satisfied, because the applicant is not the addressee of the acts in question and those acts are not of individual and direct concern to her within the meaning of the case-law. The Commission adds that the applicant does not have an interest in bringing proceedings, given that none of the acts set out in the letter of 20 October 2020 could have taken the form of a binding legal act capable of bringing her an advantage, and that the action is inadmissible also in so far as it concerns acts that were not set out in that letter.

36 The applicant argues that the letter of 20 October 2020 was sufficiently precise for the Council to ascertain the content of the acts it was being asked to adopt. She also argues that the question whether the Council was required to adopt the acts set out in that letter relates to the assessment of the merits of the action for failure to act, not of its admissibility. Moreover, she submits that the Council did not, in the present case, have discretion precluding the admissibility of an action for failure to act. Further, she claims that she was individually and directly concerned by the acts which she had asked to be adopted.

37 It should be borne in mind that the third paragraph of Article 265 TFEU provides that ‘any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the preceding paragraphs, complain to the Court that an institution, body, office or agency of the Union has failed to address to that person any act other than a recommendation or an opinion’.

38 Such action may be brought subject to compliance with the pre-litigation procedure laid down in the second paragraph of Article 265 TFEU, under which ‘the action shall be admissible only if the institution, body, office or agency concerned has first been called upon to act. If, within two months of being so called upon, the institution, body, office or agency concerned has not defined its position, the action may be brought within a further period of two months.’

39 It should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, in order for the invitation to act to be capable of setting in motion the procedure for an action for failure to act under the second paragraph of Article 265 TFEU, the invitation must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable that institution to ascertain in specific terms the content of the decision that it is being asked to adopt and must also show what matters are understood to require the institution to define its position (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 November 2017, Bionorica and Diapharm v Commission, C‑596/15 P and C‑597/15 P, EU:C:2017:886, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited, and of 16 December 2020, Balti Gaas v Commission and INEA, T‑236/17 and T‑596/17, not published, EU:T:2020:612, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited).

40 In the present case, in the letter of 20 October 2020, the applicant expressly asked the Council and the Commission to take one of the five following steps:

– ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the applicant as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and all other European or international law, principles and standards;

– urgently take all necessary measures to preserve her rights and avoid causing her further harm;

– urge the Standing Committee of the ICAC to offer or accept an effective remedy which respects all the guarantees of independence and impartiality;

– suspend the EU’s financial contribution to the ICAC until the applicant has access to an effective remedy which respects all the guarantees of independence and impartiality and the ICAC respects the fundamental human rights as protected by the European Union; and

– require the Standing Committee of the ICAC to order that the Executive Director be prevented from taking any part in the applicant’s case, in particular because of his individual involvement in the matter (including harassment and abuse of authority).

41 In the letter of 20 October 2020, the applicant also stated expressly that, should the Council or the Commission fail to define their position within the time limit set out in Article 265 TFEU, she reserved the right to bring an action for failure to act. The correspondence set out in paragraphs 18 to 20 above, including the formal complaint sent by the applicant on 26 August 2020 to the Standing Committee of the ICAC, was annexed to the letter.

42 Moreover, in the application, the applicant listed 11 acts that the Council could have adopted in order to satisfy the requests in the letter of 20 October 2020, namely:

– proposing that the Standing Committee of the ICAC, the governing body of the ICAC composed of the representative of the Members in Washington D.C., create an internal mechanism for dispute resolution;

– proposing that the Standing Committee adopt an anti-harassment policy and all relevant safeguards to protect staff members;

– requesting that the Standing Committee deal with the applicant’s formal complaint of 26 August 2020;

– making a declaration before the Standing Committee to recall basic fundamental rights and urgently requesting that they be respected and protected;

– taking further actions against the Executive Director, given that the members of the ICAC have authority over the Executive Director;

– suspending the annual programme of the European Union with the ICAC (on the contrary, the European Union had proposed to host the next plenary session in Seville) until the ICAC provides its staff members with fair and impartial access to justice and respects fundamental human rights;

– ordering, or adopting a decision for, the suspension of the EU’s financial contribution to the ICAC until the organisation provides its staff members with fair and impartial access to justice and respects fundamental human rights;

– reviewing the EU’s financial contribution until the ICAC provides its staff members with fair and impartial access to justice and respects fundamental human rights;

– adopting a decision to redefine the framework of the cooperation between the European Union and the ICAC until the organisation provides its staff members with fair and impartial access to justice and respects fundamental human rights.

43 In that regard, as was pointed out by the Commission, it is clear that the 11 acts set out in the application and listed in paragraph 42 above only partially cover the acts which the applicant asked to be adopted in the letter of 20 October 2020, as set out in paragraph 40 above.

44 In addition, the Court stresses that, by definition, details provided by an applicant, at the stage of an action brought under Article 265 TFEU, regarding the content of the decisions that he or she has asked an institution to adopt, cannot remedy an initial lack of precision of the invitation to act addressed to that institution for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 265 TFEU, the purpose of which is precisely to make it possible for that institution to ascertain specifically the content of the decision which it is being asked to adopt.

45 It follows that the details provided by the applicant in the application regarding the acts that the Council or Commission could have adopted in response to her letter of 20 October 2020 are irrelevant as to whether the applicant has, in the present case, followed the pre-litigation procedure provided for in the second paragraph of Article 265 TFEU.

46 Regarding the letter of 20 October 2020, the content of which was set out in paragraphs 40 and 41 above, it must be noted that that letter was sufficiently explicit and precise regarding the request made to the Council and the Commission to ‘suspend the EU’s financial contribution to the ICAC until the applicant has access to an effective remedy which respects all the guarantees of independence and impartiality and the ICAC respects the fundamental human rights as protected by the [European Union]’.

47 It should be borne in mind that Article 218(9) TFEU provides that ‘the Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall adopt a decision suspending application of an agreement and establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts having legal effects, with the exception of acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement’.

48 Under Article 218(9) TFEU, it is only on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy that the Council may act, with the result that, if the Commission or High Commission do not do so, the adoption of an appropriate measure is impossible.

49 The applicant’s request set out in paragraph 46 above must therefore be regarded, as far as the Commission is concerned, as seeking that the Commission submit proposals to the Council for the purpose of suspending the application of the EU’s accession decision to the ICAC and to adopt a position to be taken on the EU’s behalf within the Standing Committee of the ICAC with a view to that committee adopting legally binding acts vis-à-vis the applicant. That request must be regarded, as far as the Council is concerned, as asking it to request proposals to that effect from the Commission.

50 It is also appropriate to regard the requests to ‘urge the Standing Committee of the ICAC to offer or accept an effective remedy which respects all the guarantees of independence and impartiality’ and to ‘require [the Standing Committee] to order that the Executive Director be prevented from taking any part in the applicant’s case, in particular because of his individual involvement in the matter (including harassment and abuse of authority)’ as asking the Commission to submit proposals to that effect to the Council and the Council to request such proposals from the Commission.

51 It follows that the letter of 20 October 2020 must be regarded as an invitation to act for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 265 TFEU, as far as the requests set out in paragraphs 49 and 50 above are concerned.

52 However, it is clear that the letter of 20 October 2020 did not meet the requirement for clarity and precision required by the case-law recalled in paragraph 39 above as far as the other requests made by the applicant are concerned.

53 The same applies to the request made to the Council and the Commission to ‘ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the Applicant as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as all other European or international law, principles and standards’ and the request to ‘urgently take all necessary measures to preserve the Applicant’s rights and avoid causing her further harm’, which were clearly too vague to make it possible for the Council and the Commission to ascertain specifically the content of the decision which the applicant was asking them to adopt.

54 It follows that the action must be rejected as inadmissible in so far as it seeks a declaration that the Council and the Commission failed to act in respect of the requests set out in paragraph 53 above.

55 The Council submits that the application for a declaration of failure to act is inadmissible in so far as, in the light of its broad discretion in the management of the external relations of the European Union which involves complex political and economic matters, it was not required to adopt the acts referred to in the letter of 20 October 2020.

56 In that connection, it is sufficient to recall that that question is not a condition for the admissibility of the action for failure to act, but a question which must be examined on the merits. It is precisely in order to rule on the substance of a claim for a declaration of a failure to act that it is necessary for the Court to determine whether, at the time of the invitation to act addressed to the institution concerned within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 265 TFEU, that institution was under a duty to act in the manner requested by the applicant in the invitation to act (see, to that effect, order of 17 July 2020, Wagenknecht v European Council, T‑715/19, EU:T:2020:340, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

57 It is therefore appropriate to reject the Council’s plea of inadmissibility claiming that it had no obligation to act.

58 The Council and the Commission submit that the action for failure to act is inadmissible on the ground that the acts that the applicant asked them to adopt in the letter of 20 October 2020 were not, in any event, addressed to her, and neither were they such as to affect her legal position directly.

59 In that connection, it follows from the third paragraph of Article 265 TFEU that a natural or legal person must establish that that person is in a legal position identical or similar to that of the potential addressee of a legal measure which the institution concerned would be obliged to take in relation to that person, if that person’s action for failure to act is to be ruled to be admissible. In other words, that natural or legal person must establish either that that person is the addressee of the act which the institution complained of allegedly failed to adopt in respect of that person, or that that act directly and individually concerned that person in a manner analogous to that in which the addressee of such an act would be concerned (see order of 17 July 2020, Wagenknecht v European Council, T‑715/19, EU:T:2020:340, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

60 In the present case, it is clear that, assuming that the Council and the Commission had responded favourably to the invitation to act as interpreted in paragraphs 49 and 50 above, neither the Council’s requests for proposals from the Commission under Article 218(9) TFEU nor the Commission’s possible proposals to the Council in response to those requests would have been addressed to the applicant.

61 It must also be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the condition that a natural or legal person must be directly concerned by the decision against which the action is brought, as laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, requires that two cumulative criteria be fulfilled. In the first place, the contested EU measure must directly affect the legal situation of the individual. In the second place, it must leave no discretion to its addressees, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see judgment of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited; order of 6 March 2012, Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v Commission, T‑453/10, not published, EU:T:2012:106, paragraph 42).

62 However, in the present case, in the scenario set out in paragraph 60 above, the Commission’s invitation to submit an appropriate proposal to the Council under Article 241 TFEU would only have the effect of bringing before the Commission the invitation in question and requiring it either to submit that proposal to the Council or to inform the Council of the reasons why it would not submit the proposal in question to the Council. It follows that that invitation would not be such as to produce direct legal effects on the applicant’s position.

63 The Court also stresses that, even if the applicant’s requests had to be regarded as merely asking the Commission to adopt the decisions (i) to ‘suspend the EU’s financial contribution to the ICAC until the applicant has access to an effective remedy which respects all the guarantees of independence and impartiality and the ICAC respects the fundamental human rights as protected by the [European Union]’, (ii) to ‘urge the Standing Committee of the ICAC to offer or accept an effective remedy which respects all the guarantees of independence and impartiality’ and (iii) to ‘require the Standing Committee … to order that the Executive Director be prevented from taking any part in the applicant’s case, in particular because of his individual involvement in the matter (including harassment and abuse of authority)’, such decisions would have been addressed to the ICAC instead, and not the applicant, and would, similarly, not have been such, in themselves, as to affect the applicant’s legal position directly, unlike the decisions that the ICAC could, as the case may be, adopt vis-à-vis the applicant.

64 It follows that, in the present case, the applicant does not have standing to bring proceedings under Article 265 TFEU within the meaning of the case-law recalled in paragraph 59 above.

65 The application for a declaration of failure to act must, consequently, be rejected as inadmissible, without there being any need to rule on the other pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Commission.

66 The Council and the Commission contend that, according to the case-law, an action for compensation, such as that brought by the applicant, which is formally directed against the institutions of the European Union but is based, in essence, on the mere alleged illegality of an act or course of conduct that has been adopted by an international organisation, not by an institution of the European Union or by its servants, is inadmissible, since to do otherwise would constitute misuse of the system of remedies established by the TFEU.

67 The Council also contends that a claim for compensation that is closely connected to an inadmissible action for failure to act must also be rejected as inadmissible. In the Council’s view, in the present case, by the claim for compensation, the applicant seeks to obtain a result comparable to that which she would have obtained from her application for a declaration of failure to act, namely the Council’s intervention within the ICAC with a view to preserving her rights, preventing further harm being caused to her, and providing her with an effective remedy.

68 The Council further argues that, with regard to the claim for compensation, the application does not satisfy the requirements under Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, because it is not sufficiently precise regarding both the reality and certainty of the alleged harm and the causal link between the Council’s conduct and that harm or the unlawful conduct for which it is held responsible.

69 In addition, the Council submits that, if the application for a declaration for failure to act were to succeed and the applicant’s requests regarding the ICAC were satisfied, the harm alleged by the applicant would disappear and the claim for compensation would then be inadmissible.

70 It is appropriate to begin by examining the plea of inadmissibility based on infringement of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which is a requirement relating to the form of the application, before examining the other pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Council.

– The plea of inadmissibility based on infringement of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court

71 It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, an application seeking compensation for damage allegedly caused by an institution must indicate with sufficient precision the manner in which the various conditions for reparation of the alleged damage are satisfied. It follows that such an application must contain the evidence making possible identification of, first, the conduct which the applicant alleges against the institution, second, the reasons for which the applicant considers that there is a causal link between that conduct and the damage which he or she claims to have suffered, and, third, the nature and extent of that damage (see order of 12 September 2018, RE v Commission, T‑257/17, not published, EU:T:2018:549, paragraphs 55 and 56 and the case-law cited).

72 In the present case, regarding the conduct which the applicant alleges against the Council and the Commission, it is apparent from the application that the applicant claims that the European Union, represented by the Council and the Commission within the ICAC, in essence, contributed to the impunity of the Executive Director and denied her justice by failing to act in order to protect her fundamental rights, in particular her right to access justice and her right to a safe work environment, for two years, even though the European Union was aware of the fact that she was being harassed by that director and that the director had failed to comply with the agreement on the conditions of departure, and the absence of any means of redress by which the applicant could state her claim (paragraphs 38 to 40 and 75 to 77).

73 It is also apparent from the application that the applicant complains that the agents of the European Union – whom she had informed of her situation continuously since 2018 by letters sent to the representative of the European Union in Washington, the ICAC coordinating agencies and the representative of the Commission within the Standing Committee of the ICAC – first, acted negligently by creating the incorrect expectation that the European Union would intervene in order to ‘ensure that the rule of law is strictly applied’ in her situation (paragraphs 41 and 78) and, second, failed to request the ICAC to respect her fundamental rights, in breach of their duty to act in the interests of the European Union (paragraphs 42 and 79).

74 In that connection, it must be noted that the European Union appointed both the DG for International Partnerships of the European Commission and the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union as the coordinating agency within the ICAC. In those circumstances, contrary to the Council’s submission, it cannot be claimed that the applicant failed to identify with sufficient precision the Commission’s and Council’s alleged conduct.

75 It is also appropriate to reject the Council’s argument that the application does not make it possible to identify the agents of the European Union in respect of which the applicant raised certain complaints. In footnote 32 of paragraph 41 of the application, the applicant refers to correspondence with the representative of the European Union in Washington, to the letters sent to the coordinating agencies appointed by the members of the ICAC and to correspondence with the representative of the Commission at the ICAC, annexed to the application.

76 Regarding the nature and scope of the harm which the applicant claims to have suffered and the causal link between that harm and the Council’s alleged conduct, it is apparent from the application that the applicant claims that the conduct of the Council, the Commission and the agents of the European Union contributed to the rapid deterioration of her health (paragraph 44), resulting in a medical diagnosis of major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (paragraph 77), and damaged her reputation in so far as she was forced to leave her employment after 24 years of service (paragraph 44). It is, moreover, apparent from the fourth head of claim in the application that the applicant claims that this caused her non-material harm in the estimated amount of EUR 300 000.

77 In addition, it is apparent from the application that the applicant claims that the conduct of the Council, the Commission and the agents of the European Union caused her material harm, because she never received the amounts agreed upon in the agreement on the conditions of departure or any severance payment, since she could not assert her rights in the context of any dispute resolution mechanism; the conduct resulted in damage to her career and obvious loss of opportunity, as she has since then been out of permanent employment (paragraph 44).

78 It is also apparent from the fifth head of claim in the application that the applicant is of the view that the loss of her employment, the loss of opportunity and the damage to her career caused her material harm equivalent to one and a half years’ salary on the basis of her last salary slip at the ICAC, namely USD 103 542.92.

79 Similarly, it is apparent from the sixth head of claim in the application that the applicant is of the view that the impossibility of asserting her rights under the agreement on the conditions of departure caused her material harm in the amount of USD 19 368.13.

80 Consequently, it is clear that, contrary to the Council’s submissions, the application contains the elements referred to in the case-law recalled in paragraph 71 above.

81 Moreover, it is appropriate to reject as ineffective the Council’s arguments relating, in essence, to the fact that the application does not contain any demonstration of the alleged conduct or identification of a legal rule conferring rules on individuals which has allegedly been infringed, in so far as those arguments have been made in support of the present plea of inadmissibility. Those arguments relate to the merits of the claim for compensation.

– The plea of inadmissibility claiming that the action for compensation relies on the mere alleged unlawfulness of an act or course of conduct adopted by an international institution, not by an EU institution or the agents thereof

83 It must be noted that, contrary to the submissions of the Council and the Commission, and in line with the findings in paragraphs 72 and 73 above, the present claim for compensation does not relate to the conduct of the ICAC and its Executive Director, but rather to that of the Council and the Commission and of their agents, which the applicant confirmed expressly at the hearing.

84 In that connection, it must also be noted that the question whether the harm the applicant claims to have suffered originates from the conduct of the Council and the Commission, and that of their agents, as referred to by the applicant in the context of the present action, relates not to the assessment of the admissibility of the claim for compensation, but to its merits.

85 It should also be noted that the order of 10 November 2014, Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB (T‑289/13, EU:T:2014:981), to which the Council referred in its plea of inadmissibility and to which the Commission referred in its defence, was annulled by the judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB (C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701), with the result that those institutions cannot rely on that order in support of the present plea of inadmissibility.

– The plea of inadmissibility based on a close connection between the action for failure to act and the action for damages

87 It must be borne in mind that an action for damages is an autonomous form of action, with a particular purpose to fulfil within the system of legal remedies and subject to conditions of use dictated by its specific purpose. Whereas actions for annulment and for failure to act seek a declaration that a legally binding measure is unlawful or that such a measure has not been taken, an action for damages seeks compensation for damage resulting from a measure or from unlawful conduct, attributable to an EU institution or body (judgment of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB, T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 61).

88 That autonomous nature of the action for damages cannot be called into question by the mere fact that an applicant has decided to bring an action for failure to act at the same time as an action for damages; the fact that an action for failure to act is declared inadmissible does not mean that an action for damages brought at the same time is inadmissible on the sole ground that those actions are based on similar, or even identical, pleas of illegality. Such an interpretation would run counter to the very principle of the autonomy of remedies and would therefore deprive Article 268 TFEU, read in conjunction with the third paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, of its practical effect (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB, T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 61).

89 In addition, in so far as the Council’s intention is to rely on a risk that a procedure could be circumvented or a remedy could be misused, it should be borne in mind, first, that the case-law to which it refers, concerning the scenario in which an applicant seeks, by his or her claim for compensation, to obtain a monetary benefit identical to that which he or she would have gained by obtaining the annulment of the act it seeks at the same time as its action for damages, is an exception to the principle of the autonomy of remedies and must therefore be applied strictly. Second, it must be stated that, in the present case, by her action for damages, the applicant does not seek an instruction for the Council to invite the Commission to submit to it suitable proposals to adopt the acts referred to in the letter of 20 October 2020, or for the Commission to submit such proposals to the Council, but seeks to be compensated for the material and non-material harm which she claims to have suffered on account of the Council’s and Commission’s failure to act since 2019 (see paragraph 72 above) and the attitude of the agents of those two institutions towards her (see paragraph 73 above) (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 October 2015, Accorinti and Others v ECB, T‑79/13, EU:T:2015:756, paragraph 62).

90 The Court stresses that any conduct or failure to act which leads to damage is such as to establish non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 March 2004, Ombudsman v Lamberts, C‑234/02 P, EU:C:2004:174, paragraphs 50 to 52 and 60; of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB, C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701, paragraphs 55 to 59, 67 and 68, and of 16 November 2017, Acquafarm v Commission, T‑458/16, not published, EU:T:2017:810, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

– Elimination of the alleged instances of harm in the event that the application for a declaration of failure to act were held to be well founded

92 Regarding the Council’s argument that, in essence, in the event that the application for a declaration of failure to act were held to be well founded and that the adoption of the acts referred to in the letter of 20 October 2020 were to lead the ICAC to satisfy the requests made by the applicant in her complaint of 26 August 2020, the harm done to the applicant would be eliminated, it is sufficient to observe that, in paragraph 65 above, that application has been rejected as inadmissible and, in any event, the adoption would not be such, in itself, to result in the elimination of the non-material and material harm that the applicant claims to have suffered.

93 Having regard to the considerations in paragraphs 71 to 92 above, the Court finds that the claim for compensation is admissible.

94 The Court has consistently interpreted the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU as meaning that the non-contractual liability of the European Union and the exercise of the right to compensation for damage suffered depend on the satisfaction of a number of conditions, relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct of which the institutions are accused, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the damage complained of (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 January 1982, Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission, 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80 and 5/81, EU:C:1982:18, paragraph 9; of 9 September 2008, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 106, and of 18 March 2010, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraph 40).

95 First of all, regarding the condition relating to the unlawfulness of the alleged conduct of the institution or body concerned, the case-law requires that it must be established that there was a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. As for the requirement that the breach must be sufficiently serious, the decisive test for finding that that requirement is met is whether the EU institution or body concerned manifestly and seriously disregarded the limits on its discretion. Where that institution or body has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of EU law may suffice to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach (see judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

96 Next, as regards the requirement that there must be actual damage, liability can be incurred by the European Union only where the applicant has in actual fact suffered ‘real and certain’ harm. It falls to the applicant to submit evidence to the EU judicature to show the existence and scope of that harm (see judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

97 Last, regarding the condition relating to the existence of a causal link between the conduct alleged and the harm complained of, that harm must flow in a sufficiently direct way from the alleged conduct – that conduct must be the decisive cause of the harm – although there is no obligation to make good every harmful consequence, even a remote one, of an unlawful situation. It falls to the applicant to submit evidence to show that there is a causal link between the conduct alleged and the harm complained of (judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

98 Where one of the three conditions for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability is not satisfied, the claim for compensation must be rejected, without there being any need to examine whether the two other conditions are met. Moreover, the EU judicature is not required to examine those conditions in any particular order (see judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

99 The arguments raised by the applicant in the present case must be examined in the light of those considerations.

– The causal link between the alleged unlawful conduct of the Council and the Commission and the harm which the applicant claims to have suffered

100 The applicant submits that the Council and the Commission, which were required to ensure respect for her fundamental rights within the ICAC under Articles 3, 16, 17 and 21 TEU and Articles 205 and 207 TFEU, were aware since 1 October 2019 of her complaints against the Executive Director regarding the failure to satisfy the financial conditions laid down in the agreement on the conditions of departure and the Executive Director’s psychological harassment of her. According to the applicant, that claim is borne out by the email by which an agent of the Commission representing the European Union within the ICAC replied to her.

101 The applicant states that, in the present case, the ICAC’s Rules and Regulations do not provide for any internal or external remedy for its staff, and that, for that reason, she sought to assert her rights by her email of 1 October 2019 sent directly to the Members of the Standing Committee of the ICAC, then by the ‘ad hoc’ complaint of 26 August 2020 sent to the Standing Committee.

102 According to the applicant, the Council’s and the Commission’s failure to act, which is apparent, inter alia, from the minutes of the meeting of the Standing Committee of the ICAC of 15 October 2020, contributed to the breach of her right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, Articles 8 and 10 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and Articles 2(3) and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966, which those institutions were required to uphold within the ICAC.

103 The applicant also asserts that the Council’s and the Commission’s failure to act is contrary, in the present case, to her right to dignity and to a safe working environment, as guaranteed by Articles 1 and 31(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights read in conjunction with Article 151 TFEU. In her view, those provisions are part of an international framework intended to protect the dignity and working conditions of employees to avoid causing them undue harm, including international instruments such as the ILO Conventions, international administrative tribunals such as the ILO Administrative Tribunal, and international codes of conduct such as the Standards of Conduct of International Civil Service adopted in 2013 by the International Civil Service Commission (ISSC) of the United Nations (UN).

104 The applicant states that the European Union has for a long time made strong commitments against harassment in the workplace and for the protection of women, demonstrating that that issue is at the heart of EU policy. She also observes that the Commission recently invited all EU Member States to ratify the ILO Convention No 190 concerning the elimination of violence and harassment in the world of work, a broad commitment from the Commission in that field, not only at EU level. In the applicant’s view, it nevertheless seems that the European Union, the Commission specifically, decided willingly not to protect one of its citizens against harassment, in breach of Article 3(5) TEU. The applicant further notes that the European Union offers that protection to its own officials and is therefore well aware of that problem at the level of intergovernmental organisations and of its specificities, since EU officials have access to the Civil Service Tribunal in case of disputes.

105 In the applicant’s view, the members of the ICAC, the European Union in particular, failed to protect her by denying her access to justice, despite their clear knowledge that the ICAC did not and still does not provide for the efficient protection of its staff against harassment and abuse of authority. She claims that their failure to act led to her resignation and affected her health dramatically, as she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. She submits that, since then, she has been unable to find permanent employment due to her medical condition and general economic situation. In her view, the failure to protect her thus had a clear impact on her health and career and resulted in a loss of opportunity.

106 Furthermore, the applicant claims that the agents of the European Union also failed individually in their duties to address her situation and the serious violation of human rights. According to the applicant, despite the assurances provided by the representative of the Commission to the ICAC, no action was taken. On the contrary, she claims that the representative of the Commission in fact avoided his responsibility and recommended that the applicant contact the Chair of the Budget Subcommittee of the ICAC. The applicant observes that when she subsequently asked the representative of the Commission about any disciplinary action against the Executive Director in order to safeguard her right to a safe working environment, she was left without a response. She argues that those actions and omissions therefore misled her and caused her further harm by creating a feeling of abandonment.

108 The Court stresses from the outset that, even if unlawful conduct on the part of the Commission and Council as alleged by the applicant were established, such conduct is not such as to constitute the decisive cause of the harm that the applicant claims to have suffered for the purposes of the case-law recalled in paragraph 97 above.

109 It must be noted that applicant alleges that the Council and the Commission caused her non-material harm by their conduct resulting from the fact that she was forced to leave her employment after 24 years of service (see paragraph 76 above), material harm relating to the loss of her job, the loss of opportunity and the damage to her career, and material harm resulting from the failure to comply with the agreement on the conditions of departure (see paragraph 77 above).

110 However, those instances of harm which the applicant claims to have suffered cannot be held to originate from the conduct of the Council and the Commission as representatives of the European Union within the ICAC.

111 Thus, it must be noted that, even if the representatives of the European Union within the ICAC had offered, for example, to refer the dispute between the applicant and the ICAC to arbitration, that measure would have required the agreement of the Standing Committee of the ICAC acting unanimously or, failing consensus, that of the Advisory Committee of the ICAC, itself acting unanimously, or, failing consensus, by two-thirds majority, in accordance with Article XI of the Rules and Regulations of the ICAC. Similarly, any amendment to the Rules and Regulations of the ICAC in order, for example, to introduce a dispute resolution mechanism or a clause conferring jurisdiction on the ILO Administrative Tribunal would have required the agreement of the Advisory Committee of the ICAC, in accordance with Article XIII of those rules and regulations.

112 In addition, it must be borne in mind that Article XI of the Rules and Regulations of the ICAC provides that the voting system of the Standing Committee of the ICAC and that of the Advisory Committee of the ICAC is governed by the principle of one vote per member.

113 Admittedly, Section 5 of the Staff Regulations of the ICAC states that the Standing Committee of the ICAC may conduct a performance review of the Executive Director. In addition, Section 10 of the Staff Regulations provides that that Standing Committee may terminate the appointment of the director, if that director’s conduct or services prove unsatisfactory, for disciplinary reasons, or where, in the discretion of ICAC, it is in the best interests of the organisation. It follows that the Standing Committee has disciplinary powers vis-à-vis that director.

114 However, even if the Council and the Commission had proposed a review of the Executive Director’s conduct in the light of the complaints made against him by the applicant, in accordance with Articles XI and XIII of the rules and regulations, the setting in motion of that procedure would have been subject to the agreement of the members of the Standing Committee of the ICAC, acting unanimously or, failing consensus, to the agreement of the Advisory Committee of the ICAC by two-thirds majority, the vote being governed by the principle of one vote per member.

115 It follows that the applicant has failed to show that the Council and the Commission could require the ICAC to take any measure whatsoever and that, as a result, their failure to act was capable of giving rise to the alleged harm in a sufficiently direct manner.

116 Having regard to the absence of a sufficiently direct causal link between the alleged conduct of the Council and the Commission, on the one hand, and the harm the applicant claims to have suffered, on the other hand, the claim for compensation must be rejected in so far as it concerns that conduct, without there being any need, according to the case-law recalled in paragraph 98 above, to ascertain whether the other conditions for the European Union to incur liability are met.

– The alleged legitimate expectations of the applicant given by the agents of the European Union

117 The applicant claims that the agents of the Council and the Commission misled her by letting her believe – incorrectly – that the European Union would intervene in order to protect her interests, which caused her further harm by creating a feeling of abandonment.

118 It is settled case-law that the right to rely on the principle of protection of legitimate expectations presupposes that precise, unconditional and consistent assurances, originating from authorised, reliable sources, have been given to the person concerned by the competent authorities of the European Union. That right applies to any individual in a situation in which an institution, body or agency of the European Union, by giving that person precise assurances, has led him or her to entertain well-founded expectations (see judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2020, Council and Others v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028, paragraph 178 and the case-law cited).

119 It is sufficient to note that the applicant does not rely on any precise assurance capable of leading her to entertain an expectation that the European Union would intervene to protect her interests and safeguard her rights.

120 In that connection, although, in an email of 2 October 2019, an agent of the Commission, representing the European Union within the ICAC, assured the applicant that, as a member of the ICAC, the European Union would ensure that the rule of law is strictly applied, that representative stated in that email that, at that stage, he needed to receive all the explanations from all the individuals concerned, such as the accountant and legal advisers of the ICAC.

121 It must also be noted that, by email of 17 October 2019, the applicant asked the agent in question whether any action had been taken further to the explanations that she had provided as to why, in her view, the ICAC was not complying with the terms of her contract, as provided for in the ICAC’s Staff Regulations. However, in his reply by email of 24 October 2019, the agent told the applicant that he thought that she had already received explanations regarding her complaint and that, if there was still a misunderstanding, the applicant should request support from the Chair of the ICAC’s Finance Committee, which should be able to rephrase the position taken by the ICAC.

122 It must further be noted that, although, by an email of 24 October 2019, the applicant did in fact reply, asking the agent in question whether any disciplinary action would be taken against the Executive Director, since she had clearly suffered from his constant abuse of power throughout his tenure, the applicant herself accepts that that question remained unanswered.

123 In those circumstances, the applicant cannot argue any breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations by the agents of the Council or Commission.

124 The claim for compensation must therefore be rejected as unfounded in so far as it concerns the conduct of the Council’s and the Commission’s agents without there being any need, according to the case-law recalled in paragraph 98, to examine whether the two other conditions for the European Union to incur liability are met.

125 Having regard to the considerations set out in paragraphs 108 to 116 and 118 to 124 above, the claim for compensation must be rejected as unfounded, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of the documents produced by the applicant at the hearing.

126 Consequently, the application must be rejected in its entirety as being inadmissible in part and unfounded in part.

127 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. As the applicant has been unsuccessful and the Council and the Commission have applied for costs, the applicant must be ordered to pay the costs.

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	Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) >> Sanchez-Gavito Leon v Council and Commission (International Cotton Advisory Committee - Agreement on the applicant's conditions of departure - Judgment) [2023] EUECJ T-100/21 (08 March 2023) URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2023/T10021.html Cite as: EU:T:2023:109, [2023] EUECJ T-100/21, ECLI:EU:T:2023:109

Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)