Irish Court of Appeal

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THE COURT OF APPEAL

 

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] IECA 64

Record No. 2024/68

High Court Record No. 2022/4986P

 

Woulfe J.

Noonan J.

Burns J.

 

Between:

 

STEPHEN BEATTY

 

Plaintiff/Appellant  

-and-

 

WALTER BEATTY (REPRESENTED BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM WALTER BEATTY JUNIOR)

 

Defendant/Respondent  

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Woulfe delivered on the 19^th day of March, 2025

 

1.      I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of Noonan J. in draft form.  I am in full agreement with him that the appeal herein should be allowed, for the reasons stated by him, and I wish to add only some brief comments.

2.      As stated by Noonan J. (at para. 1 of his judgment), a central issue that arises in this case, which involves a claim of sexual abuse on the part of the plaintiff's father, appears, perhaps surprisingly, not to have been directly considered before.  This issue is whether a defendant, who seeks to have a claim dismissed for delay, pursuant to the "interests of justice" strand of inherent jurisdiction, can succeed in doing so where the delay complained of has been allegedly caused by the wrongdoing of that defendant?

3.      Firstly, approaching the issue from first principles, I agree with Noonan J. (at para. 95) that it cannot be correct in principle to hold that where the wrongdoing of the defendant has allegedly resulted in a delay by the plaintiff in bringing a claim, the defendant is then entitled to rely on that delay to have the claim dismissed.  As Noonan J. states, it is difficult to see how such an approach could be regarded as fair or just. 

4.      Secondly, the outcome of the approach from first principles by Noonan J. finds strong support in the case law, as summarised by Noonan J. at paras. 87 - 93  of his judgment.  It is noticeable that in O'Domhnaill v. Merrick [1984] I.R. 151 itself, Henchy J. referred (at 158) specifically to a defendant "who has not in any material or substantial way contributed to the delay", and there was similar emphasis on the relevance of the defendant's conduct in Toal v. Duignan (No. 1) [1991] ILRM 135 and in Manning v. Benson & Hedges Limited [2004] 3 IR 556. 

5.      It is necessary, however, to consider in particular one passage from the judgment of Clarke J. (as he then was) in Nash v. DPP [2015] IESC 32, given that the trial judge herein appears to have relied on this passage to reject the plaintiff's contention that his proceedings could not be dismissed on delay grounds, if the delay was occasioned by an impediment resulting from the defendant's alleged culpable behaviour. At para. 2.19(b) of his judgment, Clarke J. stated that in order in order that a trial on the merits not proceed, it is necessary that there be a sufficiently weighty countervailing factor involving important constitutional rights which, in the circumstances of the case, outweigh the constitutional imperative for a trial on the merits.  He then continued as follows:

"(c) In the context of lapse of time the countervailing factor may, if sufficiently weighty in the circumstances of the case, be one of:

...

(ii)        a lapse of time which irrespective of whether blame can be attached to any person, has rendered it impossible that a true trial on the merits can be conducted and has, therefore, placed whatever controversy might have been the subject of the trial beyond the reach of fair litigation...".

6.      I agree with the interpretation of the words above as suggested by Noonan J. (at paras. 108 and 109 of his judgment).  Furthermore, I used almost identical language at para. 76 of my own judgment in IBRC v. Fingleton [2024] IESC 59 ("Fingleton"), when I referred to the requirement for a defendant to establish that it will not be possible to have a fair trial because of the lapse of time, "irrespective of whether blame can be attached to any person". 

7.      In using the words quoted above, I was simply stating that the lapse of time jurisdiction could arise in principle regardless of the absence of any blame attaching to any party, and in particular without any blame attaching to the plaintiff, as was common case in Fingleton itself.  I was not suggesting that culpability on the part of the defendant is irrelevant in such circumstances, and any such suggestion would run contrary to the authorities mentioned above, which authorities were also cited in my judgment in Fingleton. 

8.      Finally, I also agree with the important finding of Noonan J. (at para. 129) that, in an application of this nature, as with other applications for summary dismissal, the Court must take the plaintiff's case at its height.  This includes the medical evidence provided by the plaintiff to say that he was unable to pursue this claim before 2017, because of the impairment caused by the abuse complained of. 

9.      As this judgment is delivered electronically, Burns J. has authorised me to record her agreement with it.